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Aims to review the potential risks associated with the separation of banking regulation from the orbit of the central bank in Latin‐American and Caribbean countries (LAC).

Sets out information on the banking regulators in LAC and on the current degree of involvement of the central bank in banking regulation; the main monetary policy issues connected to the separation of banking regulation from the central bank; and the main banking regulation issues involved.

The separation of banking regulation from the central bank would not present any great danger to LAC currently. However, the need to conduct the move in accordance with best principles must be emphasized.

Given the fertile ground offered by the countries of LAC, this paper presents arguably the most comprehensive examination to date of this “hot potato”.

Deregulation and other factors permit and encourage financial institutions to become more integrated, both within their own (financial) industries, such as banking and insurance, and across these industries. Financial regulators have responded with like integration. As financial institutions increasingly compete with firms from other industries and areas, financial regulators similarly compete more across borders. The resulting competition in financial regulation enhances innovation, choice, and efficiency. The advent of home-run regulation, which in general allows financial institutions to adhere only to the financial regulations of their home area and is spreading across the US and Europe, may allow numerous regulatory regimes within a given market.

In this paper, the authors examine the association between the banking regulatory regime and the quality of bank earnings. We further investigate whether the banking agency regulatory characteristics moderate the association between banking regulation and earnings quality.

Using panel data spanning 29 years over the period 1991 to 2019, the authors model bank earnings quality as a function of scores for banking regulation for 170 banks in the East African region using both the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation methods.

The results, which are robust for endogeneity among other checks, reveal a positive impact of bank regulatory mechanisms on the quality of bank earnings. The authors further establish differential impact of specific regulatory mechanisms, with some contributing positively toward earnings management while others contributing negatively toward earnings management. The differential impacts of banking regulation on earnings quality are also manifested in the country-level analyses.

First, the study utilises a mix of bank-specific, country-specific as well as economy-specific variables in one dataset. Second, the authors utilise survey-based data using the World Bank's Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (BRSS) for the periods 1999 to 2019. The authors assume that the bank regulatory mechanisms in place pre-1999 are close to the mechanisms in place as per the 1999 BRSS. Given limitations in data availability, the authors are not able to control for banks engaging in multiple activities such as insurance, underwriting of securities, FinTechs, among others.

The results are useful in bridging the gap between theory and practice regarding the expected effect of strict banking regulations on the quality of earnings in Eastern African Banks. For the positive impact of banking regulation on bank earnings quality to be felt, the institutional, social and environmental specificities of the five selected countries need to be adequately developed and taken into consideration.

This study is perhaps the first to utilise a large dataset of commercial banks from countries in a developing region characterised by relatively lower enforcement and dynamism in the banking regulation. Further, in-depth studies on the association between banking regulation and earnings quality remain sparse.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators.

This paper presents a review of existing literature.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

This study aims to investigate the coordinated impact of regulations on the predicted probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

The study used the dynamic panel instrumental variable probit regression model of 52 African economies over the period 2006 to 2018.

The authors observe that banking crisis is persistent for few years but dissipates in the long run. The results show that board mechanism and ownership control are important in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. The authors found a negative impact of regulatory capital and monetary policy on the predicted probability of a banking crisis while regulatory quality was not strong in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. There was also evidence to support that regulatory capital and monetary policy augment the negative impact of board mechanism and ownership control on the predicted probability of a banking crisis.

The limitation of the study is that it did not explore all measures of regulatory framework and how they impact banking crisis. However, it has an advantage of using alternative measures of regulations in a banking crisis probability model. Therefore, future studies should include other macro-prudential regulations, regulatory environments and supervision and observe how they are coordinated to reduce possible crisis in a robust methodological framework.

The research has policy implications for monetary authorities and policymakers to set coordinated regulations through internal banking mechanisms that are relevant in sustaining banking system stability goals. Countries in Africa should strengthen their quality of regulation in such a way that it can play a strong and complementary role to a robust internal control mechanisms, so as to maintain stability in the banking system. In general, regulators and policymakers should design greater coordination of external and internal regulations through a single regulatory framework and a common resolution mechanism that make the banking system more robust in curbing possible crisis.

The policy implication of the study is to build banking confidence in the society.

This study analyses the interactions of different components of internal and external regulatory framework in helping to reduce the probability of a banking crisis in Africa.

The primary objective of this study aims to intensively explore the environment of Indonesian regulations and laws related to the Islamic banking system and micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) and unveil the restrictive laws and regulatory flaws that potentially hinder the Islamic banking institution and MSME industry in achieving financial inclusion and promoting sustainable growth.

This paper implements a qualitative method by implementing a multi-case study research strategy, both from the Islamic banking institutions and the MSME industries. The data were gathered primarily through an interview approach by adopting purposive uncontrolled quota sampling.

The findings of this paper reveal two essential issues: First, the regulatory imbalances and restrictions could demotivate and hinder the efforts of Islamic banks in providing access to finance for the MSME segment, hence, encumbering the achievement of the financial inclusion agenda from the Islamic banking industry. Second, the flaws in MSME registration and taxation might discourage the formal MSMEs from extending their business license and prevent the informal MSME units from registering their business. This issue would potentially lower their chance of accessing external financing from the formal financial institutions and participating in supportive government programmes due to the absence of proper legality.

