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The purpose of this study is to examine public perceptions and attitudes toward using artificial intelligence (AI) in the US criminal justice system.

The authors took a quantitative approach and administered an online survey using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. The instrument was developed by integrating prior literature to create multiple scales for measuring public perceptions and attitudes.

The findings suggest that despite the various attempts, there are still significant perceptions of sociodemographic bias in the criminal justice system and technology alone cannot alleviate them. However, AI can assist judges in making fairer and more objective decisions by using triangulation – offering additional data points to offset individual biases.

Other scholars can build upon the findings and extend the work to shed more light on some problems of growing concern for society – bias and inequality in criminal sentencing. AI can be a valuable tool to assist judges in the decision-making process by offering diverse viewpoints. Furthermore, the authors bridge the gap between the fields of technology and criminal justice and demonstrate how the two can be successfully integrated for the benefit of society.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is among the first studies to examine a complex societal problem like the introduction of technology in a high-stakes environment – the US criminal justice system. Understanding how AI is perceived by society is necessary to develop more transparent and unbiased algorithms for assisting judges in making fair and equitable sentencing decisions. In addition, the authors developed and validated a new scale that can be used to further examine this novel approach to criminal sentencing in the future.

In the last 10 years, India has amended its laws dealing with sexual offences against women with the changes ranging from increasing terms of imprisonment for the offence of rape to state-funded compensation schemes for women and child victims. In this regard, challenges persist for the agencies of the criminal justice system in India especially the courts to realise the vision of restorative justice as these forums have to navigate the relevant statutory provisions and binding precedents. This chapter seeks to analyse the challenges faced by courts in proper reintegration of victims and offenders of sexual offences, the institutional responses of the courts and suggests reforms to the criminal justice system in India in consonance with the principles of restorative justice acknowledged in the restorative justice movement in the international discourse.

Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are the tool of choice for federal prosecutors when adjudicating corporate misconduct. A DPA is a negotiation that permits the allegedly guilty party from undergoing a criminal trial if they avoid committing further wrongdoing for a specified period. This paper aims to examine whether DPAs are a beneficial mechanism for the criminal justice system to use while adjudicating corporate misconduct. By conducting in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews with 24 practitioners in the legal field and white-collar crime experts, this study identifies the shortcomings and advantages of DPAs and highlights what policy enactments might enhance their application. The study contributes to the existing literature by expanding the narratives used by judicial officials, legal practitioners and white-collar crime scholars on the role of DPAs.

The current study is an in-depth qualitative analysis that explores judicial actors’ and white-collar crime scholars’ opinions on the adoption of DPAs to adjudicate corporate misconduct. The literature on DPAs is currently derived primarily from law and literature reviews published by legal scholars. Clandestine negotiations are not accessible to the public and are frequently kept in sealed files unless a breach of contract occurs, resulting in the case proceeding to trial. Hence, a qualitative analysis is the best approach to evaluate the effectiveness of DPAs. Further, little evidence is available that focuses on the opinions of professionals who have participated in these agreements. The interviews were conducted over Zoom and lasted an average of 43 min, with the longest interview spanning 1 h and 45 min and the shortest interview being 14 minutes. A non-probability sampling method – specifically, snowball sampling – was used to generate a total sample of 24 legal professionals and white-collar crime scholars. Initial participants were found by contacting law offices specializing in white-collar crime litigation and using current networks to attain access to a broader range of participants. Then, 19 participants provided referrals throughout the study. The final sample consisted of nine government officials, eight legal practitioners and seven white-collar crime academics experts. One of the government official interviews was excluded from the final research project due to a lack of expertise in the field of white-collar crime. The interview questions were designed to promote in-depth conversation and insight into personal opinions on the adoption of DPAs. Several inquiries highlighted whether DPAs are an appropriate response to corporate misconduct and whether they reduced recidivism through their intended deterrent effect. Furthermore, several descriptive questions sought to understand which criminal justice actors support the adoption of DPAs in white-collar crime cases and why. Coding of the data was first conducted individually by each author. The researchers then compared thematic findings that reflected consensus.

