Search results

In light of the recent 1MDB Scandal in Singapore, this research paper aims to examine the deterrent effect of Singapore’s sanctions against money laundering within financial institutions.

Case laws and legislations are examined as are relevant reports by regulators.

Singapore’s anti-money laundering (AML) regimes may not act as an effective deterrent against money laundering activities within financial institutions. This is due to the overreliance on the theory of deterrence-based thinking, the lack of an “enforcement pyramid” and economic factors which influence regulators to be lenient towards financial institutions.

There are limited data available in relation to regulators in Singapore and the prevalence of money laundering activities within Singapore’s financial institution. Any discussions within this article is based on the impressionistic observations of this author, which may not reflect the true state of affairs in Singapore.

Those who are interested in examining the relationship between money laundering and the deterrent effect of sanctions against financial institutions will have an interest in this topic.

The value of the paper is to demonstrate that Singapore’s AML regimes may not act as an effective deterrence against money laundering activities within financial institutions.

Perceptions about the frequency of misconduct – among the public, academics and even regulators – have largely been formed by examining enforcement statistics, which rely on the detection and sanctioning of the misconduct. This study aims to illuminate the real occurrence of corporate misconduct, much of which escapes public detection.

By examining confidential firm records describing misconduct within organizations, the author shows that public enforcement statistics significantly underestimate the amount of serious malfeasance that arises within firms.

Through analyzing records for several large multinational firms, the author finds that there are, on average, more than two instances of internally substantiated misconduct per week per firm.

Ultimately, this analysis illustrates the challenge of addressing corporate malfeasance within large organizations.

Collateral consequences (CCs) of criminal convictions such as disenfranchisement, occupational restrictions, exclusions from public housing, and loss of welfare benefits represent one of the salient yet hidden features of the contemporary American penal state. This chapter explores, from a comparative and historical perspective, the rise of the many indirect “regulatory” sanctions flowing from a conviction and discusses some of the unique challenges they pose for legal and policy reform. US jurisprudence and policies are contrasted with the more stringent approach adopted by European legal systems and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in safeguarding the often blurred line between criminal punishments and formally civil sanctions. The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to contribute to a better understanding of the overreliance of the US criminal justice systems on CCs as a device of social exclusion and control, and (2) to put forward constructive and viable reform proposals aimed at reinventing the role and operation of collateral restrictions flowing from criminal convictions.

In a high‐profile case that first drew big media headlines last February, a New York brokerage firm and a ring of eight brokers on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange were charged with perpetrating a scheme in which they made over $11.1m in illegal profits and at the same time covered their tracks with an elaborate fraud.

The purpose of this study is to assess whether level of income of a particular country affects the level of effectiveness in anti-money laundering (AML)/ countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) supervision to identify the most important recommendations in achieving high level of effectiveness and critically discuss the findings of the fourth round evaluations with the outcome of first two objectives.

The level of effectiveness was rated in terms of a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high, 3 for substantial, 2 for moderate and 1 for low level of effectiveness. The countries were ranked using a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high income, 3 for upper middle income, 2 for lower middle income and 1 for low income countries as per the categorisation of World Bank list of economies (World Bank, 2017). For the purpose of estimation, level of effectiveness was rated in terms of a four-point Likert scale given 4 for high, 3 for substantial, 2 for moderate and 1 for low level of effectiveness. The level of technical compliance was ranked using a five-point Likert scale given 5 for compliant, 4 for largely compliant, 3 for partially compliant, 2 for non-compliant and 1 for not applicable as per the ratings given in FATF 2013 methodology (FATF, 2013).

It was observed that the level of income of a particular jurisdiction has a positive relationship with the level of effectiveness in AML/CFT supervision. Statistical analysis reveal that AML/CFT framework on regulation and supervision of financial institutions (Recommendation 26) and providing guidance and feed back to reporting entities (Recommendation 34) have significant impact on effectiveness level on AML/CFT supervision over the powers of supervisors (Recommendation 27), regulation and supervision of designated non-financial business and professions (Recommendation 28) and sanctions (Recommendation 35).

The research was limited to 36 fourth round mutual evaluation reports.

This paper is an original work done by the author as a result of the experience which the author received involving as an assessor in mutual evaluations.

