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Purpose – Our ultimate goal is to characterize three methodological issues. First, compare the relative performance of alternative estimation methods for long time series, second, estimate the degree of correlation between effort and circumstances, and, third, decompose total inequality into inequality of opportunity and inequality of effort according to an ideal tree.

Methodology – We estimate parametrically and nonparametrically the ex-ante inequality of opportunity in the United States between 1969 and 2007. The degree of correlation between effort and circumstances is computed following the proposal in Björklund et al. (2011). In addition, we decompose total inequality based on an ideal tree with three levels of disaggregation by applying the natural decomposition of the squared coefficient of variation and the Nested Shapley value.

Findings – We find significant differences between the nonparametric and parametric approaches. In particular, our results reveal that considering cross-effects between circumstances may be relevant. Moreover, the degree of correlation between effort and circumstances which has significantly increased over the period 1969 and 2007 in the United States, explains between 5% and 20% of total IO. In addition, race is the main circumstance during the 1970s and 1980s, accounting for more than 50% of the direct IO, while parental education take the lead in the last two decades.

Originality – We modify the parametric specification by considering cross-effects between circumstances. We estimate the degree of correlation between effort and circumstances for long time series. We decompose total inequality according to a three-level hierarchical model.

This chapter provides a genealogy of the Gladue–Ipeelee principle of special consideration of Indigenous circumstances at sentencing. The principle is codified in the 1996 statutory requirement that “all available sanctions other than imprisonment … should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders” (s. 718.2e of the Criminal Code of Canada). Using the Foucaultian genealogy method to produce a “history of the present,” this chapter eschews normative questions of how s. 718.2e has “failed” to reduce Indigenous over-incarceration to instead focus on how practices of “special consideration” reproduce settler-state paternalism. This chapter addresses three key components of the Gladue–Ipeelee principle: the collection of circumstances information, the characterization of those circumstances, and finally their consideration at sentencing. Part one focuses on questions of legitimacy and authority and explicates how authority and responsibility to produce Indigenous circumstances knowledge was transferred from the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) to Indigenous Courtworker organizations in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Part two identifies how authority shapes problematization by examining the characterization of Indigenous circumstances in the two eras, finding that present-day Gladue reports articulate an Indigenous history and critique of colonialism as the root cause of Indigenous criminalization, whereas DIA reports prior to 1970 generally characterized this criminalization as a “failure to assimilate.” Part three focuses on the structural reproduction of power relations by exploring historical continuities in judicial and executive-branch consideration of Indigenous circumstances, suggesting that the Gladue–Ipeelee principle reinscribes a colonial “mercy” framework of diminished responsibility. The author discusses how the principle operates in the shadow of Indigenous over-incarceration as a form of state “recognition” and a technique of governance to encourage Indigenous participation in the settler justice system and suggests that the Gladue–Ipeelee principle produces a governing effect that reinforces settler-state authority by recirculating colonial practices and discourses of settler superiority.

This chapter aims to quantify and compare inequalities of opportunity in health across European countries considering two alternative normative ways of treating the correlation between effort, as measured by lifestyles, and circumstances, as measured by parental and childhood characteristics, championed by Brian Barry and John Roemer. This study relies on regression analysis and proposes several measures of inequality of opportunity. Data from the Retrospective Survey of SHARELIFE, which focuses on life histories of European people aged 50 and over, are used.

In Europe at the whole, inequalities of opportunity stand for almost 50% of the health inequality due to circumstances and efforts in Barry scenario and 57.5% in Roemer scenario. The comparison of the magnitude of inequalities of opportunity in health across European countries shows considerable inequalities in Austria, France, Spain and Germany, whereas Sweden, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland present the lowest inequalities of opportunity. The normative principle on the way to treat the correlation between circumstances and efforts makes little difference in Spain, Austria, Greece, France, Czech Republic, Sweden and Switzerland, whereas it would matter the most in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Poland and Denmark.

