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The health equity and prosperity of communities is closely linked to the effectiveness and success of local health coalitions. Social network analysis (SNA) is one mechanism to quantify and understand the factors leading to collaboration and effectiveness within these coalitions. This study aims to investigate network characteristics associated with perceived success and satisfaction in a health coalition and determine significant factors related to organizational collaborations.

This study examined the Olympic Peninsula Healthy Community Coalition (OPHCC) which aims to prevent chronic disease in rural Clallam County, Washington. Representatives (n = 21) from member organizations (n = 18) were asked to report on organization characteristics, perceived satisfaction in coalition activities, perceived success toward coalition's mission, and collaborations with other organizations in the coalition. Multilevel modeling used to analyze whether an organization's position within the coalition network was associated with their perceived satisfaction and perceived success. Exponential random graph modeling was used to examine what factors may impact collaboration ties between coalition members.

Organization representatives reported a total of 252 collaboration ties. In multilevel models, organization characteristics and network centrality scores accounted for between 61 and 68% of variance displayed in satisfaction scores and 45–61% of variance in perceived success scores. Exponential random graph modeling revealed activity level, for-profit status, and transitivity as significant factors in collaborative tie presence.

Encouraging consistent active participation, a balance of organizational type, and projects which require more than two collaborators may provide an environment for collaborative ties between organizations.

After noting several limiting features and procedural disadvantages of typical game theoretic studies of coalition formation, a new measurement procedure based on fuzzy set theory is described. A generalized Tanimoto coefficient measuring attitudinal similarity provides the fundamental basis for location and analysis of potential coalitions in a group decision‐making task. The results of a pilot study using fuzzy preference matrices and α‐level sets to determine the existence and structural evolution of coalitions over time are presented. Finally, some conjectures concerning the definition and future study of coalitions are advanced.

The paper aims to develop a theoretical model to explain the exact process through which the scale effect works to create a possible wedge between a perception-based ranking like the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ” and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking of economies with low enforcement against corruption.

The paper takes into account corruption both at the “high” and “low” levels of bureaucracies, where the bribes are paid sequentially at the two levels. The bribes are endogenously determined at the equilibrium using a sequential game approach.

The paper finds that in the absence of coalition between the two levels of bureaucrats, both the absolute level of corruption and the welfare level of the economies are expected to vary inversely with the perceived corruption frequency. The paper also explores the possibility of a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats and shows that with the perception of a stable coalition being formed, the negative monotonic relation between the corruption frequency and the absolute size of corruption breaks down.

First, the paper argues that the ranking of the economies with low enforcement against corruption on the basis of perceived corruption frequency may not reflect the ranking of the economies according to their absolute size of corruption; it points out that the perceived higher corruption frequency in an economy as reflected in CPI can be an indicator of both the lower size of “high” level corruption and absolute size of corruption in the economy. Particularly, this happens in economies where coalition between the “high” and “low” level officials does not form. Second, it identifies the exact way in which the scale effect works to create a difference in the CPI ranking and the axiomatic “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking and explains why similar difference would exist if “absolute costs of corruption”-based ranking is derived from all the sources of hard data on corruption. Third, it explains why a stable coalition between the “high” and “low” level bureaucrats in economies with low enforcement does not usually form.

Develops a “politics‐first” theoretical framework to explain why, how, and when innovative IT projects are implemented successfully in public organizations. Explains how individuals who share a technological interest find each other in issue‐networks. Describes why and how the interests of technologists, bureaucrats, and politicians converge to a point where a coalition with a concrete project agenda emerges. Argues that, frequently, more than one coalition emerges from a single issue‐network and describes how these coalitions compete against each other to institutionalize new dominant designs. Discusses the reasons why some coalitions win while others lose. Provides examples based on innovative national and municipal IT projects in Australia, China, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the UK, and the USA.

Community coalitions are an important part of the public milieu and subject to similar external pressures as other publicly funded organizations – including changes in required strategic orientation. Many US government agencies that fund efforts such as community-based social marketing initiatives have shifted their funding agenda from program development to policy development. The Florida Prevention Research Center at the University of South Florida (Tampa, Florida, USA) created community-based prevention marketing (CBPM) for policy development framework to teach community coalitions how to apply social marketing to policy development. This paper aims to explicate the framework’s theory of change.

The research question was: “How does implementing the CBPM for Policy Development framework improve coalition performance over time?” The authors implemented a case study design, with the “case” being a normative community coalition. The study adhered to a well-developed series of steps for system dynamics modeling.

Results from computer model simulations show that gains in community coalition performance depend on a coalition’s initial culture and initial efficiency, and that only the most efficient coalitions’ performance might improve from implementing the CBPM framework.

Practical implications for CBPM’s developers and users are discussed, namely, the importance of managing the early expectations of academic-community partnerships seeking to shift their orientation from downstream (e.g. program development) to upstream social marketing strategies (e.g. policy change).

