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This chapter presents evidence of persistence in pricing new corporate bond issues. Both transition matrix and regression analyses show that cross-sectional differences in the yields of initial public bond offerings across issuers persist over time, and the persistence effect is stronger for firms with no rating changes, less frequent bond issuance, and higher information asymmetry. Our findings support the hypothesis of the “ride on past” behavior and confirm the value of information production accumulated from the past bond issuances for the pricing of newly issued bonds.

In this study we analyze the determinants of the type and structure of debt included in dual offerings of debt and equity. Our sample consists of 54 dual offerings of convertible bond and common stock (CBCS) and 258 dual offerings of straight bond and common stock (SBCS). We find that firms with high asset substitution problems are more likely to issue CBCS offerings instead of SBCS offerings. These firms are also more likely to include convertible bonds with a high probability of conversion in the issue. The probability of CBCS offerings is higher for firms with low information asymmetry and during high interest rate periods. We also find that the announcement returns of CBCS offerings are lower than the returns of SBCS offerings.

This chapter investigates the cost of public debt for firms using a comprehensive sample consisting of 17,368 industrial bond issues from 1970 to 2011. The empirical evidence shows that yield spreads for seasoned bond issues are significantly lower than those for initial bond issues. This seasoning effect is robust across different sample periods, subsamples, and model specifications. On average, the yield spreads for seasoned bond issues are around 50 bps lower than those for initial bond issues. This difference cannot be explained by other bond and firm characteristics. The seasoning effect is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of uncertainty, lower information disclosure quality, and longer time intervals between the first and subsequent issues. Our empirical findings provide supportive evidence for the extant theories that aim to rationalize the information role in determining the cost of capital.

This paper aims to examine the motivations of firms that issue global bonds. Specifically, it seeks to test whether firms are motivated to offer bonds in multi‐markets to raise more capital, take advantage of being well‐known in foreign markets and/or owing to poor domestic economic conditions.

A sample of global bond offerings of US industrial firms during the period 1995 to 2001 was studied. Logistic regressions were used to examine the determinants of the choice between global and domestic debt offerings. The factors that explain the stock price reaction of global bond issues were also analyzed.

The authors find evidence suggesting that firms with a good reputation abroad and firms that want to raise large amounts of funds choose to issue global bonds instead of domestic bonds. Firms also tend to issue global bonds when the domestic economy is weak. In addition, the stock markets do not react more positively to global bond issues than domestic bond issues, suggesting that the issuing cost of global bonds is not lower than the cost of domestic bonds.

Future researchers may want to investigate why some firms choose to issue global bonds while others choose Eurobonds when they want to issue debt internationally.

The findings of this study suggest that, although firms might be able to raise more capital by issuing global bonds, the issuing costs are not lower.

This is the first paper to study the determinants of the choice between global bonds and domestic bonds and examine the factors that affect the stock price reaction to global bonds.

A recent study found state bond bank participants continually realize considerable interest cost savings. Savings were calculated as differences in interest costs of bond bank loans and the bond offerings participants would have sold as alternatives to loans, (alternative market offerings). The present evaluation determines the sources of the savings. Savings are generated by not only differences in issue characteristics of bond bank issues and alternative market offerings, but also differential impacts of the same market forces and institutional factors on the interest costs of both types of sales. These findings verify that bond bank issues and alternative market offerings sell in different sub-markets, and confirm municipal bond market segmentation.

This paper analyzes the impact of increased federal regulatory enforcement from the SEC's Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation (MCDC) initiative on municipal debt issuers continuing disclosure practices.

We analyze the changes in continuing disclosure practices by estimating a series of difference-in-differences regressions based on variables representing issuers' changes in regulatory risk after the MCDC. The continuing disclosure data are hand-collected for 827 cities over a seven-year period.

The empirical findings indicate that increased regulatory enforcement has a significant impact on continuing disclosure compliance. We find increased enforcement has no impact on issuers that already have a higher probability of being monitored by federal regulators. We also find that an increase in continuing disclosure compliance does not automatically increase continuing disclosure timeliness.

