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This paper gives a model of collusion formation and a method of measuring the degree of it among the traders/bidders in the agricultural commodity markets in India. The important assumption is that the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. The paper is based on full information in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The paper used the standard theory of optimization and the theory of auction and probability statistics.

This is a complete information model of cartel formation. The bidding is repetitive and continues forever in discrete time. Hence bidders behavior is observable. Using the proposed method, if the APMC measures for each market and publishes on a periodic basis, say weekly basis, then it will be easier to break the collusion in the market where relative collision is present. For example, if a farmer has three options to sell in three different markets, then the published data would help them to select the market where the degree of collusion is relatively lower. Moreover, the undesirable loss can be avoided based on the right choice of market. As a result, transaction costs will be optima.

The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

In the insurance industry, it is common for the insurance salespeople to sell insurance products to friends, relatives and associates. However, permitting (or encouraging) salespeople to sell insurance through personal relationships may result in some ethical conflicts. For example, some insurance salespeople may help relatives or friends with pre-existing medical conditions buy the health insurance. Previous studies on insurance fraud have rarely focused on this problem. Thus, this study aims to investigate the effects of guanxi (guanxi refers to the durable social connections and relationships a Chinese person uses to exchange favors for a specific purpose) on the salespeople’s acceptance of customer–salesperson collusions. Two types of guanxi are discussed in the research. The author further focuses on how the ethical attitudes and intentions are affected by the salespeople’s guanxi considerations, consequence evaluations, perception of peers’ attitudes, perceived harm to other policyholders and perceived probability of being caught.

Full-time life insurance salespeople from Taiwan were surveyed, and partial least squares method was used in the study.

The results showed that the types of guanxi, guanxi considerations, consequence evaluations, perception of peers’ attitudes and perceived harm to other policyholders were important in forming the salespeople’s ethical decision-making in the customer–salesperson collusions.

This is the first time that guanxi has been studied as the factor influencing collusive behaviors in the problems of insurance fraud. The results challenged an established belief that the insurance salespeople should first target close relations as they build their portfolio of customers.

With the surge in public procurement, especially in developing countries, ensuring fair competition in procurement has assumed paramount importance. Academic endeavors in the domain of competition issues have often lacked the views of field-level functionaries. This study aims to involve a large number of expert practitioners in India to identify the significant contemporary competition risks in public procurement from the procurer and supplier sides and develop a model depicting the hierarchy of competition-restrictive actions (CRAs) in procurement based on their mutual interactions.

The significant CRAs along the procurement cycle are identified through literature survey, interactive workshops and expert interviews. A questionnaire survey covering 143 respondents from 12 public organizations is used to evaluate their impact. Considering the complex causal interactions involved, interpretive structural modeling followed by MICMAC (Iimpact matrix cross-reference multiplication applied to a classification analysis is used to develop a hierarchical model of competition risks in procurement.

Tailor-made contracts, splitting of a project below competition thresholds, restrictive selection criteria and awarding the contract on nomination emerge as CRAs with the highest driving power. Horizontal collusion among vendors strongly depends on practices followed in the procuring organization.

The survey data and the experts’ opinions emanate from practitioners in India, which is a limitation. However, with necessary contextual calibrations, the study is of high functional utility to policymakers and practitioners.

The research facilitates a comprehensive understanding to procurement managers/policymakers of the CRAs along the procurement cycle and their interdependencies. It offers valuable insights for improving competition, which is foundational for optimal procurement outcomes.

The study enriches the public procurement domain knowledge by identifying and assessing the significant contemporary CRAs, examining their mutual interactions and developing an interpretive structural model. Although contributing to the body of knowledge, the study is unique in being grounded in field realities.

The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the hidden process of collusion among power holders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an emerging economy, which endures despite comprehensive reforms towards democracy and good governance. Why are mechanisms of checks and balances not functioning in the way they should?

The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with board members, executives, politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from auditing boards involved in the management of SOEs in Indonesia.

The findings reveal practices of collective conservatism, reciprocal opportunism and normalisation of corruption. The costs of getting into powerful positions are so high that conglomerate business owners gain control over the management of SOEs. The authors use the terms “wall-building and gatekeeping” to explain such cases.

There is a continuous process of wall building and gatekeeping occurring among business oligarchs, bureaucrats and elected politicians in Indonesia. New entrants into the system are co-opted by the established elite.

This study shows collusion, rent-seeking and corruption among political and business elites as well as top officials in the government hinder good governance reforms in state-owned Indonesian enterprises.

Collusion and illicit business practices in SOEs are clearly grounded on wall building and gatekeeping. Tackling this problem is a precondition for good governance and an improved legal and regulatory business environment in Indonesia. The ideal separation of powers and the checks and balances for good governance apparently need more than a democracy to break through. A further strengthening of the free press and critical academics will be one crucial contribution.

There is generally a lack of understanding of the context of corruption, such as the influence of institutional and organisational structures. The topic of corruption is also under-researched due to the difficulty of finding empire evidence. This paper contributes to explaining why new political and organisational structures, such as a democratically elected parliament and a particularly designed corruption eradication commission, are not able to hinder rent-seeking practices and illicit political business in state agencies.

As large‐scale homogeneous networks suffer from high costs of communication, computation, and storage requirements, the heterogeneous sensor networks (HSN) are preferred because they provide better performance and security solutions for scalable applications in dynamic environments. Random key pre‐distribution schemes are vulnerable to collusion attacks. The purpose of this paper is to propose an efficient collusion resistant security mechanism for heterogeneous sensor networks.