Findings from earlier legitimacy based accounting studies provide evidence that firms respond to threats to their perceived legitimacy by increasing communication to the public. This communication is meant to demonstrate that their actions are commensurate with the values and norms of relevant stakeholder groups. Questions remain, however, as to whether it is merely a form of impression management or a reflection of the congruent activities of the firm. In the late 1990s, a unique situation arose in British Columbia’s coastal forestry industry that enabled us to examine this issue. For many years, this industry had been the target of environmental non‐government organisations’ (ENGOs) campaigns to influence change in forest management practices and conserve the coastal rainforests. In late 1999, a subset of the industry responded by forming a coalition with key ENGOs. The aim of the coalition was to develop a consensus package of recommendations for the Government of B. C. founded on eco‐system based forest management practices. Facing threats to their critical export markets, the firms viewed this initiative as their best chance for long‐term survival. We found that during this period of time there was an increase in the amount of environmental disclosure in coalition firm annual reports as compared to pre‐ and post‐coalition periods, as well as to that in a matched set of non‐coalition B.C. forestry firms. This finding provides evidence of the use of annual reports for social disclosure beyond their use as a vehicle for impression management.

There is evidence that many promising coalitions fail to thrive, languishing for indefinite periods and/or collapsing before achieving their goals. The purpose of the current study is to conduct a qualitative investigation of a local coalition established to build a healthy community.

Text analysis and thematic coding of coalition interviews over two separate time points provided first hand insights into the experiences of coalitions as they develop and begin to implement change.

Two overarching processes defined each phase, namely: establishing potential (development phase) and fulfilling purpose (implementation phase). At the development phase, critical considerations related to the themes of “The Local Context”, “Processes” and “Time”, whereas at the implementation phase, critical considerations were focused on “Programs”, “Information” and “Funding”. The data clearly supported a shift in attention among coalition members that could be used in a preventative manner by coalition managers.

Left unattended, these critical considerations may contribute to coalition under‐performance by compromising the functional integrity of the members and the entity as a whole. The processes identified in this paper offer a way of conceptualising what topics are critical to coalition members at different phases of the coalition life cycle.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the existing approaches of coalition formation to how to adapt dynamically the size of the coalition according to the complexity of the task to be accomplished.

A considerable amount of attention has been paid to the coalition formation problem to deal efficiently with tasks needing more than one agent (i.e. robot). However, little attention has been paid to the problem of monitoring a coalition during the execution by modifying it according to the progress of the accomplishment of the task. In this paper, the authors consider a coalition of resource‐bounded autonomous agents with anytime behavior solving a common complex task. There is no central control component. Agents can observe the effect of the other agents' actions. They can decide whether they should continue to contribute in solving the common task or to stop their contribution and to leave the coalition. This decision is made in a distributed way. The objective is to avoid the waste of resources and time by using the same coalition along the task accomplishment while some agents become unnecessary to pursue the accomplishment of the task. The authors formalize this decentralized decision‐making problem as a decentralized Markov decision process (DEC‐MDP).

The paper results in a framework leading to Coal‐DEC‐MDP, which allows each agent to decide whether to stay in the coalition or leave it by estimating the progress on the task accomplishment.

The approach could be extended to deal with more than one coalition.

Decentralized control of a fleet of robots accomplishing a mission.

The paper deals with a new problem of adapting dynamically the coalition to the target task and the use of DEC‐MDPs.

Union‐community collaboration is an increasingly common practice in industrialised nations where union power and density have declined. This paper proposes a framework for defining and evaluating community unionism, through a definition of the term “community.”

The author explores this framework drawing on campaigns in Sydney and Chicago.

It defines the term community in three discrete but mutually reinforcing ways, as (community) organisation; common interest identity, and local neighbourhood or place. The term is used to then define community unionism as three discrete union strategies, and finally to examine one type of community unionism – coalition unionism. Successful coalition practice is defined by partner organisational relationships (coalition structure, bridge brokers, and coalition offices); common concern (common interest operates as mutual direct interest of organisation and members), and the element of scale (where success increases as coalitions operate at multiple scales such as the local, as well as the scale of government and/or business decision makers).

The paper identifies three elements of coalition unionism.

The purpose of this paper is to examine formal and informal types of power, and identify the characteristics of corporate communications managers who are in the dominant coalition.

The paper reports on results of a survey sent to a representative sample of S&P 500 corporate communications managers and CEOs in the USA Data about industry sector, company size, annual revenue and profitability were collected for the responding companies and a random sample of 100 non‐responding companies. The responding companies (n=161) did not significantly differ from the non‐responding companies

The paper finds that four attributes of informal power differentiate communications managers who are in the dominant coalition from those who are not: reciprocal trust, strategic business decision‐making, social inclusion and communication expertise.

Future research should explore whether any of the 37 percent of communications managers in the dominant coalition at these top companies come from backgrounds significantly different from those of the executive elite.

The paper supports the organizational theory of the importance of informal power as a prerequisite to be in the dominant coalition – particularly friendship and “being included.” Communications managers who are in the dominant coalition are in a better position to institute ethical and excellent (symmetrical) communication practices. The findings of this study have implications for the likely success (or lack thereof) of managers with diverse backgrounds of being included in the dominant coalition.

The paper provides quantitative, generalizable results based on a representative sample where many previous studies have relied on qualitative data alone.