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Competition law is key to the promotion of consumer welfare and consumer choice, efficiency maximization, market integration, market liberalization, and competitiveness. The review of the evolution of competition law enforcement in Greece shows that it has run in parallel with the path of the Greek economy toward liberalisation modernisation, development and growth. Upon this basis, competition law has contributed to increased levels of investment in the Greek economy, the development of new services and new corporate structures and accountability in Greece. In a fast changing world, in which market and societal development is increasingly interdependent across national borders, the question now turns on to whether competition law enforcement in Greece ought also to take into account public policy objectives, such as environmental protection and sustainability or industrial policy objectives. The competition law enforcement authorities and national Courts have made great progress in the last 20 years in keeping abreast with developments in respect of competition law compliance and enforcement and this has provided a better guarantee for a level playing field and fairer conditions of competition in the various product and services markets in Greece.

Competition rules maximise consumer welfare by promoting efficient use of scarce resource and thus high output, low prices, high quality, varied services, innovation, production and distribution. European courts consider doctors and hospital staff as undertakings (any entity that performs economic activities), so that if they enter into agreements then they have to comply with competition rules. This paper's objective is to determine whether competition law, which applies to undertakings, can in fact be applied to different healthcare‐sector players and whether specific rules are needed regarding competition between healthcare undertakings.

Data were selected from relevant European and national case law, European institution legal documents (such as regulations, guidelines and communications) and healthcare competition law literature, and then examined.

The paper finds that competition rules are applicable to healthcare players considering the consequences if competition rules are applied to the healthcare market. For market processes to result in the appropriate cost, quality and output, competition law must be proactive. In other words, quality must be fully factored into the competitive mix, allowing consumers to weigh healthcare price and non‐price characteristics.

Countries have different healthcare system and competition rules (although similar), competition rule impact is different for each country. Some healthcare systems are more regulated and there will be less opportunity for healthcare players to compete.

Efficiently applying competition law to healthcare players means that several challenges need facing, such as healthcare quality complexity and court scepticism.

This article points out the challenges when competition law is applied to the healthcare sector and how these challenges are faced in certain countries such as The Netherlands.

It is often “assumed,” even among well-informed lawyers and economists, that European competition law is an emulation of the US antitrust law because of American influence on European political and economic debates after the Second World War. However, such an assumption is disputable: in accordance with Professor Gerber, the competition law in Europe is an indigenous product based primarily on ideas developed in Germany by the so-called ordoliberal thought. In this respect, the article 102 TFEU may be considered a proof. The aims of this article are to furnish a critical examination of ordoliberal ideas of anticompetitive conducts and underline the relevance of ordoliberal thought for the development of the modern European competition law.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This paper aims to understand the emergence, operation and evolution of judge-centred models for the enforcement of competition law in Ireland and in Hong Kong SAR. The public enforcement model in Hong Kong chimes with the Irish regime where competence to adjudicate on competition law violations and to impose sanctions is intentionally reserved exclusively to judges. This design choice renders the Irish and Hong Kong regimes both similar to each other and atypical on the global stage, where in many jurisdictions an administrative competition agency investigates suspected infringements, makes determinations of infringements and may penalise infringers.

This paper starts by detailing the current competition law architecture in each jurisdiction. Then, it examines closely the discourse (expressed in consultations, experts’ reports and Parliamentary documents) in the lengthy period preceding their introduction. This approach aims, firstly, to understand why judicial models were chosen over more familiar administrative ones and, secondly, to unearth any similar concerns which had a bearing on the choice of atypical design. Next, it analyses some implications of the judicial model in operation for, firstly, parties; secondly, the administrative competition agencies; and, thirdly, the evolution of competition law.

It finds the existence of similar concerns surrounding due process/separation of power arose in each jurisdiction. Other similar strands include a sluggish political appetite which delayed reform. Each jurisdiction actively sought to inform itself about international experience but did not feel obliged to copy the enforcement dimension even where substantive prohibitions were persuasive.

It shines a light on the independent response by two small Common Law jurisdictions, which does not converge with popular administrative international models of competition law enforcement.

It is hoped that the decades-long experience in Ireland may interest those involved in Hong Kong competition law, which is at a comparatively fledgling stage of development.

This is an original research and appears to be the first paper exploring the atypical approaches taken in Hong Kong SAR and Ireland to designing locally suited regimes for the enforcement of competition law.

