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This case describes and analyzes the negotiations surrounding the U.S.–Thailand free trade agreement (FTA) that never materialized. The case offers an excellent opportunity to discuss the complexities of trade negotiations, the welfare analyses of FTAs (with trade diversion and creation), and the growth of FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as opposed to multilateral trade liberalizations.

This case investigation used firsthand statements, reports, testimony and regulatory records. While widely publicized in the popular press, this case is based on primary documents. On their website, many documents were obtained from Wells Fargo’s Corporate newsroom, such as the internal audit report shared with shareholders and press releases. Most other sources were from US regulatory websites (.gov) or congressional testimony. In a few places, quotes and comments came from reliable journalistic sites that cite their sources and follow a journalist’s code of ethics and conduct, ensuring that the reported remarks and data were verified.

Since 2016, Wells Fargo Bank has faced multiple customer mistreatment investigations and resultant fines. Public outcry and distrust resulted from Wells Fargo employees creating hidden accounts and enrolling people in bank services without their knowledge to meet desired levels of sustained shareholder growth. Over the past five years, Wells Fargo has been fined and returned to customers and stockholders over $3bn. Wells Fargo executives spent the first year of the scandal citing improper behavior by employees. Leadership did not take responsibility for setting the organizational goals, which led to employee misbehavior. Even after admitting some culpability in creating the extreme sales culture, executives and the Board of Directors tried to distance themselves from blame for the unethical behavior. They cited the organizations’ decentralized structure as a reason the board was not quicker in seeing and correcting the negative behaviors of these ‘bad apple’ employees. Wells Fargo faced multiple concurrent scandals, such as upselling services to retirees, inappropriately repossessing service members’ vehicles, adding insurance and extra fees to mortgages and other accounts and engaging in securities fraud. As time has passed, the early versions of a handful of “bad apples” seem to be only a part of the overall “poison tree.”The dilemma, in this case, is who is responsible for the misbehavior and the inappropriate sales of products and services (often without the customer’s knowledge)? Is strategic growth year-over-year with no allowances for environmental and economic factors a realistic and reasonable goal for corporations? This case is appropriate for undergraduates and graduate students in finance, human resources, management, accounting and investments.

An active case-based learning pedagogical approach is suggested. The materials include a short podcast, video and other materials to allow the faculty to assign pre-class work or to use in the classroom before a case discussion.

The decade from 2000 until 2010 was a turbulent time for Toyota Motor Company. The carmaker came under significant criticism from the United States government, consumers throughout the world, and media critics amid allegations of poor quality control and vehicle safety concerns. Problems with accelerators and brake systems were found on several of its most popular models, a situation initially exacerbated by the slow and somewhat tentative response from top management. Toyota was accused of not addressing early warning signs that appeared several years before the crisis received intense negative publicity. Toyota struggled to retain the confidence of consumers and governmental regulators, eventually recalling approximately eight million automobiles.

This case is about Kija Kim, a Korean born founder and CEO of Harvard Design and Mapping Inc. (HDM). Founded in 1988, HDM is a cutting-edge GIS firm with $5 million in revenue and 35 employees in their Cambridge, MA and Washington D.C. offices. Through Kija Kim's leadership, HDM has become a significant niche player in homeland security and disaster relief. The case ends in fall 2005 just after HDM provided Hurricane Katrina mapping support, and Kija is nominated for the SBA Small Business Person of the Year. This case explores the intersection between cultural heritage, leadership effectiveness and organizational behavior. It particularly notes Kija's ability to turn her immigrant female minority status into a business advantage. This strength coupled with her ethos of care and ability to network in all walks of her life contributes to her distinctive and integrated leadership style. Definitions of leadership success and implications for decision making are also highlighted.

The case compares two U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) programs from the 1970s and 1980s: (1) “stealth” combat aircraft, capable of evading detection or engagement by anti-aircraft systems, and (2) precision attack of hardened ground vehicles from “standoff” distances, i.e., far behind the battle lines. Conceived at roughly the same time, motivated by the same strategic challenge, and initially driven by the same DoD organization, stealth combat aircraft progressed from idea to deployment in less than eight years---an astounding pace for a complex military system---while a demonstrated system for standoff precision strike against mobile ground targets was not fully implemented. The case highlights the critical role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), part of the DoD, regarded as one of the most innovative entities in the U.S. federal government.

The case highlights factors that facilitate rapid, successful implementation of radically innovative or disruptive concepts. Students are introduced to the organizational realities facing such projects, including issues of strategic clarity, interdepartmental competition and cooperation, executive leadership, and timing. Comparing the differences in implementation of the two programs in the case reveals issues relevant to any large organization seeking to bring innovative concepts to fruition.

Describes the history of the tobacco industry and its emergence as an extremely effective marketer and non-market strategist. After years of success, both publicly and politically, the leaders of the tobacco industry are faced with mounting political pressure and the financial threat of litigation from class-action lawsuits. The leaders face an industry-wide strategic decision of whether to acquiesce to government demands in exchange for immunity, focus on judicial success, or develop a new course of action.

To evaluate the formulation and implementation of non-market strategies in the context of regulatory, legislative, and legal institutions. To understand how various aspects of the non-market environment interact and how these environments not only change over time, but change market competition within an industry. Further, to formulate and decide between firm-specific and industry-wide strategies. Finally, to appreciate and reflect upon the potential conflict between non-market strategies and ethical concerns.

