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This paper aims at comparing and contrasting the Ao Man-long scandal with the Ho Chio-meng case in Macau, drawing lessons from the two events and casting lights on the literature on corruption scandals.

The study used documentary research and interpretative and analytical approaches.

The two cases show considerable administrative discretion on the part of the principal officials involved, and remedial measures along the line of having more rigorous and frequent internal auditing may be necessary.

Original analyses were conducted together with literature review and documentary research. This paper would be of interest to scholars and practitioners concerned with how Macau combats corruption.

Recent corporate scandals such as WorldCom, Enron, and others suggest a failure of corporate governance, that is, of the allocation of power and its lawful use and accountability within the corporation.

This chapter presents a game theoretic model for analyzing the power dynamics among the three groups responsible for oversight in the Anglo-American corporate model – namely the Board of Directors through its audit committee, corporate management, and the external auditors.

The chapter shows, among other findings, that the current governance structure results in an extreme imbalance of power among the three groups that not only permits but even induces management to conceal necessary financial data and often to ignore the long-term interests of the firm.

The chapter also derives changes in principles of governance that can right such imbalances and prevent defalcations from taking place through institutionalizing effective ex-ante checks and balances of power in addition to the ex post measures that come into play only after a wrong has been committed and which are the case with recent exchange rules and Congressional enactments.

None.

No prior analysis along these lines.

The global financial crisis of 2008 raises many governance questions regarding the roles and responsibilities of executives and board members. Simultaneously, CEO duality in the USA and elsewhere has come under renewed scrutiny because of the perceived loss of checks and balances and resultant abuse of power. The authors suggest that the financial crisis presents a unique opportunity to explore the effects of, and attitudes, to CEO duality. The purpose of this paper therefore is to investigate whether CEO duality is associated with bank failure and whether bank regulators, as can be expected, are opposed to CEO duality.

The authors investigated the correlation between CEO duality and publicly traded banks in the USA that received Federal bailout funds, using available databases, and investigated bank regulators' attitudes to CEO duality using a series of structured interviews.

No correlation was found between bank failure and CEO duality. However, a strong correlation was found between bank ownership and receipt of Federal bailout funds in that publically owned banks were far more likely to have received bailout funds than banks which were privately owned. Surprisingly, it was also found that Regulators accepted CEO duality for several reasons and have no agenda to limit it.

The results suggest that CEO duality is a less significant issue factor in corporate management than suggested by many previous researchers and policy makers. This has clear implications for governance, regulation and legislation.

This study is the first to investigate the relationship between bank performance and CEO duality. The authors' results suggest that whilst there may be many good reasons for limiting CEO duality, the key measure of adverse effects on corporate performance in this sector is not one of them.

Institutional governance has recently attracted significant attention, fuelled by increasing numbers of global high‐profile corporate failures and scandals. In many countries issues have been raised about university governance. In Ghana, university governance has become crucial following the upsurge of private universities in recent years arising out of: increased demand for tertiary education resulting from high population growth; and expanded enrolment at basic and secondary levels, which have far exceeded the capacity of existing institutions. This study aims to explore and assess the governance arrangements of private and public universities in Ghana.

A multi‐stage sampling technique was used to select three private and two public universities. An exploratory and comparative approach was used to examine the governance arrangements of private and public universities in Ghana.

Both private and public universities in Ghana follow the “traditional”, “business”, and “trusteeship” models of university governance, although in different proportions. Additionally, both types of institutions follow the bicameral system of decision making.

Only five of 19 universities in Ghana were sampled. Future research might expand the sample size to test and validate the initial perspectives from this study and also investigate differences between governance arrangements of faith based and non‐faith based private universities.

The paper reports the findings of the first nation‐wide investigation into governance arrangements of Ghanaian universities. It will interest policy makers, university authorities, and other stakeholders in the higher educational sector.

Managers as Actors Those of us who manage are playing on an organisational stage every day. We enter early every morning to take up our roles, whether it is as chief executive, marketing manager, personnel adviser, production executive or any of the numerous other roles that have to be performed if work is to be done effectively.

The intent of this article is to explore the resultant conundrum that arises when the role of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the role of the chairman of the corporate board are merged into one person. There is a resultant loss in checks and balances and this can result in a decrease in vigilance in the operation of the corporation. Given this loss of vigilance power begins to center in one leader, the CEO/chairman, that can be used for personal gain at the expense of the other stakeholders of the corporation. This creates an environment of greed and corruption that eventually creates mistrust in the viability of the stock of the corporation as well as loss of personnel that can right the course. The article raises the concern and sees an answer for such issues in government regulation as it relates to the corporate structure.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the key dimensions of mobile banking (m-banking) service quality.

The authors employ the critical incident technique to unveil the key dimensions of m-banking service quality as perceived by m-banking customers, and to identify critical satisfiers/dissatisfiers among the identified dimensions.

The analysis reveals a total of 17 dimensions of m-banking service quality: m-banking application quality (content, accuracy, ease of use, speed, aesthetics, security, diverse mobile application service features, and mobile convenience), and m-banking customer service quality (reliability, responsiveness, competence, courtesy, credibility, access, communication, understanding the customer, and continuous improvement). Of these, five dimensions, such as mobile convenience, accuracy, diverse mobile application service features, ease of use, and continuous improvement, are considered as the main sources of customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction.

M-bankers, based on the identified 17 dimensions, can develop a comprehensive service quality management system, which helps them identify and overcome key obstacles to the delivery of high quality m-banking customer services.

This study focusses on uncovering the key dimensions of m-banking service quality and their associated sub-dimensions specific to the context of m-banking. Theoretically, the identified dimensions and their related sub-items can serve as building blocks for further research in customer relationship management in m-banking.