An immediate theme identifiable in the research is the intrinsic value that DPAs offer in adjudicating corporate wrongdoing. As indicated by a participant, corporate misconduct is not “black or white,” stressing the importance of prosecutors having a middle ground between criminal prosecution and the dismissal of charges. A judicial official indicated that “DPAs are another essential arrow in a prosecutor’s quiver – and something a defense attorney can bargain for” (Respondent 5). Seven government officials and legal practitioners noted that you are unable to send a corporation to jail, and you do not simply want to put them out of business; thus, a DPA is the only tool in which the government can mandate structural change in a company without dismantling the entire entity. Only three academics concurred with the government officials and legal practitioners that DPAs are beneficial and offer prosecutors a vital middle ground. One academic, for example, stated that “DPAs have given U.S Attorney offices that ability to be involved for a considerable amount of time in a company's business, while simultaneously promoting change within the entity” (Respondent 14). Additionally, DPAs ensure that corporations are held criminally liable without triggering an endless cycle of collateral consequences for innocent third parties. One legal practitioner, for example, stated: “Just look at the Enron case; they charged Arthur Andersen with obstruction of justice and dismantled the entire entity they made it where the business was never going to come back. A small subset of individuals, in this case, should have been held responsible but instead, hundreds and if not thousands of people were harmed. With this in mind, DPAs are extremely important, in that it limits collateral consequences because DPAs take a more holistic view that criminal prosecution does not consider” (Respondent 21). Another respondent highlighted that “DPAs are the only tool available that can be employed to change an entire organization structurally” (Respondent 20). Ultimately, the findings suggest that there is a consensus among respondents that DPAs are an appropriate response to corporate misconduct, particularly when the agreement stipulates that a company must hire an external compliance monitor and update their current compliance system. Overall, participants emphasized that these stipulations promote a sense of corporate accountability, provide for the dismissal of guilty employees and mandate structural change. The majority of the respondents (n = 20) insisted that DPAs are advantageous, yet a subset of participants were skeptical of their use in white-collar crime prosecutions. One legal practitioner, for example, noted that “DPAs are political creatures that are awarded as political favors to the largest of corporations that our economy relies upon” (Respondent 17). Another government official confirmed this statement, indicating that “DPAs are a mere slap on the wrist for large corporations – they simply see it as doing business” (Respondent 6). Four academic participants emphasized that DPAs are typically negotiated with multi-level corporations and are not extended to the small businesses that suffer the dire consequences of criminal prosecution. One academic, for instance, stressed that “the question becomes is it fairly applied and being implemented properly. Larger companies are more likely to receive and benefit from a DPA, thus, raising the question of fairness” (Respondent 12). Another academic who was previously a government official stated: “DPAs risk abuse – there have been several instances where prosecutors have forced companies to donate money to favored charities and overstepped their powers. Sometimes DPAs also come with monitors. For example, banks typically have to pay for the auditor, and it becomes extremely intrusive, and it it not clear that they are efficient.”

Several limitations exist in this research. First, it is not a comprehensive study that is representative of the larger population, which limits generalizability. Given the contention of research on DPAs, this qualitative research contributes to the literature, and its findings are likely transferable to multiple settings in which DPAs are used. Second, DPAs are processed and drafted differently across jurisdictions; thus, comparing DPAs across state levels and among departments in the federal government would be equivalent to comparing apples to oranges. This comparison is yet another limitation to the study because criminal justice practitioners operate in both the state and federal jurisdictions. Another challenge in the current study and something that likely will be a problem for future researchers is the difficulty of gaining access to experts in an exclusive field of criminal justice, such as federal prosecutors, Department of Justice officials, federal judges and elite corporate defense attorneys. Ultimately, several obstacles arose during the study, particularly when recruiting participants to gain a large enough sample size to conduct meaningful analysis. This resulted in smaller sample size but rich, in-depth data that achieved saturation among participants.

Several policy implications are identifiable. First, it appears that DPAs are a mainstay of white-collar crime prosecution. No participants advocate for their complete removal from the prosecution process. Participants highlight that DPAs occupy an essential middle-ground between dismissal and criminal charges. Without this mechanism, prosecution would be impeded, and holding corporate criminal actors liable would increasingly become formidable. Although it appears that the system cannot function without DPAs, several respondents emphasize that we must begin to hold individuals accountable alongside corporations. Another policy implication that a minority of participants mentioned within the study involves ensuring that our compliance monitoring system operates appropriately. A majority of participants note that the overarching stipulation that promotes structural change within an organization is adopting a functioning compliance monitoring system, thus, emphasizing the importance of this process operating smoothly and ethically. The selection of an independent compliance monitor may be problematic. For example, a former government compliance monitor notes that not all monitors are experts in the field they are overseeing. A pharmaceutical expert, for example, may be attempting to regulate an automotive organization, which may present unique challenges. An agency of federal professionals dedicated to supervising specific industries such as automotive, pharmaceutical and financial would ensure that organizations are actually implementing the terms of the DPA.

