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Studies about the determinants of the clarity of central bank communication are still scarce. To the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies regarding emerging economies. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature in the following aspects: to analyze the determinants of the clarity of the central bank communication in an inflation targeting emerging economy; observe the influence of inflation volatility over the clarity; and observe the effect of the monetary policy signaling over the clarity.

The work uses readability indexes to measure the clarity of central bank communication. The empirical analysis uses ordinary least squares and the Generalized Method of Moments with one- and two-step estimations.

The findings suggest the inflation volatility reduces the clarity of central bank communication. Moreover, the monetary policy signaling also affects the clarity, but the effect depends on the direction of the signal.

This paper observes the determinants of the clarity considering an emerging economy environment. The clarity of central bank communications is an important tool to access transparency. Hence, the analysis of what determines the clarity of central bank communication is a debate about the level of transparency accessed by the central bank.

There are no studies about the determinants of the clarity of central bank communication in emerging economies. Moreover, the novelty are the effects of inflation volatility and monetary policy signaling over the clarity.

Due to the fact that studies on central bank communication in emerging countries are still scarce and there are few studies related to the influence that central bank’s perspectives about the state of the economy have on inflation expectations in emerging economies, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature in the following aspects: it proposes an indicator of the central bank’s perception of inflation based on the minutes of the COPOM meetings, and, it analyzes the influence of central bank communication on expert inflation expectations through such indicator.

Due to the fact that the perception of the Central Bank of Brazil is not directly observable, it is measured through the fuzzy set theory by an indicator that captures the informational content of the minutes of the COPOM meetings. The empirical analysis uses ordinary least squares, the generalized method of moments and vector-autoregressive through impulse-response analysis.

The findings suggest that the expectations of financial market experts react according to the content of the information provided by the central bank, i.e., announcements cause deterioration of expectations in times of instability, and reduce inflation expectations when inflation is controlled. The results also support the idea that the credibility of inflation targeting plays a key role in determining inflation expectations.

This paper suggests a new approach on studies about central bank communication. The focus here is not on the effect of the announcements in terms of future monetary policy, but on the perception of the central bank in terms of inflation. This central bank’s perception reflects the optimistic or pessimistic view about the economic outlook and risk of inflation and this perception is considered by experts of financial markets.

For Brazil, there are no studies about the influence of communication through the minutes of the Brazilian Monetary Policy Committee meetings on inflation expectations. The authors develop an indicator in order to measure central bank’s perception of inflation based on the minutes of COPOM meetings.

This paper aims to review the economic literature on central bank communication to address the questions of how economists account for the effects of speech acts and whether and to what extent discourse analysis is applied in their studies. Moreover, whether there may be room for more linguistic approaches to analyse central bank communication is investigated.

A range of recently published (2004-2013) works in the area of central bank communication are critically scrutinized to highlight the current thinking in this area. The sources are organised into different sections, namely, communication in monetary policy theory; impacts of speech acts; optimizing central bank communication; and linguistic analysis of central bank communication.

The current literature is developing a coherent argument that central bank communication is an important part of monetary policy and that speech acts by the central bank do have impacts at the macroeconomic level. Linguistic analysis does have the potential to contribute to this literature, as little attention has been paid to the content of the speech acts.

This paper fulfils the need for an up-to-date review of the developing literature on central bank communication. This paper also provides support for linguistic analysis in this area.

The purpose of this paper is to make an analysis of the Brazilian experience after the adoption of inflation targeting concerning the effects caused by the new practices of transparency and communication in the monetary policy.

Changes in the financial market's expectations due to monetary policy actions are analyzed based on methodologies proposed by Cook and Hahn and Kuttner. Daily data from transactions in the interbank deposit futures market of the Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (BMF&BOVESPA) are used for the period July 1999‐January 2009. Two sub‐periods are also considered: the “maturation period” – the first phase of the effects caused by an increase in central bank transparency; and the “wisdom period” – the second phase in the financial market's perception regarding an environment with more transparency.

The findings are in consonance with the idea that an increase in central bank transparency and communication improves the efficiency of expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rate and the anticipation of changes in the interest rate target.

This study offers some new insights into how central bank communication improves the efficiency of the monetary policy for developing countries, which have adopted inflation targeting.

The purpose of this paper is to study if the central bank (BC) communications affect the effectiveness of the monetary policy.

For this analysis, a new Keynesian theoretical model and the ordinary least squared methodology were used. The objective to be achieved was to determine if there is some effect of economic transparency on accountability, inflation average, output gap, interest and central bank credibility.

The results highlighted that central banks with greater transparency contribute to decrease inflation rate and interest rate. The findings denote that an increase in the information quality (clarity) implies a significant change in the rate of readjustment of market expectations. Furthermore, central bank transparency contributes to anchor the public expectations and to affect long‐run interest rates.

Impulse‐answer research was employed to show how the central bank transparency affects the credibility of monetary authorities.

This paper suggests that the central bank publicizes its outlook, its policy monetary decisions, its expectations and its preferences.

The originality of the paper resides in the fact that empirical and theoretical studies were made in the single work. Also, new results were found denoting that economic transparency reduces uncertainty effect and increases the power of incentive contract made between the BC and public.

This study contributes to the pool of knowledge about the impact of monetary policy communication of central banks on financial instruments' prices and assets' value in emerging markets.

Empirical analysis is executed using the National Bank of Poland (NBP) announcements about its monetary policy covering the data from the broad financial market in its three main segments: stock market, foreign exchange market and bonds market. The reactions are measured relative to the changes in the NBP announcements and also with respect to investors' expectations. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models with dummy variables are used as the main methodological tool.

Bonds market and foreign exchange market are the most sensitive market segments, while interest rate and money supply are the most influential types of announcements. The changes of the revealed new macroeconomic figures had more impact on assets' prices movements than the deviations from their expectations. Moreover, greater diversity of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members' opinions on the voted motions, captured in the MPC voting reports, is associated with more cases of statistically significant NBP communication events.

The findings have direct relevance for fund managers, portfolio analysts, investors and also for financial market regulators.

The results provide novel evidence about how the emerging financial market responds to monetary policy announcements. They help understand the nature of the impact of public information on financial assets' valuation and on movements of their prices, analysed comprehensively in three market segments, in the emerging market environment.

This study aims to better understand the effects of speeches as a valuable communication tool for central banks. It extends the analysis of the effects of public speeches on jumps to determine whether individual speakers matter partly because of their name, position or institution.

This study detects intraday jumps using a robust-to-jump volatility estimator that accounts for deterministic seasonality. As a result, this study removes spurious jumps that occur when volatility is high and consider the relatively small jumps that occur when volatility is low. After identifying jumps, this study examines their reactions to senior official speeches and macroeconomic news surrounding the US and European Union (EU) financial crises.

Despite having the most influential individual speakers, this study finds that the impact of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB) is mitigated because the two institutions have a relatively small impact on currency jumps. This finding shows that the speaker’s name is more important than his or her institution affiliation. While the Federal Reserve Bank President and Chief Executive, as well as ECB board members, significantly reduce jump sizes, particularly during the EU crisis period, both the Fed Chairman and the ECB President increase the magnitude of the jump in both the US crisis and noncrisis periods, contributing to market instability.

The implications of the results include international portfolio management, currency derivatives pricing and hedging, risk management and market efficiency.

The findings contribute to a better understanding of the effects of senior official speech attributes on currency jumps in various economic states. The results raise questions about the speaker’s name, institution and position’s effectiveness in calming markets and reducing uncertainty.