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This paper explores the role of colonial heritage on long-term economic development from a resource-curse perspective. The authors investigate the impact of colonial exports on long-term economic development through two channels: (1) a direct impact of the economic dependency on natural resources and (2) an indirect impact via its effect on colonial institutions, which persisted over time and influenced current economic development.

To address this issue, the authors use an original data set on French bilateral trade from 1880 to 1912. The authors use partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in the empirical analysis, so that the authors are able to construct latent variables (LVs) for variables that are not directly observable, such as the quality of institutions.

The authors find that exports of primary goods to France had a negative impact on colonial institutions and that for French colonies, this impact was driven by minerals exports. Despite its impact on colonial institutions, exports of French colonies had no significant indirect impact on their current institutions. The authors find no significant direct impact of colonial trade on current development for French colonies. Finally, colonial exports of manufactured products had no significant impact on colonial institutions among French colonies and a positive impact among non-French ones.

Research implications regarding the findings of this paper are, namely, that the relative poor performance within French colonies today cannot be attributed to the extraction of raw materials a century ago. However, human capital and institutional development, instead of exports, are more relatively important for long-term growth. Some limitations in trying to determine the simultaneous relationship among colonial trade, institutions and economic performance are the relation between colonial trade and the extent of extraction from the colonizer, which is hard to quantify, as well as its precise mechanism.

Since the initial institutions set in those former colonies presented a strong persistence in the long run, their governments should focus now on building sound and inclusive political and economic institutions, as well as on investing in human capital in order to foster long-term growth. Once a comprehensive set of institutional and human resources are put in place, the quality and quantity of exports might create a positive spillover on the short-run growth.

One social implication that can be retrieved from this study is the ever-lasting effect of both human capital investment and introduction of inclusive political and economic institutions on the long-run impact of growth.

The paper uses an original primary data set from archival sources to explore the role of colonial heritage on long-term economic development from a resource-curse perspective. It applies a relatively new model partial least squares path modeling (PLS-PM) that allows the construction of LVs for variables that are not directly observable, as well as channeling the impact on growth through both direct and indirect channels. Finally, it allows for the simultaneous multigroup analysis across different colonial groups.

Long established and revisionist approaches to European state formation are put to one side in this article and a turn to the imperial domains of early modern states is made. The rise of Atlantic Studies as a new current of history has drawn attention to transatlantic patterns of colonialism. However, historical sociologists and comparativists have yet to grapple with the conclusions of this field of research. This article points to a possible line of argument that could draw historical sociology and Atlantic Studies together. It takes up the argument that early modern polities broke new ground in the formation of territorial institutions when they turned to transcontinental state building. From their inception, the projects of empire produced conflict-driven institutions. Comparative examination of the Spanish, British, Dutch, French and Portuguese empires reveals that, despite the authority accorded to overarching institutions of imperial government, domestic and colonial patterns of institutional formation diverged considerably. The article explores how developments in European territories took one course in each case, while colonial trajectories in the Americas took others and thereby generated distinct kinds of conflict.

Exports are both an important component of overall economic performance and an indicator of broader trends in economic growth for the early American economy. In this article we describe a new set of estimates of the volume of overseas exports originating in the colonies and states of the Middle Atlantic region from 1720 to 1800. Measured in constant prices, export volumes grew rapidly in this period, but were unable to outpace the rapid growth of population and the labor force. Despite significant short-run fluctuations, per capita export values displayed no trend. At the same time, regional terms of trade improved considerably, increasing the foreign exchange earnings produced for any real export quantity.

This chapter examines the fur trade commodity frontier in northeastern North America as a contested periphery, involving an evolving process of conflict and cooperation between North American indigenous groups and European powers. Native people used European powers for help in their battles with other native groups, and European colonial authorities attempted to use native people as proxies in their attempts to make up for often low European populations in the various North American colonies. Within the colonies there were also splits between commercial/trading interests and more purely geostrategic concerns. This chapter will explore these various conflicts involving the Iroquois, English and French, and will consider how the trade's fundamental material, environmental and geographical structure shaped the evolution of this peripheral extractive political economy and the efforts of those in the core seeking to exploit the area's resources.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the gravity model to examine the role of infrastructure (including human capital (HC)), macroeconomic policies, the institutional quality and the colonial regimes on intra-African trade during the period 1990-2013. The results show that the basic gravity variables have substantial influence on the bilateral trade in the continent. Most interestingly, whilst internal conflicts appear to have harmful and significant impacts on the flow of such trade, HC, the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the British colonial regime appear as encouraging factors. The results of the study imply that devoting more resources to HC and creating a favourable investment environment should come as a top priority in current efforts to facilitate Africa’s economic regionalism.

The paper employs Tobit technique on a semi-log extended form for the gravity model.

