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Given the complexity of inclusive business (IB) to combine social contribution and business sustainability, companies make strategic choices. One multinational corporation (MNC) avoided interconnections with villagers and used only market-based relations with stimulants and incentives in the market. Another one delegated management completely to local partners, succeeding in stimulating the poor’s self-initiated economic activities. MNCs seem to have difficulties in handling institutional interconnections. In such cases, market-based relations or delegating management to the local partners were found to be highly effective for covering missing capabilities. One foreign NGO, despite its well-developed institutional interconnections with the locals, is struggling to develop markets for its social enterprises. In contrast, one local trust successfully cooperated with many local partners, appealing to local institutions (values and beliefs). Also, poor farmers felt the social contributions of two local companies by being incorporated into the companies’ supply chains backed by their corporate social responsibility (CSR) orientations and activities. Hence, both foreign and domestic organizations seem to succeed in IB by embedding their projects to their original institutions and developing diverse mechanisms to compensate for missing capabilities. One exception is a local company which successfully coordinated MNCs’ CSR activities, local communities, and governments. However, its success is owing to governmental regulation for CSR contribution. In general, though restricted by institutional backgrounds and business orientations, each case tried to create a fit between business models and its contingencies, achieve scale (at the level of communities, nations, or the global market) and business sustainability, and generate socioeconomic effects.

Cross-boundary cooperation with shared goals and values involving the poor has been argued as an indispensable means for inclusive business (IB) success. Cooperation may become dynamic, especially when exploratory and creative attempts with effective cooperative learning among partners can be realized. Even so, not many companies have reported successful in building the cooperation. One case, providing clean, affordable drinking water to the poor in Tanzanian rural villages, suggests that a delegated and grassroots-based approach in cooperation with a highly trustworthy local partner can successfully promote cooperative learning and transfer know-how in both operations and management. This approach also stimulates local and self-initiated activities for expanding water facilities and generating local businesses in an area where employment is scarce. Deviation from mainstream-institution-based operations and management is one example of institutional interconnections that enable the rural poor to self-manage projects and stimulate self-initiated business activities, consequently contributing to rural development and sustainable development goals.

The importance of reliable and well‐developed infrastructure for the development of any nation hardly needs to be emphasized. Efficient transport, reliable energy, safe drinking water and modern telecommunication systems are all critical to attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), expanding international trade, achieving long‐term investment and growth, and ultimately ensuring social development of the population. Although globalization was expected to ensure that global capital markets, which have the depth, maturity, size and sophistication to fund all viable investments would ease financing of infrastructure projects, this has not happened and demand for infrastructure, particularly in the developing countries has remained acute. This paper reviews the financing of infrastructure projects and based on historical trends it argues that construction industries need to take more active part in the financing of infrastructure projects as a strategy for their own development. It concludes by emphasizing the importance of putting infrastructure industries on commercial footing as a prerequisite to financing them.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

This article is concerned with “internal” corporate governance i.e. corporate governance within the firm – in particular the delegation of decision‐making powers from the parent company board to the boards of divisions and subsidiaries. In fast‐moving businesses, companies must respond quickly to changes in technologies and markets and with this in mind international businesses are tending to delegate substantial discretion to the boards and management teams of subsidiaries. In researching divisionalized companies in financial services, electronics and process manufacturing the author discovered that much of the business was carried on among subsidiaries through a network of contracts and the resources which were held at the center were often made available to subsidiaries through license agreements. Such complex arrangements present parent boards with difficult issues which must be resolved if their companies are to act entrepreneurially. For example: what powers should be reserved for the parent board and what decisions should be delegated to subsidiary boards? Also should subsidiary companies have autonomous boards with independent non‐executive directors?

The purpose of the chapter is to develop and substantiate the necessity for delegating authorities in the process of decision making in modern business systems, as well as conditions, principles, and criteria of successful delegation in view of the applied approach. The methodology of the chapter is based on the method of analysis of causal connections, which is used for determining the necessity and essence of delegation, evaluating and comparison of the possible concepts and means of its implementation in the process of decision making, and studying the managers' opinions for determining the problems of delegation. This allows determining the conditions and criteria of successful delegation and developing an optimal set of principles that allow for effective implementation of the process of delegating authorities. As a result, the authors determine conditions and limitations that determine the possibility of delegating authorities in the process of decision making and offer criteria of successfulness of the process: preliminary task setting, interest and readiness of employees, briefing, written form of delegating authorities for complex and responsible tasks, accessibility of any necessary information, support from manager, and controllability of the process and result. The concepts of delegation are studied, and priority of its new model is established. Based on this, 11 principles of successful delegation were formulated: determination of goal, certainty, parity of rights and responsibility, adequate support, motivation of effective solutions, participation, “finite character,” structural limitations, complex nature of tasks, succession, and vision of perspective.

Complexities of the process of delegation in the process of decision making in business systems are described – their knowledge helps developing own styles of delegation and improving it.

The early-stage venture capital (VC) industry has long been dominated by small firms comprising senior venture capitalists and few junior staff. However, during the late 1990s, a group of firms changed their internal structures, adopting pyramidal structures and redesigning internal processes to leverage the efforts of junior staff. In doing so, they followed first-movers in other professional services industries that transitioned to pyramidal models in the 20th century. Has the recent industry downturn terminated the transition, or simply delayed it? This chapter analyzes the events that led the VC firms to transition, the barriers to doing so, and related issues affecting the industry's future.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The paper aims to rethink empirical models and theory used in explaining banks and financial institutions (FIs) and to enhance the process of theory construction. This is a provisional response to Colander et al. (2009) and Gendron and Smith-Lacroix’s (2013) call for a new approach to developing theory for finance and FIs.

An embryonic “behavioural theory of the financial firm” (BTFF) is outlined based on field research about banks and FI firms and relevant literature. The paper explores “conceptual connections” between BTFF and traditional finance theory ideas of financial intermediation. It does not seek to “integrate” finance theory and alternative theory in “meta theory” and has a more modest aim to improve theory content through “connections”.

The “conceptual connections” provide a means to develop ideas proposed by Scholtens and van Wensveen (2003). They are part of a “house with windows” intended to provide systematic means to “take data from the outside world” whilst continuously recognising “the complexities of the context” (Keasey and Hudson, 2007) to both challenge and build the core ideas of FT.

The BTFF is a means to create “conversations” between academics, practitioners and regulators to aid theory construction. This can overcome the limitations of such an embryonic theory.

The ideas developed create new opportunities to develop finance theory, propose changes in banks and FIs and suggest changes in the focus of regulation.

Regulators can use the expanded conceptual framework to encourage theory development and to enhance accountability of banks and FIs to citizens.

Despite its strategic importance, researchers have given little attention to when CEOs are willing to delegate decisions to top management team members. Prior studies and conventional wisdom suggest that CEOs will be more willing to delegate in times of good performance. Drawing from prospect theory, we suggest an alternative view: that CEOs will be risk‐averse and, therefore, less willing to delegate when their firms have performed well. Our findings provide support for both perspectives.