The cases describe the demise of Arthur Andersen, a firm that had long set the industry standard for professionalism in accounting and auditing. Once an example of strong corporate culture with a commitment to public service and independent integrity, Andersen saw its culture and standards weaken as it grew explosively and changed its mode of governance. The (A) case describes a crisis precipitated by the admission of Waste Management, a major Andersen client, that it overstated its pretax earnings by $1.43 billion from 1992 to 1996. The resulting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation ended with Andersen paying a $7 million fine, the largest ever levied against an accounting firm, and agreeing to an injunction that effectively placed the accounting giant on probation. Students analyze the causes of Andersen's problems and advise Andersen leadership. The (B) case covers Arthur Andersen's relationship with Enron, one of the great success stories of the “new economy” boom. When Enron's aggressive use of off-balance sheet partnerships became impossible to hide in autumn 2001, news reports stated that Andersen auditors had engaged in extensive shredding of draft documents and associated communications with Enron. Students are asked to act as crisis management consultants to Andersen CEO Joe Berardino. The (C) case details Andersen's collapse following its indictment and conviction on criminal charges of obstructing justice in the Enron case. Its conviction was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on narrow technical grounds, but by then Andersen had ceased to exist, eighty-nine years after Arthur E. Andersen had taken over a small accounting firm in Chicago. Students can focus on the impact of media on a reputational crisis.

Students will: Identify the teachable moment in a crisis that leaders can leverage as an opportunity to improve a firm's reputation or core identity, to reinforce values, and to drive change, Understand the impact on crisis management of the media landscape and regulatory decision-making, Realize the fragility of corporate cultures and the need to actively maintain them, especially during difficult times,

The cases describe the demise of Arthur Andersen, a firm that had long set the industry standard for professionalism in accounting and auditing. Once an example of strong corporate culture with a commitment to public service and independent integrity, Andersen saw its culture and standards weaken as it grew explosively and changed its mode of governance. The (A) case describes a crisis precipitated by the admission of Waste Management, a major Andersen client, that it overstated its pretax earnings by $1.43 billion from 1992 to 1996. The resulting Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation ended with Andersen paying a $7 million fine, the largest ever levied against an accounting firm, and agreeing to an injunction that effectively placed the accounting giant on probation. Students analyze the causes of Andersen's problems and advise Andersen leadership. The (B) case covers Arthur Andersen's relationship with Enron, one of the great success stories of the “new economy” boom. When Enron's aggressive use of off-balance sheet partnerships became impossible to hide in autumn 2001, news reports stated that Andersen auditors had engaged in extensive shredding of draft documents and associated communications with Enron. Students are asked to act as crisis management consultants to Andersen CEO Joe Berardino. The (C) case details Andersen's collapse following its indictment and conviction on criminal charges of obstructing justice in the Enron case. Its conviction was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on narrow technical grounds, but by then Andersen had ceased to exist, eighty-nine years after Arthur E. Andersen had taken over a small accounting firm in Chicago. Students can focus on the impact of media on a reputational crisis.

Students will: Identify the teachable moment in a crisis that leaders can leverage as an opportunity to improve a firm's reputation or core identity, to reinforce values, and to drive change, Understand the impact on crisis management of the media landscape and regulatory decision-making, Realize the fragility of corporate cultures and the need to actively maintain them, especially during difficult times,

In October 2016, Timothy Sloan, the newly appointed CEO of American banking giant Wells Fargo, faced a massive public-relations crisis. A few weeks earlier, a United States government agency had announced the results of its regulatory review of the bank and exposed a shocking practice common in the retail division, in which aggressive community bankers had created more than a million fraudulent accounts and credit card applications on behalf of unaware customers for the past several years. Over the next few weeks, the bank—and Sloan's predecessor, John Stumpf, in particular—suffered from harsh criticism from politicians, journalists, and former employees alike, ultimately forcing Stumpf's resignation. As Sloan sought to minimize the public-image backlash and restore general trust in Wells Fargo, he struggled to construct the best communication strategy for the bank's next chapter.

In early 2014, recent Stanford University graduate Tyler Shultz was in a quandary. He had been working at Theranos, a blood-diagnostic company founded by Elizabeth Holmes, a Stanford-dropout wunderkind, for almost a year. Shultz had learned enough about the company to realize that its practices and the efficacy of its much-touted finger-prick blood-testing technology were questionable and that the company was going to great lengths to hide this fact from the public and from regulators.

Theranos and Holmes were Silicon Valley darlings, enjoying positive press and lavish attention from potential investors and technology titans alike. Just as companies like PayPal had revolutionized the stagnant payments industry and Uber had upended the for-hire transportation sector, Theranos had been positioned as the latest technology firm to substantially disrupt yet another mature sector: the medical laboratory business. By the start of 2014, the company had raised more than $400 million in funding, and had an estimated market valuation of $9 billion.

Shultz's situation was exacerbated by the fact that his grandfather, the highly respected former US Secretary of State George Shultz, was on the Theranos board and was one of Elizabeth Holmes's biggest supporters.

But Tyler Shultz worried about the customers he was convinced were receiving highly unreliable and often inaccurate blood-test results. With so much at stake, Shultz wondered how he should proceed. Should he raise his concerns with the firm's investors? Blow the whistle externally? Report to industry regulators? Go away quietly?

This case and its subsequent four brief follow-up cases are based largely on interviews with Tyler Shultz, and outline the dilemma he faced and the various steps he would take both to extricate himself from his unsavory position and let the public know the full extent of the deception at Theranos.

Five optional handouts are available to instructors to further discussion after the case has been debriefed. The handouts serve as additional decision points for the students if your class time permits.