The purpose of this paper is to retrace some of the key factors leading to the enactment of competition law in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the prevailing debates for such laws to be enacted in Hong Kong (HK). The regulatory journeys of one country under two different administrations is another interesting dimension, where one is a modern economy under a quasi‐democratic government, the other is a developing one, labelled as a “market economy with socialist characteristics” under a centralised socialist government.

The authors begin with a brief introduction to the PRC Anti Monopoly Law (AML), followed by an overview of the act, and then address the uncertainties in various provisions as well as enforcement issues. The next part devolves into the debates in enacting competition law in HK, which has yet to become law.

Despite the detailed proposal transplanting many ideas from the laws of other modern economies, there are some provisions that are either weak or that continue to safeguard the interest of monopolies in selective sectors. Central to the experiences for both administrations is to balance between conventional wisdom in economic laws and domestic economic interests.

Since, the laws in PRC are newly enacted and HK is still in the drafting process, the arguments highlighted in this paper tend to address the current concerns.

The value of this comparative paper is to reveal the choice of regulatory strategies in HK and PRC.

This paper aims to draw attention to a broad range of experimental institutional initiatives which operate in the absence of a global antitrust regime. The purpose of this paper is to offer food for thought to scholars in other fields of international trade law facing challenges from divergent national regimes.

Taking inspiration from political science literature on institutions, this paper crafts a broad analytical lens which captures various organisational forms (including networks), codes (including soft law) and culture (including epistemic communities). The strength and shortcomings of traditional “bricks and mortar” institutions such as the European Union (EU) and General Agreement Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation are first examined. Then, the innovative global network of International Competition Network (ICN) is analysed.

It highlights the value of the global antitrust epistemic community in providing a conducive environment for extensive recourse to “soft law”. Examples from the EU and the ICN include measures which find expression in enforcement tools and networks. These initiatives can be seen as experimental responses to the challenges of divergent national antitrust regimes.

It is desktop research rather than empirical field work.

To raise awareness outside the antitrust scholarly community of the variety of experimental institutional initiatives which have evolved, often on a soft law basis, in response to the challenges experienced by national enforcement agencies and businesses operating in the absence of a global antitrust regime.

It offers some personal reflections on the ICN from the author’s experience as a non-governmental advisor. It draws attention to the ICN’s underappreciated range of educational materials which are freely available on its website to everyone. It submits that the ICN template offers interesting ideas for other fields of international trade law where a global regime is unrealisable. The ICN is a voluntary virtual network of agencies collaborating to agree ways to reduce clashes among national regimes. Its goal of voluntary convergence is portrayed as standardisation rather than as absolute congruence. Even if standardisation of norms/processes is too ambitious a goal in other fields of international trade law, the ICN model still offers inspiration as an epistemic community within an inclusive and dynamic forum for encouraging debate and creating a culture of learning opportunities where familiarity and trust is fostered.

This study aims to analyze the development of digital market characteristics particularly focusing on how the strategic choices of platforms are not fully reflected in pricing. In addition, the implications for the development of theories of harm are investigated to explore the necessity of a relevant market definition in assessing infringement and evaluating the adequacy of Indonesian competition law.

This study is a legal analysis that uses statutory approaches, cases, comparative law and the development of theories of harm in digital mergers. The case approach is conducted by analyzing three cases decided by the Indonesia Business Competition Supervisory Commission. This approach provides insight into the response of Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha concerning the merger and acquisition cases in the digital era as well as the provision of different analyses in conventional markets. However, competition can be potentially damaged in digital markets and a comparative law approach is taken by analyzing digital merger cases decided by authorities in other countries.

Results reveal that the digital market has created a “relevant market” that is challenging and blurred due to multi-sided network effects and consumer data usage characteristics. Platform-based enterprises’ prices fluctuate due to the digital market’s network effect and consumer data statistics. Smartphone prices depend on the number of apps and consumer data. Neoclassical theory focusing on product markets and location applied in Indonesia must be revised to establish a relevant digital economy market. To evaluate digital mergers, new harm theories are needed. The merger should also protect consumer data. Law Number 27 of 2022 on Personal Data Protection and Government Regulation on the Implementation of Electronic Systems and Transactions protects online consumers, a basic step in due diligence for digital mergers. The Indonesian Government should promptly strengthen the notion of “relevant markets” in the digital economy, which could lead to fair business competition violations like big data control. Notify partners or digital merger participants of the accessibility of sensitive data like transaction history and user location.

The development of digital market characteristics has implications for developing theories of harm in digital markets. Indonesian competition law needs to develop such theories of harm to analyze the potential for anticompetitive digital mergers in the digital economy era.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.