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The justification of punishment is an age-old debate which continues unresolved. In late twentieth century several attempts were made to reconcile the two opposing justifications: retributivism and consequentialism. But these attempts focused narrowly on merely one manifestation of punishment, i.e.: criminal punishment carried out by the state. To the extent that these mixed justifications are successful, they relate to only one (undoubtedly important) manifestation of punishment. But clearly punishment can occur in many different institutional contexts, and the institutions in each context vary dramatically in complexity and relevance. I recommend analyzing punishment in its manifold manifestations.

This chapter explores the vital connection between ethics and community development, underlining the fundamental role of ethical considerations in shaping fair, just, and sustainable communities. It begins by emphasizing that community development is inherently ethical and delves into the concept of ethics, examining ethical theories like consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics in the context of community development. Real-world case studies from diverse countries, such as South Africa, Australia, and India, are interwoven throughout the chapter to provide practical insights. These case studies illustrate the complexities of ethical implementation in community development, from navigating power dynamics to addressing conflicts of interest and balancing immediate needs with long-term sustainability. The chapter also explores macro-level considerations, highlighting the need for systemic change to create a more just and equitable society. It guides practitioners on integrating ethics into their work, establishing a strong moral framework for community development. Continuous learning, reflective practice, and adaptability are underscored as essential in responding to evolving societal contexts, norms, and challenges.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the use of moral theory as a philosophical analytical framework for built environment organisations' ethical codes of practice. The identified moral theories under consideration are “deontology”, “consequentialism” and “virtue ethics”.

The paper uses a case study to examine the use of moral theory to explain the ethical codes of practice of built environment professional organisations. The chosen organisation is the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). The approach for conducting the case study is through semi‐structured interviews with experienced RICS members which gather views on the application of moral theory to explain the RICS ethical principles.

The case study revealed that there are mixed views on the use of moral theory to explain the RICS code of practice. The general view is that deontology is the most suitable theory to explain the fact that the work or process has been undertaken correctly. On the other hand, there is also a view amongst senior professionals that virtue ethics is most appropriate as it addresses the importance of both the correct “result” and the correct “process”.

The paper uses a case study approach to examine the ethical code of one built environment professional organisation. This research does not therefore claim empirical generalisation but instead provides illustrations on the use of moral theory to explain the code of practice of a built environment professional organisation. The paper is based on a series of interviews. The findings should be understood as the aggregated opinions of the interviewees.

The paper makes an original contribution to existing literature on the theoretical analysis of codes of practice for built environment professional organisations. It describes research which is the first to use moral theory as a framework for analysing rules of conduct of built environment professional organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether profit maximizing behaviour can be defended from an ethical point of view, and what possible restrictions should be made on following this interest.

The main structure of the paper is as follows. First, it states the problem. Second, it considers which ethical theory is relevant for evaluating the situation at hand, and argues that rule‐consequentialism is the most appropriate one, but that some constraints in the form of, e.g. protecting human rights must be used as a supplement. Third, it analyses the consequences of profit seeking and profit maximization, and argue that these have a number of beneficial effects. The methodology and approach is one of critical argumentation.

Profit maximization as a firm goal has traditionally been meet with suspicion in the literature on business ethics, being seen as either immoral or amoral. It is argued herein that this practice should be evaluated according to rule‐consequentialist ethics, but supplemented with elements that are more of a deontological ethical character. When seen from this point of view, profit maximization may be seen as ethical. This requires, however, that a number of institutional and other requirements are fulfilled.

In stead of arguing, or taking as a premise, that profit maximization is inherently unethical, researchers should argue which ethical point of view should be used to evaluate such a goal, and then argue whether business practices are ethical or not. In addition, business ethics literature should incorporate basic insights from economic theory.

The paper provides new insights in the ethical nature of profit maximization as the main corporate value. More generally, we argued that, given it is in the owner's perceived interest(s), it is ethically justifiable for executives to take profit maximization as their ultimate goal in running their businesses, as long as they do not violate law, norms or social customs.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce, in the project management field, an Aristotelian ethics lens moving beyond the classical deontological and consequentialism approaches underlying the current ethical practices and codes of ethics and professional conducts. In doing so, the author wishes to pose the premises of a debate on the implications of a conscious ethical perspective for the structure and agency relationship within the project management field.

Project management is a knowledge field on its own right. However, the current perspectives applied to make sense and develop the field (modernism vs postmodernism) leads to dichotomous thinking rather than recognizing the merits and contextual validity of both sides. The author calls for Aristotelian ethics as a way of moving beyond this dichotomous thinking. The author introduces briefly Aristotelian ethics and its consequences in term of relation theory – practice, means and ends, facts and values and finally politics (i.e. being part of a community of practitioners). Then the author illustrates some consequences for the field taking PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct and APM Code of Professional Conduct as supports for discussion.

The author suggests a need for revisiting and/or redesigning the codes of ethics and professional conducts for project management according to an Aristotelian perspective, in order to move beyond the normative limitations of classical deontological (conflict between competing duties, exemplified by PMI Code) or consequentialism (focusing on the “right” outcome to the detriment of duties, exemplified by APM Code) approaches (both, in fact, leading to a disconnection means and ends, and facts and values). This implicates shifting the view from the question “what is my duty”? to the questions “why should I undertake my duty”? and “how ought I act in this situation”?

Raising professional bodies, industry and education institutions awareness and consciousness and leading them to rethink about codes of ethics and the implications for the way they conceive practice and research, bodies of knowledge, credentialing, education, etc.

To the best of the author's knowledge, this kind of discussion has not yet been conducted within the project management field, and considering the implication of project management in the life and for the well-being of the society, an ethical debate may present some value(s).

