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The implementation of a statistical process control (SPC) procedure in the setting up of a crime‐control monitoring system is considered. The SPC system can be viewed as a computer‐aided alarm to trigger corrective action related to crime control. Both implementation procedures and barriers to implemen‐tation are addressed. Four effective strategies are also discussed.

This purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamics of globalisation on the state’s ability to fight crimes. Given the complicated dynamics of the global market influence on crime control and prevention, the paper has analysed the theory of globalisation and how it manifests itself across or within different states. While, it is internationally acclaimed that globalisation has become a fact of life, it needs to be noted that not all countries have been able to harness its benefits. Therefore, globalization has manifested itself differently in different states. This paper examines the dynamics of globalization on sovereign states in the context of their ability to control and prevent crimes, the influence of open border controls, the new crimes typologies, articulating whether modern state approaches are adequate to caution them against contemporary global challenges.

The paper is written drawing on experiences of the UK, the European Union and in other jurisdictions farther afield. I have used a range of secondary data sources such as analysing data in newspaper, journal papers, textbooks and online sources. The paper has also drawn on some of my earlier scholarly work but internalised to suit the purposes for writing it.

This paper finds that unless states first position themselves properly to pervasive global changes and challenges, they risk being continuously sidelined (swamped). Globalisation and its offshoot effects on traditional states approaches have elicited a wide range debates and controversies. The conclusion one draws in the analysis of the global influence in fighting traditional and non-traditional crimes would usually depend on where one stands/leans in contemporary debate on these twin issues.

The study was undertaken using a qualitative research methodology, relying heavily on the analysis of secondary data sources. By the very nature of this methodology, it would have been better to carry out interviews and to gain a first hand experience on issues this paper was written on. This is because qualitative research methodology thrives in a natural setting where the researcher interacts with his/her constituent subjects directly. This would also have mitigated the potential for bias inherent in the use of secondary data sources.

The paper is important in demonstrating that states need to be more proactive to benefit from globalisation and its influences. They cannot afford to be laid back lest they are submerged by pervasive global influences in its various manifestations. The paper has highlighted that relaxing border controls could be bad for states because it has the potential to send wrong signals to dangerous criminals. The state needs to reclaim some of its lost sovereign space to remain relevant in asserting its influence on what happens and does not happen inside its borders.

States have no choice but to come together and forge common interstate initiatives. This will enable them to deal with overlapping global exigences effectively. There is no state (whether it likes or not) that can afford to act unilaterally when it come to overlapping global exigences.

The analysis of the paper is based on contemporary challenges and narratives of globalisation and its influence on crimes control. It is nevertheless written in a distinctive way to foster the objectives of writing it.

The purpose of this paper is to examine public perceptions of police efforts to control crime in South Korea.

The data were gathered from surveys administered to college students in the Seoul-Gyeonggi Province metropolitan area. Logistic regression analyses were performed to assess the impact of gender, fear of crime and perceived risk of victimization on diffuse and specific perceptions of police performance.

The respondents did not view the police favorably. Fewer than half the respondents reported that the police do a good job of controlling drunk driving, approximately a quarter reported that the police do a good job of controlling burglary and investigating homicide and roughly a fifth reported believing that the police effectively control crime. Violent victimization and fear of violent victimization had a significant negative impact on confidence in the police.

The data suggest that informing the public about the low risk of violent victimization and other publicity campaigns designed to reduce fear of violence may foster confidence in the police.

This study identifies subtle similarities and differences in the structure of public perceptions of the police between Eastern and Western nations. Additionally, the data indicate there is a need for greater specificity in measures of public perceptions of the police.

The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate role of penal approach in corporate crime control and to assess if compliance program can be accepted in China, the largest developing country with relatively little regulatory capacity and an immature financial market when compared to developed economies.

Based on the general corporate crime control theory, a perspective from legal culture will be specially followed in studying control instruments.

This paper found that the criminal control approach has its limitations in corporate crime control in China and, therefore, argued that compliance programs are highly consistent with Asian legal cultures. However, unlike many developed economies, compliance programs have not been included in sentencing guidelines yet, which has been left to judges’ discretion.

The concept of compliance as a control instrument has been widely discussed in developed economies. Limited research observes areas such as China, which faces a notable dilemma, i.e. economics has been speedily booming, whereas regulation rules are relatively left behind.

This paper aims to explore the strategy of police harnessing the crime control capacities of third parties and to relate this to problem‐oriented policing.

Harnessing the crime control capacities of third parties requires police to act as effective brokers of public safety by improving the spheres of influence that third parties assert over relevant locations, systems or conditions that facilitate crime. This process is often termed redistribution, leveraging or third‐party policing. Research from the fields of illicit synthetic drug control and regulation is reviewed to highlight a number of key implementation issues.

The term “harnessing capacity” provides a strong conceptual basis by which to analyse police efforts to facilitate the co‐production of public safety, with terms such as third‐party policing being conceptually imprecise. To effectively engage third parties in crime prevention police need to use a range of compliance‐seeking mechanisms. In harnessing the crime control capacity of third parties police need to consider a range of issues: existing deficits in capacity, competency to act against crime, existing incentives to act, and the costs of co‐production.

Relevant implementation challenges are canvassed, as well as issues relating to third parties bearing the costs in return for co‐producing crime prevention.