A growing body of work suggests that welfare and punishment should be understood as alternative, yet interconnected ways of governing poor and marginalized populations. While there is considerable evidence of a punitive turn in welfare and penal institutions over the past half century, recent studies show that welfare and carceral institutions increasingly comanage millions of people caught at the intersection of the welfare and penal sectors. The growth of “mass supervision” and the expansion of the social services sector help explain the blurring of welfare and punishment in the United States in daily practice. We suggest that these developments complicate the idea of an institutional trade-off and contend that welfare and punishment are best understood along a continuum of state management in which poor and socially marginalized populations are subjected to varying degrees of support, surveillance, and sanction. In presenting the punishment–welfare continuum, we pay particular attention to the “murky middle” between the two spheres: an interinstitutional space that has emerged in the context of mass supervision and a social services–centric safety net. We show that people caught in the “murky middle” receive some social supports and services, but also face pervasive surveillance and control and must adapt to the tangle of obligations and requirements in ways that both extend punishment and limit their ability to successfully participate in mainstream institutions.

Evaluates the effects of shipwrecks and peoples’ reactions following them, with regard to their feelings of preventability on someone’s part. In particular to the Erika in 1989, and the Prestige in 2002. The European Union (EU), which theretofore seemed to be neglecting maritime safety appears to have developed a maritime culture. The EU seems to have adopted the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) attitude regarding safety protocols, which must be a right and proper thing to do. Concludes that shipping has needed, and is now receiving, a proactive approach with regard to safety from the EU which should limit, as far as possible, disasters of both a human and ecological kind for the maritime world.

During the 1990s, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) instituted a policy of arresting and detaining people for minor offenses that occur in public as part of their quality‐of‐life (QOL) policing initiative. The purpose of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of the current policy and compare it with possible alternatives including: arrest and issuing of a desk appearance ticket (DAT); issuing of a non‐criminal citation (violation); street warnings; and toleration of public marijuana smoking.

The paper reviews several studies of QOL policing and examines the pros and cons of the current NYPD policy, compared to possible alternatives.

The number of NYPD arrests for marijuana in public view (MPV) (with most detained for one or two days) increased from 3,000 in 1994 to over 50,000 in 2000, and have been about 30,000 in the mid‐2000s. Most of these arrestees (84 percent) were minority; Blacks were 2.7 more likely and Hispanics 1.8 times more likely to be detained than Whites for an MPV arrest. Minorities received more severe dispositions, even controlling for demographics and prior arrest histories.

The paper recommends that the NYPD change to routinely issuing DATs to reduce detention for marijuana violators. Drug policy reformers might wish to further pursue changing statutes regarding smoking MPV into a violation (non‐criminal) or encourage the wider use of street warnings, as in Britain. Any of these policy changes would help reduce the number detained and the disproportionate burden on minorities associated with the current arrest and detention policy. These policies could help maintain civic norms against smoking marijuana in public.

Since 2008-2009, the governments in France and Great Britain have encouraged more rigorous penalization of tax evaders. This paper aims to investigate the implementation of these policies on the basis of an important and original empirical material.

The study done in France relies on interviews conducted with representatives of law enforcement agencies on public statistics and on an innovative database compiled from nearly 600 cases submitted to the judiciary. The comparison with Great Britain is developed through interviews conducted with different participants in the fight against tax fraud and statistical information.

This paper describes the recent evolution of the machinery for screening tax-related wrongdoings in France and in the UK. It demonstrates that whilst publicly calling for harsh punishment against tax dodgers, in practice, both governments tend to seek a balance between the growing demand for tax equality and the belief that the State should not intervene in the economic realm. This strategy leads to the over-representation of certain categories of taxpayers. Despite the commonalities resulting from the numerous filters before prosecution, the penal strategy takes on two different shapes on either side of the Channel: whereas the British institutions support an “exemplary punitive” system, French regulatory system favours a “quasi-administrative” treatment. The French tax authority continues to use the criminal procedures mainly as a financial instrument for the improved restitution of stolen taxes. The policy of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, supported by the “Sentencing Guidelines”, aims much more at obtaining exemplary convictions.

Based on a large empirical material, this paper highlights the different outcomes of the criminal trials against tax evaders in the two countries.