Since this paper only observed six Islamic banks and 22 MSME units in urban and rural locations in Indonesia using a case study approach, the empirical findings and case discussions were limited to those respective Islamic banks and MSME participants.

By referring to the recommendations as presented in this paper, two critical policy implications could be expected from adopting the proposed recommendations, among others: By addressing the issues of the regulatory imbalance associated with the Islamic banking industry and introduce the deregulatory policies on profit and loss sharing (PLS) scheme implementation, this approach will motivate the Islamic banking industry in serving the MSME sector better and provide greater access to financial services, particularly in using the PLS financing schemes. By resolving the problems on MSME registration and taxation, this strategy will enhance the sustainability of the formal MSMEs’ operation and encourage the informal ones to register, hence, improving their inclusion into the formal financing services and government assistance programmes.

The present study attempts to address the literature shortcomings and helps to fill the gaps – both theoretical and empirical – by incorporating the multi-case study among Indonesian Islamic banks and MSMEs to extensively explore the Indonesia regulatory environment pertaining to the Islamic banking system (supply-side) and MSMEs (demand-side), and thoroughly investigates and reveals the restrictive laws and regulatory flaws that could potentially hinder the Islamic banking institutions and MSME industries in attaining financial inclusion and contributing to sustainable development.

The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 sets out five categories of capital and mandates corrective action for banks. Each bank based on its capital amount fall in the certain categories or states. The purpose of this paper is to consider the effect of banking regulations and supervisory practices on capital state transition.

First, the authors investigate how much the practices influence banks' capital adequacy using a dynamic panel data method, the generalized method of moments. Then, to scrutinize the results of the first phase, the authors estimate the effect of practices on some characteristics of capital state transition such as transition intensity, transition probability and state sojourn time using multi-state models for panel data in 107 developing countries over the period 2000 to 2012.

The dynamic regression results show that capital guidelines, supervisory power and supervisory structure can have significantly positive effects on the capital adequacy state. Moreover, the multi-state Markov panel data model estimation results show that the significantly positive-effect practices can change the capital state transition intensity considerably; for example, they can transmit the critical-under-capitalized (the lowest) capital state of banks directly to a well or the adequate-capitalized (the highest) capital state without passing through middle states (under-capitalized and significantly-undercapitalized). Moreover, the results present some new evidence on transition probability and state sojourn time.

The main contribution of this paper, unlike the existing literature, is to consider the power of banking regulations and supervisory practices to improve the capital state using a multi-state Markov panel data model.

The 2015 global economic crisis has triggered the issuance of several banking regulations in Indonesia, including those related to temporary stimulus for Islamic banks and branchless banking (fintech). However, few studies attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of such regulations. Thus, this study aims to determine the role and assess the effectiveness of such banking regulations.

The data used cover all 12 Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia during the stimulus period of Q3.2015 to Q2.2017. The variables included were banks’ fundamental factors (Islamic financing, capital adequacy ratio, investment, non-performing financing, return on asset, efficiency, financing deposit ratio and fintech) and macroeconomic variables (inflation, exchange rate and money supply). The model was analyzed by using multiple linear regressions with generalized least square estimation technique.

The main finding suggests that the stimulus regulation indeed played a positive role in the acceleration of Islamic bank financing. However, the fintech-related regulation was not yet effective to achieve the goal, at least in the short term. Furthermore, the study found that return of assets, operational efficiency, financing deposit ratio and money supply also influenced Islamic financing.

For policymakers, the effectiveness of the temporary stimulus in accelerating Islamic banking financing and preventing the possible negative impacts of the external crisis provides indications that the regulator could conduct similar policy in the future. More generally, the findings are also expected to enrich Islamic banking literature.

This is possibly one of the few studies to investigate the role and effectiveness of banking regulations on Islamic banking financing in Indonesia.

This paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

To avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks on www.ecb.int

The empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.

This analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.

The changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.

Culture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.

This paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.

This paper aims to examine whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede technical efficiency and risk‐taking behaviour of Islamic banks across the globe.

Technical efficiency scores are calculated using the data envelopment analysis (DEA) model while simultaneity between banks' supervision and regulation on risk and efficiency estimates are calculated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach.

The author's results suggest that regulations and strict monitoring of banking operation, and higher supervisory power of the authorities, increase the technical efficiency for Islamic banks. The opposite effect is observed in the case of risk‐taking behaviour of Islamic banks, with higher restrictions resulting in a reduction in risk taking of Islamic banks.

The Basel II & Basel III guidelines suggested that stricter regulations and supervision could hamper banking efficiency. The existence of a powerful supervisory body could also lead to the inefficiency of banks. The DEA scores from this paper suggest that this may not necessarily be the case, especially as Islamic banks appear to be technically efficient in stricter regulatory conditions.

A message that emerges from this analysis is that there is a strong link between Islamic bank technical efficiency and risk‐taking behaviour with the Central Bank regulatory and supervisory policies. It is also conclusive that the Islamic banking system works well within a stricter regulatory environment.