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This paper discusses a pedagogical approach that incorporates multiple critical topics in the accounting curriculum using an integrated tax research case. Our approach is designed to develop students research, data management and analysis, critical thinking, decision-making, and professional communication skills. These goals are achieved through the use of an integrated assignment requiring students to conduct research, decide how to use an assortment of information sources, conduct analysis of data and business documents, and arrive at and communicate a conclusion. The key issue is reasonable compensation, a highly litigated tax issue which requires students to identify relevant authority found across many court cases. The use of a closely held business with multiple family members with different fact patterns exposes students to different outcomes with a varying degree of complexity. Students must analyze business documents and firm- and industry-level data to determine the appropriate tax treatment. Further, the case scenario exploits the fact that reasonable compensation is a tax issue in which circuit courts have ruled differently on the same issue, requiring in-depth research and interpretation of primary authority. Students are also exposed to differing outcomes based on entity type. We provide discussion of our multiple implementations and student questionnaire results to support the efficacy of our approach. We have prepared resources to help instructors implement this pedagogical approach, including a completed data analysis, supporting summary tables, and an in-depth discussion of the primary authority related to reasonable compensation.

This paper aims to establish a theoretical framework that can comprehensively explain the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the context of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The author develops a theoretical framework for executive compensation in SOEs from the perspective of Marxist economics and points out that the executives in SOEs are engaged in management labor, and their compensation should adhere to the principle of distribution according to labor contribution.

Based on this theory, the author posits that the continuous upward trend of executive compensation in SOEs, is consistent with the trend of SOEs' ongoing expansion, which reflects a continuous improvement of SOE executives' management labor in both quality and quantity.

It is necessary to start with Marxist economic theory and scientifically study the issue of SOE executive compensation, adhere to the principle of distribution according to work in the context of a socialist market economy and implement the specific guideline of the Party Central Committee; only in this way can the long-term healthy development of SOEs be promoted continuously.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues surrounding “say‐on‐pay” legislation in the USA; evaluate the corporate governance alternatives to “say‐on‐pay” legislation; recommend a policy encouraging enhanced executive accountability; and suggest research questions pertaining to “say‐on‐pay” proposals and executive compensation for scholars to pursue.

The paper takes an exploratory approach to discussing and analyzing the issues surrounding “say‐on‐pay” legislation in the USA and offering an alternative corporate governance approach to enhancing executive performance.

The paper finds that whether an annual non‐binding “say‐on‐pay” policy is instituted or not within a company is not the crux of the executive compensation issue. What is important is whether concerned shareholders have the ability to have proxy access and successfully pass such a resolution, thereby exercising shareholder pressure on the board of directors to implement a corporate policy of equating appropriate executive compensation with managerial performance. Moreover, this improvement in board‐shareowner engagement, along with expanded disclosure of executive compensation packages, will assist in obviating the need for the exercise of a draconian shareholder resolution to remove directors.

This paper offers an in‐depth review of the “say‐on‐pay” legislative and corporate governance controversy; places the issue in the context of effective corporate governance; recommends a reasoned approach to executive compensation accountability; and offers a list of research questions for corporate governance and human resource management scholars to pursue.

Some companies are now seeking to design compensation plans that not only reward performance but also improve it. They want techniques that look forward, beyond their current situation and even beyond pay systems themselves. This approach is called strategic compensation design. It involves focusing on what an organization needs to do to become more competitive and then on developing a compensation plan to help.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the problems of compensation for compulsory acquisition of oil exploration fields in Delta State with particular reference to the oil field acquired by Agip Oil Company for gas pipeline way leave in Irri and Okpai towns of Delta State.

A survey was conducted in which questionnaires were administered on some residents whose lands were acquired compulsorily on one hand and some estate surveying and valuation firms who are professionals in the fields of compensation on the other hand. The data collected were analyzed and presented using simple statistical methods.

The findings in this paper show that the compensation paid to residents whose lands were acquired is grossly inadequate, since professionals are not always involved in the process.

The paper shows that the issue of compensation for compulsory acquisition for oil exploration is very central in the oil‐rich Niger‐Delta, and if this is not handled carefully, it can lead to uncontrollable crisis.

This paper empirically examined the process involved in compulsory acquisition and compensation of land in the Niger‐Delta for oil exploration with a view to determining the adequacy or otherwise of the compensation paid.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

The authors study and compare the effects of three CEO compensation restricting policies issued by the Chinese government in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This paper aims to shed light on the conditions under which CEO compenstation can be effectively regulated without negatively affecting firm performance.

These policies targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). Using these policies as natural experiments, the authors investigate how their effects differ on CEO compensation, firm performance and two known performance-decreasing mechanisms: perk consumption and tunneling activities.

The authors show that restricting CEO pay does not necessarily backfire in terms of deteriorating firm performance. This non-decreasing firm performance can be achieved by restricting perk consumption and tunneling activities while introducing CEO pay regulations.

The authors exploit a powerful experimental setting in the context of China. The evidence contributes to the literature on CEO pay regulations and is relevant to the managerial decisions of policy makers and boards of directors.

Internal Revenue Code §162(m), which applies to public corporations, was designed to reduce executive compensation and strengthen its relation to performance. This article examines the effectiveness of the code section. While the results reflect a continual increase in the compensation of a group of key executives for the years reviewed, evidence is found in support of the performance-based objectives of §162(m). Findings indicate a shift away from salary and toward bonus payments over the time period examined. Further, the link between compensation and performance appears to have strengthened slightly after the enactment of §162(m).