The ethicality of using audience segmentation in social marketing contexts has typically been framed within either a consequentialist or non-consequentialist perspective, leading to a hitherto intractable debate. This paper seeks to shed new light on this debate using two alternative ethical frameworks: the theory of just health care (TJHC) and integrative social contracts theory (ISCT).

The paper uses cross-sectional survey data from a Kenyan social marketing campaign that aimed to increase awareness and support for the use of anti-retroviral therapy (ART), a class of drugs that inhibit the development of HIV.

Application of the TJHC and ISCT to the Kenyan social marketing campaign revealed the use of audience segmentation to be ethically justified. Moreover, the TJHC provided a useful framework for guiding decisions about the selection of target audience(s) in health-related contexts.

In situations where there are known asymmetries in exposure to mass media channels, adopting a non-segmented mass-media approach may unintentionally entrench pre-existing disparities in health knowledge.

The application of the TJHC and ISCT to health-related social marketing contexts offers a means of resolving the longstanding debate about the ethicality of audience segmentation. The ethical principles underpinning the TJHC also provide a decision-making framework to guide discussions about whether audience segmentation should be based on cost-effectiveness (consequentialism) or need (non-consequentialism). This is particularly relevant in social marketing settings, where the resources available for conducting campaigns are often limited and segmentation decisions about the groups that are targeted or excluded can have important health-related implications.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the mechanics of the neoliberal mindset is governed paradigmatically by a peculiar notion of “time,” which leads, in turn, to a kind of amoral consequentialism that projects meaninglessly and amorally into the future. The author proposes, in comparison, the pre-modern and ancient sense of the temporal which has the potential to yield moral insights for guiding policy thinking.

The author employs a philosophical approach and historical approach. The authors analyze philosophically the notion of the temporal in the consequentialist neoliberal agency, and draws on continental, ancient and medieval philosophical sources of temporality to develop an alternative.

The author argues that a rich notion of the temporal can be retrieved from medieval sources. This notion of the temporal is located in our experience of changing embodied beings, or physis, and gives rise to thuamazein or awe, which shows moral insights. The latter is a valuable source of guidance in policy thinking.

This paper also suggests that epistemological commitment to an authority as numbers, feeding a policy as numbers, needs to be challenged. This paper does not draw on empirical data but nevertheless aspires to develop a thoughtful conceptual case on behalf of its conclusions.

A moral, neoliberal consequentialism is harmful to professional agencies. This paper offers a different way to think policy that puts what truly matters in front of us.

Neoliberalism breeds the terrors of performativity that forgets what as a society we need to aim for on behalf of happiness, and instead drives us to compete without restraint after particular quantitative achievements. By challenging this paradigm, it is possible to offer policy thinking a different set of conceptual tools with which to think ourselves out of this performative irrationality.

This paper retrieves a medieval notion of time that is related with the showing of moral insights, opposed to amoral neoliberal consequentialism. In this way, there is a proposal of an alternative to neoliberalism, and not merely the worry of its damaging effects. It is also an original developmental study of Heidegger’s retrieval of ancient philosophy’s sense of temporality and its connection with ethics in the light of the resources in medieval philosophy.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and critique ways in which the threats from confirmation bias have been rejected.

Dismissals of the existence of, or threats from, confirmation bias are identified from a review of literature across a very wide range of disciplines. The dismissals are robustly examined.

The dismissals are categorised as: (1) radical scepticism (2) consequentialism: and (3) denial. Each type of dismissal, it is argued, is flawed.

The three-fold structuring of confirmation bias dismissal is novel. In addition to drawing from organisation, management and wider social science literature, the article also uses arguments and examples from the creative arts.

Pragmatism in the sense of harmonizing rules and reality for the sake of appropriate problem solving and overall performance is a ubiquitous phenomenon in organizational life. As such it has been generalized as an everyday requirement of making organizations work and a virtue of human decision making under the condition of complexity, strategic dilemmas or “wicked problems.” This chapter addresses both the theoretical and the normative dimensions of pragmatism in organizations, public administration in particular. The main statement is that the necessary theoretical clarification concerns the distinction between pragmatism and what is referred to as a logic of appropriateness while the normative limits of pragmatism refer to the necessity of ranking logics of appropriateness and related values plus the ability to act on the basis of accurate judgment which is primarily, even if not exclusively, a matter of leadership.

In this chapter I build upon the case I argued in Volume 1 of this series (Carpenter, D. (2016). The quest for generic ethical principles in social science research. In R. Iphofen (Ed.), Advances in research ethics and integrity (Vol. 1, pp. 3–18). Bingley: Emerald). There I established arguments for eschewing principlism and other well-established theories of practical ethics, such as deontology and consequentialism, in favour of virtue ethics. I drew on the work of Macfarlane (2009, 2010) in making a case for virtuous researcher and virtuous research. In this chapter, I draw attention to the role and conduct of ethics committees in reviewing research. If we are to consider the ethics of research and researchers, then we might also consider the ethics of reviewing and reviewers. Whilst there is an abundance of codes and similar documents aimed at guiding research conduct, there is relatively little to guide ethics committees and their members. Given the argument that a virtue ethics approach might help committees evaluate the ethics of proposed research and researchers, it could equally be the case that virtue ethics could be useful when thinking about the work of committees and ethics review. In this chapter I attempt to relocate and develop Macfarlane’s work by examining its application to the work of ethics committees and the virtues of their members. In particular, I will consider the virtues that reviewers should exhibit or demonstrate when reviewing research, and what we might take as the telos of ethics committees.