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This study aims to examine how brands can leverage on advergames as an interactive marketing tool to foster prosumer culture and build a sacred brand. Drawing from game theory, this research scrutinizes how advergame format (cooperative vs noncooperative) influences consumers’ perceived brand sacredness by harnessing positive brand relationship quality (BRQ) and intention to prosume. It also examines how reward types moderate the relationship between advergame format and advergamers’ BRQ.

Three different studies were conducted. Study 1 develops a measure to capture advergamers’ intention to prosume. Study 2 uses survey to collect data from brand-controlled gaming community platform. Study 3 is an experiment that uses 2 (game format: cooperative vs noncooperative) × 2 (reward type: hedonic vs utilitarian) between-subject format.

Study 1 provides a reliable and valid measure to capture “intention to prosume.” The results of Study 2 elucidate that (non) cooperative advergame format generates strong cold (hot) BRQ, leading to intention to prosume, which, in turn, drives brand sacredness. The results of Study 3 elucidate that using (utilitarian) hedonic rewards strengthens the impact of (non) cooperative advergame format on (cold) hot BRQ.

This research has examined the roles of cooperative vs noncooperative game design formats and hedonic vs utilitarian reward formats. Future research may focus on other possible advergame design formats and reward types.

This research provides insights to advergame marketers toward designing appropriate hedonic or utilitarian game rewards to strengthen the impact of cooperative vs noncooperative advergame format on brand sacredness through enhancing BRQ and intention to prosume among the target advergamers.

This research applies game theory in the advergaming context to manoeuvre game format and rewards so that a sustainable prosumption culture is built, which has strong beliefs about the sacredness of the brand.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the results of Meca et al. (2004) depending on the grey information revealed by the individual firms.

The authors introduce cooperative grey games and focus on sharing ordering cost rule (SOC-rule) to distribute the joint cost.

In this study, the authors introduce a model, where inventory costs are assumed as grey numbers instead of crisp or stochastic ones studied in literature. At first, grey numbers and classical cooperative inventory games are recalled. Then, cooperative grey games are introduced and related results are given. Finally, an application is performed for three shotgun companies in Turkey.

It is an effective approach for theoretical analysis of systems with imprecise information and incomplete samples. Therefore, grey system theory, rather than the traditional probability theory and fuzzy set theory, is better suited to model the inventory problems by using cooperative game theory. To the best of the knowledge no study exists modeling inventory situations by using cooperative grey games. From this point of view this study is a pioneering work on a promising topic.

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.

The purpose of this study is to propose a decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme based on a certificate transaction mechanism for the transaction of excess consumption certificates (ECCs) of renewable energy. The aim is to address the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode and to promote the development of the green electricity industry.

The proposed scheme involves calculating the quotation difference for the same type of certificate transaction based on the quotations of all users of both buyers and sellers. The transaction volume is then determined based on the order of quotation difference from large to small, and the total interests of cooperation are calculated. The nucleolus method is adopted to allocate the total interests to each member of the alliance and calculate the final transaction price. The blockchain technology is used for the transaction to achieve accurate traceability and efficient supervision, and a corresponding smart contract is designed and simulated in the Ethereum consortium chain.

The results of the simulation show the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme can overcome the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode, such as low transaction efficiency, difficulty in obtaining the optimal transaction strategy and efficient supervision. The proposed scheme can promote the development of the green electricity industry by stimulating users' demand potential for green electricity.

The proposed scheme is original in its use of a certificate transaction mechanism to facilitate the trading of ECCs of renewable energy. The scheme adopts a decentralized multi-party cross-trading approach that overcomes the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode. The use of the nucleolus method for the allocation of total interests to each member of the alliance is also original. Finally, the use of blockchain technology for accurate traceability and efficient supervision of the transaction is an original contribution to the field.

The policy choices of Eurasian states whether to form a coalition along with the “Eurasia Initiative” can be explained by the cooperative game theory. While the each bilateral relationship before making a binding agreement seems to be a non-cooperative game, the coalitions with many other states through a binding agreement of Mega-FTA would be a cooperative game. Despite the lack of numerical data, this study at least tries to show the possibility of applying the game theory to analyze the “Eurasia Initiative” and it’s the impacts of Mega-FTAs on this ambition. While the Eurasia Initiative necessarily involves some economic projects requiring enough investment promotion, Korea can strategically set up the policies linked with the development of Mega-FTAs. To utilize the investment promotive effect of Mega-FTAs, Korea has to assure that the core of the cooperation game would be the grand coalition of a Mega-FTA. If it continues to search for the best policies to maximize the superadditivity of this cooperative game, Korea will finally be able to achieve the co-promotion of Mega-FTAs and the Eurasia Initiative.

