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This paper seeks to investigate the relation among corruption, institutional quality and economic growth.

It expands the Erlich and Lui (JPE) endogenous growth model. From this model, institutional aspects such as judicial corruption, bureaucracy, democracy and income inequality are introduced into the analysis in order to identify the institutional conditions that may inhibit corruption and stimulate economic growth.

It was demonstrated that the magnitude of the marginal effect of bureaucratic corruption on growth crucially depends on other institutional aspects of the economy and that judicial corruption amplifies the perverse effects of bureaucratic corruption.

The paper explains why some countries with a lot of corruption grow at high rates. In that sense if a country has only a lot of judicial or bureaucratic corruption it may grow at high rates but, when these two kinds of corruptions occur at the same time, then the economy will be at a low‐growth pitfall.

In observational data, access to information is associated with lower levels of corruption. This chapter reviews a small but growing body of work that uses field experiments to explore the mechanisms behind this relationship. We present a typology for understanding this research based on the type of corruption being addressed (political vs. bureaucratic), the mechanism for accountability (retrospective vs. prospective), and the nature of the information provided (factual vs. prescriptive). We describe some of the tradeoffs involved in design decisions for such experiments and suggest directions for future research.

The general objective of the paper is to investigate the impact of corruption and other institutional factors on economic growth in some selected transitional economies for the period of 1990‐2004 and make policy recommendations for combating it. Specifically, the study attempts to: assess whether corruption has any impact on the growth of the sample countries; examine whether simultaneous policy reform focussing on accountability and rule of law impact positively on growth of these economies; and investigate whether corruption in these countries exhibit the efficient grease syndrome.

The indices for corruption and other institutional variables were drawn from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG – PRS) for the period of 1990‐2004, the polity data were obtained from the Polity IV, while the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth were obtained from the Penn World 6.2. The study covered the period between 1990 and 2004 that coincides with the real transition of these economies from centrally planned to market economies. It adopts the panel data framework, the fixed effect, the random effect and the maximum likelihood estimation techniques for the analysis.

The study's findings support Mauro's hypothesis that corruption has a negative impact on the economies. However, the study cannot find a robust statistical evidence to support the efficient grease hypothesis of Leff and Huntington.

The paper recommends policy efforts that would strengthen accountability and bureaucratic quality, reduce discretionary power, ethnic fractionalisation and military involvement in politics with a view to enhancing social responsibility practices at both micro and macro levels.

Unlike previous studies that focussed on single cross‐country regression with an assumption of identical aggregate production function for all countries, this study adopts the panel data framework that makes it possible to allow for differences in the form of unobservable individual country effects. The paper employs the fixed effect, the random effect and the maximum likelihood estimation techniques.

The link between corruption and firm performance has received considerable critical attention. However, until now, far too little attention has been paid to different dimensions of corruption and their relationship with firm performance. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to examine the relationship between dimensions of corruption and firm productivity.

This paper uses the fifth wave of Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, which is based on the survey questionnaire with senior managers of 16,566 randomly selected firms across 32 developing countries. Empirical analysis employs structural equation modeling (SEM) and instrumental variable two-stage least square (IV 2SLS) estimation techniques.

Our results revealed that political corruption and red tape have a positive relationship with firm productivity. We also found that perceived extent of bribe and corruption experience are positively related to the firm productivity.

Findings suggest that multifaceted dimensions of corruption exist. Therefore, policymakers should develop anticorruption measures by taking into account these dimensions. In addition, policymakers should focus on improving institutional quality by reforming laws and measures to detect and punish government officials.

So far only few studies have looked at the dimensions of corruption; therefore, this study seeks to examine the effect of different dimensions of corruption together on firm performance in postcommunist countries.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-08-2019-0476

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of the e-goverment on corruption in Mexico. Mexico, although it has fought corruption from different angles, continues to be among the most corrupt countries in the world. One possible tool to reduce corruption, or at least so-called bureaucratic corruption, is e-government. There are studies that confirm an inverse relationship between e-government and corruption; as e-government increases, corruption decreases. The purpose of this research is to analyze the impact of the development of e-government (electronic portals) on corruption.

To achieve the stated objective, the authors have used econometrics (clusters) as the main methodology to obtain a possible confirmation of such inverse relationship between e-government and corruption in the 32 states that make up the country, for the period 2015–2019.

In the states that make up the Republic of Mexico, as the development of e-government increases, the corruption variable does not decrease. There is no significant relationship between these two variables.

The relationship between the variables e-government and corruption has been extensively studied in previous articles. However, in Latin America, studies on the impact of e-government on corruption are scarce, and at the Mexican national level are almost nonexistent.

Despite an intensified anti-corruption campaign, China's economic growth and social transition continue to breed loopholes and opportunities for big corruption, leading to a money-oriented mentality and the collapse of ethical standards, and exposing the communist regime to greater risk of losing moral credibility and political trust. In Hong Kong, the setting up of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974 marked the advent of a new comprehensive strategy to eradicate corruption and to rebuild trust in government. The ICAC was not just an anti-corruption enforcement agency per se, but an institution spearheading and representing integrity and governance transformation. This chapter considers how mainland China can learn from Hong Kong's experience and use the fight against corruption as a major political strategy to win the hearts and minds of the population and reform governance in the absence of more fundamental constitutional reforms, in a situation similar to Hong Kong's colonial administration of the 1970s–1980s deploying administrative means to minimize a political crisis.

Societies may differ in their views as to what constitutes corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestations. Experts have different perspectives on the meaning, causes and effects of this universal phenomenon. While a few take an inter‐disciplinary approach, positions are more often influenced by the respective discipline. The literature on the subject is vast and diversified. Any attempt to summarize it here would not do it justice. It may be useful, however, to begin this paper by sharing with the reader some of the main findings based on that literature.

Past studies on corruption and anticorruption efforts in Africa lacked the systemic perspective. Yet, efforts of a constellation of state and non - state anticorruption institutions tends to yield not less but more corruption. Focusing on Cameroon (West Africa), this study is a holistic attempt at an institutional appraisal of the scope and effectiveness of the anticorruption system. It is based on a thorough description and a critical analysis of essential structures, functions and processes of the system, with an emphasis on their missions, goals, activities, structures as well as their actual outcomes and limitations. The researcher suggests that, because of the numerous structural and functional weaknesses, Cameroon’s anticorruption system has failed. Clear suggestions for effective reform of the system and rapid corruption minimization are made.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.