The paper further expands theory and practical implications related to police harnessing the crime prevention potential of third parties.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the question of whether corruption and economic crime can be controlled in developing economies and whether the cost of doing that can be justified. It also explores the implications of corruption in the development of developing economies.

The paper reviews a range of published articles (1964‐2005), which offer theoretical and empirical research on corruption, economic crime and development. Themes discussed range from; the causes, implications, controls and the cost of controlling economic crime and corruption in developing economies.

Provides a critical analysis of the debate on corruption and economic crime in developing economies. The paper generally concludes that no single institution can be used to control corruption and economic crime and efforts to control these phenomena need to come from multiple fronts. The best way to tackle corruption in developing countries is through sector‐by‐sector control and that efforts to eliminate corruption are unlikely to be entirely successful in developing countries, not even in the developed countries.

The paper reminds developing countries to adopt measures that best suit their local circumstances in setting up anticorruption agencies/institutions while taking into consideration the borderless nature of crime – economic crime and corruption. Policy makers, especially in developing countries should re‐examine both local and international tools for combining economic crime and corruption to ensure development.

Although the paper argues along similar lines with the neo‐liberal approach to combating economic crime and corruption in developing countries, a major departure of this paper is that it proposes the need for a global effort to corruption and economic crime as a result of the increasing borderless nature of crime in this present age of information communication technology.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the violence-reduction effects following an FBI-led gang takedown in South Central Los Angeles.

The time series impact of the intervention was estimated using a Bayesian diffusion-regression state-space model designed to infer a causal effect of an intervention using data from a similar (non-targeted) gang area as a control.

A statistically significant 22 percent reduction in violent crime was observed, a reduction that lasted at least nine months after the interdiction.

The research method does make assumptions about the equivalency of the control area, though statistical checks are employed to confirm the control area crime rate trended similarly to the target area prior to the intervention.

The paper demonstrates a minimum nine-month benefit to a gang takedown in the target area, suggesting that relatively long-term benefits from focused law enforcement activity are possible.

Longer-term crime reduction beyond just the day of the intervention can aid communities struggling with high crime and rampant gang activity.

Few FBI-led gang task force interventions have been studied for their crime reduction benefit at the neighborhood level. This study adds to that limited literature. It also introduces a methodology that can incorporate crime rates from a control area into the analysis, and overcome some limitations imposed by ARIMA modeling.

The number of reported cases for Japanese Penal Code offenses amounted to 2.5 million in 1997 and increased every year, reaching 3.6 million in 2002 and 2003. However, the number decreased from 2004 to 2008 to 2.5 million. Almost throughout the same period, the number of cases and persons cleared remained comparatively steady between 1.3 and 1.5 million and 1 and 1.2 million respectively, but the latter finally fell below one million in 2011. In this chapter I describe such a rise and fall as a “Mt. Fuji-line” that appears as a mountain-shaped curve on a graph.

The Japanese government reacted to the increase of crimes, which was seen as a reflection of a weakened or broken security and safety. The most effective policy, it was thought therefore, was to increase the number of policemen. This policy followed the strategy of New York City, made famous by its then Mayor Giuliani, who declared “A War on Crimes” and increased the number of police officers by ten thousand to revive New York from “A Crime City.” As criminologists have experienced so-called “labeling shocks” and learned from the approach of symbolic interactionism, criminologists can no longer simply accept that statistical data reflect weakened or broken security issues. Agencies of criminal justice, especially police officers, use such data as statistical evidence to show that the crime situation got worse.

I argue that the rise and fall of crimes, especially the increasing and decreasing number of reported cases, reflects changes of crime control policies. I analyze the Mt. Fuji-line from 1998 to 2011. The increase of crimes as well as the weakened or broken security and safety functioned as evidence that justified the reinforcement of police power and a new criminal justice shift for a lay judge system in the rising phase (1998–2003). Since the concept of a bigger justice system needs, however, lots of personnel and material sources, the Japanese government eventually gave up sustaining it. Agencies used their discretion to skip petty crimes and divert suspects because of a reduction of excessive burdens and inappropriate prison population, but they stepped into a new stage to adjust their burdens, keeping their own empowered framework of criminal justice system. These changing policies resulted in the reduction of crime in a falling phase (2004–2011).

These phenomena are explained from the viewpoint of Jürgen Habermas’ crisis theory. I conclude that the framework and capacity of the Japanese criminal justice system grew far bigger and that original functions of crime control through criminal procedure became weaker by being outsourced to other peripheral social systems and agencies. Thus the crime control system has been successful in bringing about a net-widening effect.

In Chapter 2, the author will develop the theoretical framework of the sociological analysis of youth delinquency in SEA. The author will introduce the control theory (both self-control and social control), in order to understand under what circumstances youths are more and less likely to behave in a deviant manner. The author will, then, mention the general strain theory, to draw the relationships between the encounters of negative life events, the development of strain, and the disposition to perform delinquency. The author will also, address the cultural deviance and social learning theories that help justify the expression of juvenile delinquency from a sociocultural perspective, alongside pathing the way to explaining how social costs of youth delinquency can be raised by policy amendments in order to mitigate adolescents’ exercises of smoking, drinking and sexual misconduct behaviours. In this chapter, the author will highlight how poverty, the availability of delinquent opportunities, peer influence and pressure, a lack of parental and school socialisation, and deviant social and cultural norms are all risk factors for youth delinquency.