In most countries, inequalities of opportunity in health are mainly driven by social background affecting adult health directly, and so would require policies compensating for poorer initial conditions. On the other hand, our results suggest a strong social and family determinism of lifestyles in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Poland and Denmark, which emphasises the importance of inequalities of opportunity in health within those countries and calls for targeted prevention policies.

Can an estimate of the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) be interpreted as a measure of inequality of opportunity (IOp)? If parental income is the only childhood circumstance, then the answer is yes. However, parental income is one of many potential circumstances that can shape IOp. These circumstances can influence the offspring’s income indirectly – by influencing parental income – or directly, bypassing the IGE altogether. I develop a model to decompose the interaction between childhood circumstances, parental income and offspring income. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the United States, I find that childhood circumstances account for 55% of the IGE for individual earnings and 53% for family income, with parental education explaining over a third of those shares. Furthermore, the IGE misses a large part of the influence of circumstances: only 45% of the influence of parental education on the offspring’s income goes through parental income (36% for earnings).

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The additional tax (referred to as a “penalty” by the judiciary), which may be imposed in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act (“the Act”) when a taxpayer is in default, can be very harsh (Up to 200% of the tax correctly chargeable). The Commissioner may remit any penalty imposed as he sees fit. However, when there was intent on the part of the taxpayer to evade the payment of tax, the Commissioner may not remit the 200% penalty, unless he is of the opinion that there are “extenuating circumstances”. This article examines the general meaning, as interpreted by the courts, of the “extenuating circumstances” that may be taken into account for the purposes of remission of penalties in terms of section 76(2)(a) of the Act.

An employee who is eligible to make a complaint for unfair dismissal has to prove that he has been dismissed by the employer if the employer contests that the employee has in fact been dismissed. If the dismissal is not contested, all the employee has to do is to show that he has been dismissed. This constitutes the first stage of the proceedings in an industrial tribunal.

This study aims to investigate the differences between destructive leadership in two different contexts: crisis management and usual circumstances. The specific research questions are as follows: What is the relationship between destructive leadership behaviours in usual circumstances and destructive leadership behaviours in crisis management? Are destructive leadership behaviours in usual circumstances or in crisis management the best predictors of trust in the leader and subordinate performance?

Questionnaire responses were obtained from 337 individuals who had experience from handling various societal crises, such as terror attacks and forest fires. The respondents represented four different organisations: municipalities, county administrative boards, the police and the emergency service.

The results from the study reveal that there is a strong association between destructive leadership in usual circumstances and destructive leadership during crisis management. The study indicates that everyday leadership matters the most. It is above all behaviours in usual circumstances that show the strongest associations with trust in the leader and subordinate performance. The results also show that it is especially task-related, passive forms of destructive leadership behaviours that show the strongest association with the studied outcome variables.

Limitations related to measurements and self-reported data are discussed.

The study emphasises the importance of paying attention to leaders’ task- and strategic-oriented behaviour as well as the importance of building trusting relationships with the subordinates.

The need for industry-specific studies of destructive leadership has been highlighted and this study contributes with knowledge from the crisis management context.

Heavy penalties may be imposed on a defaulting taxpayer in terms of section 76(1) of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (the “Act”), unless “extenuating circumstances” are found to prevail, in which case any penalty imposed may be remitted partly or even in toto. This article examines the defence or plea of adverse personal circumstances, such as education, intelligence, financial means, hardship, age, influence of others, provocation and the death, insolvency or liquidation of a taxpayer, and whether such adverse personal circumstances could be considered to be “extenuating” for the purposes of section 76(2)(a) of the Act and lead to a remission of the penalties imposed.

In a previous monograph a discussion took place on stages one and part of stage two of the three stage process in an unfair dismissal action, namely the employee having to show that he has been dismissed (stage one), and some of the reasons for dismissal which fall within the statutory categories, namely the employee's capability and qualifications; misconduct and redundancy (part of stage two). In this monograph an analysis is proposed on the two remaining reasons, these being the contravention of a duty imposed by an enactment and some other substantial reason. There will then follow a discussion on the test of fairness as constituting the third of the three stage process and on the remedies available when the tribunal finds that the employee has been unfairly dismissed.