An abundance of literature suggests that organisations adopting a cooperative approach achieve greater rewards than those that act in opposition or isolation. An emerging body of work also highlights the multiple actors involved in servitization. Despite this, in some contexts the benefits of servitization are not apparent. This paper examines business relationships in the oil industry and how they affect levels of servitization.

A mixed method study employing qualitative and quantitative methods was used to fully explore the context. In the quantitative phase, 48 oil industry specialists responded to a scenario based on game theory. This aimed to determine if the relationships between their respective organisations are cooperative or adversarial. Abduction drove a second qualitative phase. This consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews used to explore the servitization level and influence of servitization on relationships and vice versa.

The statistical results suggest that all parties used adversarial strategies despite the publicised intent to work cooperatively. The interviews suggested that increasing (decreasing) servitization could increase (decrease) cooperation and, in turn, value co-creation but revealed nuances to this effect. It also adds to our understanding of the darker side of servitization by illustrating the impact of mimetic isomorphism.

The findings add to understanding of the complex dynamics around servitization by showing that it is only at advanced levels of servitization that cooperative behaviour is observed, and base and intermediate levels result in non-cooperative behaviour and thus illustrate the importance of adopting a multi-actor lens to explore servitization.

This paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.

This paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.

A case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.

Based on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.

For any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.

The contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

This paper aims to solve the problem of public resource allocation among vulnerable groups by proposing a new method called uncertain α-coordination value based on uncertain cooperative game.

First, explicit forms of uncertain Shapley value with Chouqet integral form and uncertain centre-of-gravity of imputation-set (CIS) value are defined separately on the basis of uncertainty theory and cooperative game. Then, a convex combination of the two values above called the uncertain α-coordination value is used as the best solution. This study proves that the proposed methods meet the basic properties of cooperative game.

The uncertain α-coordination value is used to solve a public medical resource allocation problem in fuzzy coalitions and uncertain payoffs. Compared with other methods, the α-coordination value can solve such problem effectively because it balances the worries of vulnerable group’s further development and group fairness.

In this paper, an extension of classical cooperative game called uncertain cooperative game is proposed, in which players choose any level of participation in a game and relate uncertainty with the value of the game. A new function called uncertain α-Coordination value is proposed to allocate public resources amongst vulnerable groups in an uncertain environment, a topic that has not been explored yet. The definitions of uncertain Shapley value with Choquet integral form and uncertain CIS value are proposed separately to establish uncertain α-Coordination value.

Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff's 1995 co‐opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments.

The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled.

The co‐opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff's model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative).

This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision‐ and policy‐makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies.

A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

This conceptual paper examines the need for viable theoretical models of international learning alliances in the light of cooperative games and complexity in two distinguished educational settings. Game theory is used to demonstrate the need for the top managerial executives to acquire a detailed understanding of decision makers' behaviours and trigger the deployment of complex analytical methods. The paper scrutinizes Russia's pursued aggressive approach using shock therapy, also suggest the critical need to reform policy.

Combining the critical analysis of (1) cooperative games and (2) adaptive systems structures, a dependable model is derived, which sets the baseline for determining the role of costs and gains. The analysis is supported using a real-world example of an alliance between British University (the X and Y alliance) and Russian University. It also emphasizes the importance of both internal and external pressure variables closely connected with the cooperative games, adaptive system and shock therapy.

Two features of alliances have been emphasized. The first is the importance of informal relationships in the evolution of partnerships and of cooperation. This is a well-known factor in the success of any relationship. Especially in international partnerships, empathy at the individual level is perhaps necessary to bypass the influence of historical and cultural differences that are barriers at the macro level, preconditions rather than consequences of successful policies and contractual arrangements at the level of organizations and governments. The second feature is interdependence at the cost–benefit level and in the domain of decisions. The cooperation of both partners is required to realize payoffs.

The implication of this paper is a guideline for regulators and policymakers designing worldwide alliances in higher education. In addition, this paper covers an interesting domain that could be of interest to organizations involved in forming strategic alliances, developing and re-engineering policies for strategic coalitions and setting future profitable payoff relationships within the contextual limitations of X and Y.

This paper creates new knowledge by concisely examining the meaning of strategic alliances in the context of the global education industry.