The authors consider a heterogeneous sensor network (HSN) consists of a small number of powerful high‐end H‐sensors and a large number of ordinary low‐end L‐sensors. However, homogeneous sensor network (MSN) consists of only L‐sensors. Since the collusion attack on key pre‐distribution scheme mainly takes advantage of the globally applicable keys, which are selected from the same key pool, they update the key ring after initial deployment and generate new key rings by using one‐way hash function on nodes' IDs and initial key rings. Further, in the proposed scheme, every node is authenticated by the BS in order to join the network.

The analysis of the proposed scheme shows that even if a large number of nodes are compromised, an adversary can only exploit a small number of keys near the compromised nodes, while other keys in the network remain safe.

The proposed key management scheme described in the paper outperforms the previous random key pre‐distribution schemes by: considerably reducing the storage requirement, and providing more resiliency against node capture and collusion attacks.

In November 1999, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission took legal action against participants in bids for oil delivery work ordered by the Self-Defense Forces. Then, in September 2000, the Korean Fair Trade Commission took legal action against participants in bids for oil delivery work ordered by the Korean Ministry of National Defense. These actions were not related, though there are similarities between the cases, each of which involves oil delivery companies obtaining special procurement privileges through deals with national security authorities. Study of these cases led to speculation as why the industry is conductive to collusion. According to the study three important results were recognized: Several measures in the plan for Japanese and Korean procurement reform were then analyzed. The implementation can clarify issues that are important for eradicating the participantsyʼ incentives for collusion.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the major international audit firms reach collusive agreements in Spain, in order to exercise market power and impose higher prices than those of competitors. According to the traditional theory of oligopoly, the ability to achieve these agreements is dependent primarily on the high level of market concentration, so that multiple studies have analysed the relationship between concentration and prices. However, the concentration has serious limitations to infer collusion and therefore the exercise of market power (Dedman and Lennox, 2009).

Based on an alternative current of the theory of industrial organisation, the authors use measures of industrial mobility as a measure of collusion or rivalry of firms in oligopolistic markets.

The results reveal that international audit firms do not reach collusive agreements to limit competition between them.

According to the empirical evidence obtained, the measures taken by the regulatory bodies to avoid market concentration would not be necessary or efficient and they would have significant costs for the audit market (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; European Commission, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013).

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to introduce mobility measures to explain market collusion and the exercise of market power in the audit market.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si las Grandes Firmas Internacionales de auditoría alcanzan acuerdos colusivos en España con la finalidad de ejercer poder de mercado e imponer precios superiores a los de los competidores. Según la teoría tradicional del oligopolio, la capacidad para alcanzar estos acuerdos se hace depender fundamentalmente del alto nivel de concentración del mercado, por lo que múltiples estudios han analizado la relación entre concentración y precios. Sin embargo, la concentración presenta serias limitaciones para inferir la colusión y, por tanto, el ejercicio del poder de mercado (Dedman y Lennox, 2009).

Basándonos en una corriente alternativa de la teoría de la organización industrial, utilizamos medidas de movilidad industrial como medida de la colusión o rivalidad de las empresas en mercados oligopolistas.

Nuestros resultados revelan que las firmas internacionales de auditoría no alcanzan acuerdos colusivos para limitar la competencia entre ellas.

Según la evidencia empírica que obtenemos, las medidas adoptadas por los organismos reguladores con la finalidad de desconcentrar el mercado, las cuales presentan importantes costes para el mercado de auditoría, no resultarían ni necesarias ni eficientes (GAO, 2003, 2008; FRC, 2009; Comisión Europea, 2010; Competition Commission, 2013).

Hasta donde conocemos, éste es el primer estudio que introduce medidas de movilidad del mercado para explicar la colusión y el ejercicio del poder de mercado en el mercado de auditoría.

E‐government procurement (E‐GP) can improve the traditional government procurement process. E‐GP can help decrease corruption. This research aims to present the factors of E‐GP that can create good governance in government procurement through e‐auction.

A survey was conducted with Thai public managers who are involved in e‐government procurement. The sample size is 169 professionals representing 67 government agencies.

There are five factors that enhance governance procurement. These relate to the transparent e‐procurement process, committed public managers and political officials, honest vendors, and specific policies and regulations. A transparent e‐procurement process has a positive effect on good governance practice, increasing cost effectiveness and accountability, and decreasing collusion among vendors. Vendor honesty has a negative impact on collusion. Supportive policy and regulations requirements improve cost effectiveness, accountability, and law enforcement.

E‐GP is not a guarantor of enhanced governance and reduced corruption. It requires a dedicated commitment to strong rule enforcement and penalties to achieve successful implementation of e‐government procurement.

Using a wide range of government agencies, the research addresses the best practices e‐government procurement governance and the benefits of good governance in terms of cost effectiveness, accountability, collusion reduction, and stringent law enforcement.

This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal decision methods under a cooperative situation in two-echelon logistic models.

The authors propose the optimal strategies of exporters in the three types of rival game behaviors: Stackelberg, Collusion, and Cournot, each of which provides the optimal decision for the duopolistic shippers and the oligopolistic forwarders in each scenario.

From the empirical studies the paper finds that among three scenarios, the oligopolistic treatment of forwarders’ actions demonstrates that Stackelberg behavior can carry out the maximum profit, and Collusion game can achieve the maximum profit for the shippers.

Proposed an optimal decision methods in two-echelon logistic models.