Ultimately, the current research highlights the necessity of empirically studying the benefits and drawbacks of such agreements. Future research on the topic remains onerous due to the scarcity of a centralized database that contains extensive details of DPAs. The present study suggests that the verdict on DPAs is undecided, with more than half of the study's criminal justice professionals advocating for their continued and even increased use. However, about half of the participants, particularly academics, called attention to the agreements’ potential bias. The disagreement among participants is most contentious in the consideration of a DPA centralized database which would immensely aid future research and policy advancements.

This chapter examines the nexus between women's experiences of domestic abuse and their subsequent violent offending, as viewed through the lens of keyworkers in a women-only charity. The role of female subjectivity, stereotypes of femininity and the gendering of behaviours is discussed, alongside an exploration of the paradox of the female ‘victim-offender’. Qualitative semi-structured interviews with the keyworkers, drawing on the author's experience of working in the system, enable individual voices to be captured in detail, resulting in a rich narrative piece. This is analysed thematically and framed conceptually by the work of Judith Butler on gender performativity and precarious existence, and Jessica Benjamin on the ‘Third’ and the potential of recognition to transcend the experience of gendered violence. The discussions lead to the conclusion that the keyworkers' attention to interpellatory dynamics and intersubjectivity effects powerful individual change. However, the impact of this is limited, as the criminal justice system itself acts as Benjamin's ‘moral Third’, maintaining its status quo of inequality and gendered violence through patriarchal attitudes and a corresponding language of exclusion.

This chapter examines the relationship between neocolonialism, neoliberalism and the overrepresentation of Indigenous women and girls in Canada's criminal justice system. Indigenous women are 60% more likely to be convicted of violent offences than non-Indigenous women and they make up 42% of all federally sentenced women – while First Nations people represent approximately 5% of the total Canadian population. With an abolition feminist and decolonial theoretical framework, we argue that even when Indigenous women do commit violent crimes, their criminalisation is contingent on the legacy of colonialism. This includes the ongoing genocide against Indigenous women and girls and a neoliberal criminal justice system that reproduces gendered racial state violence and perpetrates the portrayal of stereotypes about Indigenous women, rendering them as inherently violent and ‘risky’. We examine why and how such a disproportionate number of Indigenous women end up involved in cycles of violence, with subsequent disputes with the law. This chapter advances the field of feminist criminology by building on feminist analyses of penal abolition to critique global neoliberalism and the interlocking systems that sustain the ongoing violence in which First Nations women and girls are involved.

The development of electronic monitoring policy over the last decade in Scotland has contributed towards its expansion and the intensification of what McNeill (2019) refers to as mass supervision. Often posited as a solution to relieve problems in the criminal justice system such as prison overcrowding and high remand populations, electronic monitoring can be punitive and problematic, exposing more people to diffused forms of social control and functioning more as a supplementary feature of prisons as opposed to a substitution for prisons. In this chapter, I explore the existing and emerging policy landscape of penal electronic monitoring Scotland, drawing upon qualitative, experiential data about being subject to and enforcing penal electronic monitoring in Scotland (see Casey, 2021) to highlight how policy is enacted in practice. Ultimately, I argue that there are fundamental issues with how electronic monitoring is currently enacted in terms of what it promises, in terms of fairness and in relation to the potential harms of integration. I call for a fundamental and holistic reframing of policy and regulation of penal electronic monitoring in Scotland that avoids siloed approaches towards policymaking, attending to both the social and digital impacts of electronic monitoring in people’s lives, thus contributing to arguments about how ‘mass supervision’ should be moderated and resisted.

This paper aims to debate moral and legal dilemma embedded with plea bargaining (PB) and raises a question whether the approach of “PB” is a viable tool to tackle financial crimes and to what extent it contributes in recovery of stolen money. This paper critically examines the concept with reference to relevant laws of the USA, the UK, Pakistan and Nigeria.

This study used legal scholarship, jurisprudence and other open source data to analyze issues in the application of PB as a viable tool in asset recovery and financial crimes.

This paper provides that PB has certain moral and legal dilemma in terms of legality and punishment; the concept offers a sense of escape from criminal punishment by simply return of partial stolen money or “settlement” in exchange of discounted punishment even without imprisonment, thus incentivizing an offender. Further, the concept is unregulated, misapplied especially in developing world like Pakistan and Nigeria, where plea bargain laws are mostly manipulated by white-collar individuals. Therefore, this study recommends the amendment of relevant laws pertaining to PB; construction of “plea bargain handbook” to prevent arbitrariness and misapplication and to ensure transparency in its application; legislations like Speedy Trail Act; creation of “Fast Track-Model Courts” and a balancing system between “settlement” and “deterrence.”

Perspectives on PB are brought to bear from financial crime and malpractice and recovery of stolen money.