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This paper analyzes the role of trade credit in financial crises. Using newly collected data, we investigate the impact of negotiated agreements between debtor and creditor countries on bilateral trade. Our results indicate that exports to creditor countries rise considerably after debt restructuring agreements in the period 1980–1997, while we find no effect for imports and for the more recent period. We identify trade credit as one key channel behind this positive effect. Apparently, crisis resolution efforts, in particular agreements to extend and roll over trade credits, play a crucial role for export recoveries. This gives some support to current worldwide efforts to sustain trade financing via coordinated policy interventions.

This chapter surveys papers and the related literature on the relationship between banks’ creditor structure and bank risk during the period of liquidity crises. Departing from the conventional banking literature, which points to deteriorating asset quality to be the culprit for the amplified bank risk in the midst of financial crises, the studies in the aftermath of the global financial crisis look into the liability side of the bank balance sheet as a potential source for the augmented bank risk during the financial crisis when there is a liquidity contraction. Recent studies theorize and provide empirical evidence that banking institutions with a greater share of large lenders and an economy with high noncore bank liabilities in the banking sector may experience heightened bank risk or country risk. We also search for policy implications from this survey.

Pledging collateral to secure loans is a prominent feature in financing contracts around the world. Existing theories disagree on why borrowers pledge collateral. It is even more challenging to understand why in some countries collateral coverage exceeds, for example, 300% of the value of a loan. This study looks at the association between collateral coverage and country-level governance and various institutional proxies. It investigates the economic implications of steep collateral coverage and sketches policy options to lower ex-ante asymmetric information and ex-post agency problems. Within this framework, should a lender collect the debt forcibly on default and liquidated assets fetch prices below outstanding loan values, the lender’s loss is covered through credit insurance, which would significantly reduce the need for steep collateral coverage. This proposal may increase level of private credit, investment and growth; particularly, in a number of developing countries where collateral spread is the main inhibitor of finance.

In 1767, did Sir James Steuart predict the political and financial crises that started the French Revolution? Étienne de Sénovert, the editor and translator of Steuart’s work, seems to argue to this effect in the introduction to the first French edition of An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy in 1789. The visionary “prediction” set forth by Steuart was the following: if the king of France had introduced public credit, this would have changed the political balance in French political society, making it very unstable. The English and the French governments used different ways of borrowing money in 1760: the French king contracted debts with a network of financiers close to the government, while the English government borrowed on the credit markets through the intermediary of the Bank of England. The second of these methods constitutes public credit and has proved its efficiency. According to Steuart, implementing the English public credit system in France could have dangerous consequences. Landed interests and moneyed interests would compete for the control of the State. The author realized that the French nobility, the landowners, as a social and economic group would have no chance in facing such a powerful rival (the public creditors). In this chapter, the author analyzes Steuart’s “prediction” as a coherent part of his systematic and original approach to political economy. Steuart’s theories about the role of political economy and the role of “interest” are connected to his understanding of institutions. Introducing such a complex support for the value as public credit might have different consequences in France and England. Steuart thinks each country’s economy should be analyzed according to its own institutional and social context.

Steuart’s work was still relevant in 1789 for two reasons. Firstly, the author’s prediction of political antagonism between capitalists and nobility anticipated the political conflict about debt expressed by pamphleteers such as Sieyès, Mirabeau, and Clavière between 1787 and 1789. This is the context of Étienne de Sénovert’s claim: the political narrative built by the revolutionaries of 1789 (rescuing the “sacred” public debt from royal despotism) fitted Steuart’s prediction. This may have been the incentive for the translation and publication of his work in 1789 and 1790. Secondly, Steuart’s financial and monetary theory was at the heart of the project of financial reform that would lead to the assignats. Steuart’s (1767) theory of public finance and state power in 1789 provides a key to the understanding the events of the time, and to how actors tried to make sense of them. Steuart made another crucial observation about the deep effect of what he called “the modern economy” upon the power of the governments of Europe: even an absolute monarch could not damage public credit without destroying his own sovereignty.

We show why investors may prefer not to be a firm’s unique lender, even if they are in a strong bargaining position. Some firms need additional funds after a first investment: providing additional funds is rational after the first investment is sunk, but together the two investments are unprofitable. A unique lender will always provide additional funds and make losses. Two creditors can commit not always to provide funds: inefficient negotiations over debt forgiveness may end with a project’s liquidation, which is harmful ex post, but helpful ex ante, if it keeps entrepreneurs with nonpromising projects from initially requesting funds.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the possible relation between public policy measures, particularly relating to currency exchange rates, capital flow mechanisms and cross-border insolvency by describing the current state of insolvency regulation in Latin America and some cases that exemplify this public-private dynamic.

The first part of the chapter is based on literature review and content analysis to show the current situation of the regulation of insolvency in Latin America and the evolution of policies shaping the flow of capital and the exchange rates. The second part illustrates the proceedings in selected countries, particularly for Colombia and Venezuela.

The analysis led to the finding that some countries’ policy mechanisms such as in the case of Venezuela might lead to a problem regarding national companies involved in an insolvency proceeding, particularly when the company alleges that public policy in force have changed circumstances leading to the impossibility of paying foreign-located liabilities.

The chapter is based largely on literature review and available data, public legal documents and cases relating public policy and cross-border insolvency; however, insolvency proceedings are not of public domain; thus, there is a large amount of information related with the mentioned cases that remain undisclosed.

This chapter provides a theoretical and practical perspective to analyze cross-border insolvency from a local regulatory framework. It also demonstrates the possible link between public policy and cross-border insolvency.

This study investigates the impacts of operational risks and corporate governance on bond yield spreads, examining their impacts on bond yield spreads during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results indicate that operational risks significantly raise yield spreads, especially for high-leverage firms. Moreover, a higher independent director percentage reduces debt costs. Furthermore, the results reveal more pronounced effects of operational risks on yield spreads during the COVID-19 pandemic, with these risks increasing the financing costs for large firms. When the effect of the independent director percentage on the yield spreads increases, this consequently raises the debt costs for large firms.

The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.