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At the same time, new military and political factors have emerged, which determine the strategy of the Russian defense industry, rates of its development, and change of the structure. On February 8, of the current year, the chief of Pentagon, R. Gates spoke at a session of the Committee for the Armed Forces of the Chamber of Representatives of the Congress, declaring that USA should be ready to possible military conflicts with other countries including Russia and China: “We need the whole spectrum of war facilities for army involving conflicts, since we do not know what could happen in such places as Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and other.”¹ As a result, the USA military policy is encircling Russia with antimissile defense systems. They are supposed to install a powerful radar in the Czech Republic and shaft-basing missiles in Poland. A superpowerful floating radar is to be transferred from Hawaii islands to Aleut islands, etc. Thus, the whole territory of Russia will be surrounded with radar-missile complexes. These activities will produce an increased attention to elaboration and manufacturing of constituents of the antimissile defense system and by-pass systems, possible withdrawal from the Treaty on conventional weapons in Europe and the Treaty on medium-range strategic missiles etc., which may change the direction and paces of development of the defense industry.

Military technology is traditionally shrouded in secrecy. Even joint research between allies can be a marriage of convenience. But with the end of the Cold War and greater European integration, the technological landscape is changing, and a closer interface is emerging between military and civilian technologies. A worldwide stagnation in defence spending is accelerating the take‐up of commercial off‐the‐shelf technologies, while in the aerospace sector, the factors of safety and the environment are becoming at least as important as cost.

This article presents an analysis of some particular aspects of European public opinion with respect to defence and security issues under the threat of international terrorism after September 11, 2001.

It is based on secondary data analysis from standard EUROBAROMETER surveys, Candidate Countries EUROBAROMETER surveys and Flash EUROBAROMETER surveys carried out in 2000–2006.

The analysis shows that there is an increase in the level of anxiety across European public opinion in the ‘Age of the War on Terror’ related to international terrorism and proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

The existing divergence in the threat perception in Western and Eastern parts of Europe in the first years following the end of the Cold War significantly diminished after September 11, 2001, is based on the common perception of the threat from international terrorism.

The technology of so‐called new public management (NPM) in the UK encompasses a broad range of approaches to the reform of public services based loosely around notions of downsizing the State, cost‐cutting, marketisation, competition and emphasis on the reform of accounting within the Government. NPM has been utilised in the reform of the old public sector science and technology laboratories. This paper sets out the reasons why the provision of science and technology services may be a discrete area of public service, not necessarily amenable to NPM. It then charts the development of policy and practice in this area, using actual examples of agencification and privatisation. Finally it offers a tentative evaluation of the manifestations of NPM in this area concentrating on ownership, control and accountability; markets and customers; and financial costs and rewards.

The European Union (EU) is one of the most notable examples of economic cooperation and integration in international politics. However, it is difficult to argue that a similar stance prevails in politics and security. Although the EU made various advances and took institutional steps, particularly in the fields of defense and security during the Cold War, it acted on North Atlantic Treaty Organization's axis/with North Atlantic Treaty Organization throughout this period. During the post-Cold War period, the EU made concerted efforts to develop more independent defense and security policies. A similar determination, however, was not seen in terms of the reflections of these activities in practice. The diversity of the EU's issues, on the one hand, and the periodic divergence of interests between Atlanticist and Europeanist countries, on the other hand, posed barriers to acting on a single platform. At the same time, the United Kingdom's exit from the EU has resulted in the establishment of new defense and security balances. Nonetheless, the EU's efforts to develop an autonomous security policy persist. Among these initiatives is Permanent Structured Cooperation, which has recently been noted. Although debates on the effects of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's existence in the twenty-first century in their own context reflect a separate dimension, it does not appear plausible to foresee that the EU will have a wholly separate security perspective from North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the near future. Taking into account the relevant general framework, this study discusses the historical backdrop of the EU's security and defense strategy, new developments in the post-Cold War period, and projections for the future of transatlantic relations.

I. The Gendarmerie: Historical Background The Gendarmerie is the senior unit of the French Armed Forces. It is, however, difficult to give a precise date to its creation. What can be asserted is that as early as the Eleventh Century special units existed under the sénéchal (seneschal), an official of the King's household who was entrusted with the administration of military justice and the command of the army. The seneschal's assistants were armed men known as sergents d'armes (sergeants at arms). In time, the office of the seneschal was replaced by that of the connétable (constable) who was originally the head groom of the King's stables, but who became the principal officer of the early French kings before rising to become commander‐in‐chief of the army in 1218. The connétable's second in command was the maréchal (marshal). Eventually, the number of marshals grew and they were empowered to administer justice among the soldiery and the camp followers in wartime, a task which fully absorbed them throughout the Hundred Years War (1337–1453). The corps of marshals was then known as the maréchaussée (marshalcy) and its members as sergeants and provosts. One of the provosts, Le Gallois de Fougières, was killed at Agincourt in 1415; his ashes were transferred to the national memorial to the Gendarmerie, which was erected at Versailles in 1946.

Although the state of Israel is a democracy, military censorship has been in use since its establishment in 1948 and is still imposed. The chapter analyzes the theoretical and practical grounds for military censorship in Israel based on an agreement between relevant parties: the government, the army, the media, and the public. Analysis of Israeli military censorship reveals that military censorship is not necessarily the enemy of the media and the public's right to know. On the contrary and paradoxically, we show that in Israel's case, military censorship not only performs its task of preventing the publication of information that threatens the national security, at times it sustains the country's freedom of the press, freedom of information, and the public's right to know.

The purpose of this investigation was to look at three organisations (a naval shore establishment, a police academy, and a small, family‐owned engineering firm) and see to what extent they had developed a culture that was both ethically and socially responsive.

The investigation was carried out by speaking to key players, observing their organisations and by detailed analysis of the documents which related to this study.

The findings revealed that the Navy has a set of values (HHCIL) which overlap with the more general values of the Department of Defence (imPLICIT). The Western Australian Police Service has an approach to developing an ethical corporate culture which includes the establishment of a dedicated unit, and running discussion groups and seminars. The family‐owned and operated engineering business relies more heavily on an indirect approach based on following traditional family values.

Pursuing the topic of what makes a just war, particularly in today's political climate, was one possibility for further research. There were limitations to the study; these were mainly due to issues of confidentiality and in broaching sensitive topics to both Navy and Police senior officers.

Three conditions were essential for developing an ethical corporate culture: CEOs were ultimately responsible for the ethicality of their organisations; formal training programs were necessary to impart the required knowledge; and formal mechanisms were essential to facilitate the reporting of any behaviour of organisational members that was deemed to be wrong, unethical or illegal.