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Our paper presents an extension of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs to an open market economy. We examine domestic banks that are subject to potential runs by domestic depositors who worry that they will not be able to be repaid in full, because the domestic banks may not be able to refinance in the international financial markets. A loss in confidence in the banking system might precipitate a bank run. A bank run might be costly to safety net guarantors, for example, the central bank. Further, a bank run might lead to a breaking of the fixed exchange rate. Our model shows that adding central bank and International Monetary Fund guarantees, increasing long term debt as well as more equity financing reduces financial fragility, but consistent with economic intuition, these policy levers cannot eliminate the possibility of a bank run or a banking crisis leading to a currency crisis.

We find evidence that the runs on banks and trust companies in the Panic of 1907 were linked to the Bank of England’s contractionary monetary policy actions taken in 1906 and 1907 through the medium of copper prices. Results from our vector autoregressive models and copper stockpile data support our argument that a copper commodity price channel may have been active in transmitting the Bank’s policy to the New York markets. Archival evidence suggests that the plunge in copper prices may have partially triggered both the initiation and the failure of an attempt to corner the shares of United Copper, and in turn, the bank and trust company runs related to that transaction’s failure. We suggest that the substantial short-term uncertainties accompanying the development of the copper-intensive electrical and telecommunications industries likely played a role in the plunge in copper prices. Additionally, we find evidence that the copper price transmission mechanism was also likely active in five other countries that year. While we do not argue that copper caused the 1907 crisis, we suggest that it was an active policy transmission channel amplifying the classic effect that was already spreading through the money market channel. If the bust in copper prices partially triggered the 1907 panic, then it provides additional evidence that contractionary monetary policy may have had an unintended, adverse consequence of contributing to a bank panic and, therefore, supports other recent findings that monetary policy deliberations might benefit from considering the policy impact on asset prices.

Business groups often contain banks or near banks that can protect group firms from economic shocks. A group bank subordinate to other group firms can become an “organ bank” that selflessly bails out distressed group firms and anticipates a government bailout. A group bank subordinating other group firms can extend loans to suppress their risk taking to default risk, preserving risk-averse low-productivity zombie firms. Actual business groups can fall between these polar cases. Subordinated group banks magnify risk taking; subordinating group banks suppress risk taking; yet both distortions promote business group firms’ survival. Limiting intragroup income and risk shifting, severing banks from business groups, articulating Business Group Law, or dismantling business groups may mitigate both distortions but also limits business groups’ internal markets, which are thought to be important where external markets work poorly.

In the economic literature, a crisis has been thematically defined around bank runs, failure of large financial corporations, and financial distress. Section 1 summarizes our learnings about international banking crisis, in terms of the origin and impact of such crises. This provides us an international benchmark before we delve deeper into India's banking distress, its size and trends. Section 2 focuses on the twin-balance-sheet crisis in India. On one side, corporate firms recklessly overleveraged, resulting in excess capacities and business diversification. On the other side, banks, both private and public, fell prey to excessive and procyclical credit lending and improper monitoring. Overall, too many projects were left too weakly monitored. Separately, we have focused on two subsections, first, how the financial institutions in India have overstretched their credit-disposal limit during market upturns. Second, we found absence of any theoretically grounded approaches to determine the capital-adequacy ratios (CARs) for the banks. In Section 3, we have identified the steps taken so far by the Banking regulator and the Government to resolve the crisis. Further, we critically examine the role of Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) towards a successful non-performing assets (NPAs) resolution in South Korea. Few key takeaways include, (1) establishing a public asset-management company (AMC) focused on maximization of recoveries and resolution of stressed assets, (2) well-defined governance structure for the AMC ensuring it works on market principles, shielded from political interferences, and (3) realistic asset valuation and transfer price that ensures limited downside risks for the public AMC.

This paper studies banking crises in a framework where the government can be biased in favor of a “business elite.” When the deposit contract is such that the run on the bank takes place only if the economic system is in a recession, the presence of a “crony” government introduces an element of indeterminacy, i.e. equilibrium can be multiple. Moreover, by means of an information updating mechanism, it is shown that the crisis may spread out to countries “similar” to the one that is examined, i.e. that contagion is possible.

At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and in sharp contrast with 2007–2009, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance. Savings and Loan (S&L) remediation cost between 2 percent and 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the US Treasury. But the direct cost of government remediation is largely irrelevant in judging macro significance. What matters is the cumulative output loss associated with and plausibly caused by failing financial institutions. I estimate output losses for 1981–1984, 1991–1998, and 2007–2026 (the latter utilizing forecasts and projections along with actual data through 2015) and, for a final comparison, 1929–1941. The losses associated with 2007–2009 have been truly disastrous – in the same order of magnitude as the Great Depression. The S&L failures were, in contrast, inconsequential. Macroeconomists and policy makers should reserve the word crisis for financial disturbances that threaten substantial damage to the real economy, and continue efforts to identify in advance financial institutions which are systemically important (SIFI), and those which are not.

Systemic banking crises can have devastating effects on the economies of developing or industrialized countries. This paper reviews the factors that weaken banking systems and make them more susceptible to crises. It is the first of two papers examining root causes of banking crises and time-consistent policies for resolving them.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.