The results show that the basic gravity variables have substantial influence on the bilateral trade in the continent. Most interestingly, whilst internal conflicts appear to have harmful and significant impacts on the flow of such trade; HC, the flow of FDI and the British colonial regime come out as encouraging factors.

The results provided can be useful to design policies oriented to facilities intra-trade between African economies. So far, this is the first study that incorporates the soft type of infrastructures, colonization and institutional quality in the investigation of the factors that can influence intra-Africa trade.

The literature examining the participation of developing countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and International Trade Organisation (ITO) negotiations generally sees their attitudes towards these projects as having been driven exclusively by a commitment to import substitution. This commitment, it is argued, led developing countries to oppose many aspects of the GATT/ITO project, particularly the requirement for reciprocal tariff cuts. The purpose of this paper is to focus on examining the critical period around the ultimately doomed negotiation of the Charter for an ITO and the process of creating the GATT.

This paper draws from GATT documents and from the literature on economic history to give a more comprehensive account of the motivating ideas underpinning developing countries attitudes to the post‐war negotiations.

This paper argues that this view misconstrues and caricatures the ideas and motivations underpinning developing countries' attitudes towards the GATT and ITO. Though import substitution and the related objective of industrialisation each played a part in shaping developing countries' attitudes, they are only aspects of a more complex set of aims and ideas. Developing countries were drawing from a range of key experiences and ideas beyond simply import substitution in forming their attitude towards the GATT/ITO project, in particular the volatility in commodity markets that preceded the negotiations, the legacy of colonialism and the lessons provided by the ninetieth and twentieth centuries on trade policy. Finally, this paper argues that the first round of GATT negotiations shows that developing countries were substantially less opposed to reciprocal tariff concessions than has previously been argued.

These findings are important for anyone who wants to understand the evolution of the GATT and the role developing countries played in it, and the difficulties between the rich and poor nations that continue to characterise negotiations in the World Trade Organisation.

Scholars have long emphasized that the Lower South was one of the most economically successful regions of British North America. The region had the highest levels of private wealth per capita in the colonies by 1774, and it has been argued that income per capita rose rapidly due to the rapid growth of rice exports. Here we present new and more comprehensive estimates of the region's exports, which reveal a different result. While exports grew rapidly, they grew slower than rice and indigo alone, and slower than population. Here we explain why the extensive growth of exports and population did not lead to rapid growth of income per capita.

This study aims to apply the modified Walker-Unger model to show the degree of attractiveness of a country for Mexican-based money launderers to send their illicit funds for the 2000–2015 time period.

The modified Walker-Unger model is used to conduct the analysis, as it combines several independent variables related to an illicit financial activity. These allow the researcher to investigate the attractiveness of a market to money launderers and the possible economic effects of money laundering. In total, 13 categories of indicators were used, namely, gross national product per capita; banking secrecy; government attitude; society for worldwide interbank financial telecommunication membership; financial deposits; conflict; corruption; Egmont group membership; language; trade; culture, colonial background; and physical distance.

Model results suggest the preferred destinations for Mexican-based money launderers from 2000 to 2015 were Bermuda (i.e. from 2000–2004), Canada (i.e. in 2005 and 2006) and Monaco (i.e. from 2007–2015).

Timing and availability of reliable data after 2015.

Aids in continuing to empirically validate the Walker-Unger model. There is little literature on models that quantify money laundering activity.

May aid policymakers in targeting anti-money laundering policy to more relevant countries.

The first empirical investigation that looks to quantify money launderer activity in Mexico. Contributes to the limited literature of quantitative investigations on money laundering.

The Economic Community of West African States (EOWAS) is a major attempt by 16 lesser developed countries (LDCs) to gain economic advantages through regional co‐operation and to improve their international leverage on several factors with multinational companies, foreign governments, an inter‐governmental organizations. This group of mostly young nations has survived uniquely difficult circumstances and is now relaunching its efforts at economic reform, trade liberalization, and political dialogue. Although there are problems, the regional economy it covers offers significant opportunities for international marketers.

Why, despite clear economic incentives, did eighteenth-century slave traders fail to defend their business interests against the abolition campaign? We focus on the outport of Bristol as a case in point. Our main argument is that slave traders lacked an organizational basis to translate their economic interests into political influence. Supporting evidence from merchant networks over the 1698–1807 period shows that the Society of Merchant Venturers offered such an organizational site for collective political action. Members of this chartered company controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne commerce and held chief elective offices in the municipal government. However, the Society evolved into an organization that represented the interests of a closed elite. High barriers to entry prevented the slave traders from using the Society as a vehicle for political mobilization. Social cohesion among slave traders outside the chartered company hinged on centrally positioned brokers. Yet the broker positions were held by the few merchants who became members of the Society, and who eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading. The result was a fragmented network that undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize against the political pressure of the abolitionist movement.