The MCDC lacks monetary penalties for noncompliant bond issuers and no direct regulatory consequences exist for untimely disclosure. Our findings suggest that regulatory enforcement should be followed by adequate sanctions to emphasize the credibility of the enforcement threat and the SEC should consider requiring bond issuers to commit to the timely disclosure of significant information in offering documents.

This paper extends prior studies by analyzing regulatory risk in the market, and the ability of regulation to reduce disclosure compliance deficiencies in the municipal market. By focusing on the MCDC, this study is able to disentangle the impact of regulatory enforcement from the changes in accounting regulation.

This paper aims to examine how a firm’s customer concentration, which is the amount of sales between a supplier firm and the major customers, affects corporate bond contracts. This study also investigates how the types of customer concentration have a significant impact on bond contracts.

The research uses the Compustat’s segment customer database and the Mergent fixed income securities database, which provides details about publicly offered US bond issues and issuers. The sample also includes the US Congressional committees’ data from the 96th to 115th congresses. To control any endogenous concerns, the author uses changes in the seniority of US senators on powerful committees and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as exogenous shocks. For a robustness test, the author also uses the propensity score-matched pairs.

While higher customer concentration, on average, leads to higher yield spreads and strict covenants, firms that have the US Government as a major customer pay lower yield spreads and have higher issue ratings. However, as a firm’s sales depend too heavily on the US Government customer channel, the bond issuance is likely to have lower issue ratings. The main findings also show that firms with government concentrations take advantage of political links, leading to lower yield spreads after two exogenous events.

The findings in this paper show the importance of a firm’s customer types in bond markets by emphasizing the positive impact of the US Government as the sales channel. Exogenous event studies based on the propensity-matched sample alleviate the endogenous concerns.

The marketing literature theorizes the adoption of the relationship marketing paradigm to foster stronger customer relationships. However, empirical evidence is scarce on how consumers' ability to judge the service influences such relational exchange. This paper aims to examine how information asymmetry influences a service firm's initiative to build customer relationships. The relationship marketing literature proposes conceptually that relational bonds and their interaction influence relationship outcomes. However, there is no empirical study to verify such an interactive effect. This study aims to provide empirical evidence on how interaction effects between relational bonds can act as buffers in developing customer relationships.

In the first stage, this study classifies financial services offered by retail banks into search, experience, and credence (SEC) categories. In the second stage, this paper uses survey data from 452 UK retail bank customers to understand the effect of relational bonds on consumer future intentions in information asymmetry context using hierarchical regressions.

The results show that relational bonds have differential impacts on firms' initiative to develop consumer relationship, and information asymmetry moderates this relationship. A positive synergistic association is present between relational bonds that strengthen their effectiveness in influencing relationships.

This study is the first attempt to demonstrate the moderation role of information asymmetry on relational bonds→relationship quality→relationship outcome framework. The findings provide directions to managers on how to have a balanced approach in their relationship building efforts.

Policymakers worldwide have proposed a new contract – the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) – which they claim can allay the underperformance afflicting not-for-profits, by tying the private returns of (social) investors to the success of social programs. We investigate experimentally how SIBs perform in a first-best world, where investors are rational and able to obtain hard information on not-for-profits’ performance. Using a principal-agent multitasking framework, we compare SIBs to inputs-based contracts (IBs) and performance-based contracts (PBs). IBs are based on a piece-rate mechanism, PBs on a non-binding bonus mechanism, and SIBs on a mechanism that, due to the presence of an investor, offers full enforceability. Although SIBs can perfectly enforce good behaviour, they also require the principal (i.e., government) to relinquish control over the agent’s (i.e., not-for-profit’s) payoff to a self-regarding investor, which prevents the principal and agent from being reciprocal. In spite of these drawbacks, in our experiment SIBs outperformed IBs and PBs. We therefore conclude that, at least in our laboratory test-bed, SIBs can allay the underperformance of not-for-profits.