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This study aims to investigate whether auditors compromise their independence for economically important clients in countries with a secrecy culture.

The authors empirically examine the research question based on a data set of 33 countries for the period from 1995 to 2018. The dependent variable is the auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit opinions, which is a proxy for auditor independence. The authors use relative client size as a proxy for client importance. The authors adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue involved in the selection of Big-N auditors.

Using a large sample of firms and controlling for the firm- and country/region-level factors, this study reveals that both Big-N and non-Big-N auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions to clients located in countries with a strong secrecy culture relative to those located in other countries. However, Big-N auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions for their economically important clients with a secrecy culture relative to their other clients, while no or weaker evidence is found for non-Big-N auditors. The results are consistent and robust to endogeneity tests and sensitivity analyses.

This study enriches the literature by providing a new perspective on auditor independence that an auditor’s reporting behavior can vary depending on the client’s importance and auditor type, even under the same secrecy culture.

This study aims to investigate whether auditors compromise their independence for economically important clients in family business settings.

The authors empirically examine the research question based on China for the years 2011 to 2020. The dependent variable is the auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit opinions, which is a proxy for auditor independence. The authors use relative client audit fees as a proxy for client importance. To address endogeneity issues in the selection of family firms, the authors use the two-stage least squares regression model and, subsequently, the propensity score matching and Hausman firm fixed effect modeling.

This study reveals that the propensity to issue modified audit opinions is positively correlated with client importance. Big-N auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions for their economically important family firm clients, whereas such evidence is not found for non-Big-N auditors. Results are consistent and robust to endogeneity test and sensitivity analysis.

This study enriches the literature on auditor independence and the effect of family firms’ ownership structure factors on audit reporting behavior for their economically important clients. Findings may prove useful for managers and practitioners interested in family business.

This paper aims to examine the perspectives of auditors, regulators and financial report preparers on the effects of key audit matters (KAMs) reporting on audit effort, fees, quality and report transparency.

The authors conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders (13 Audit Partners, 5 Chief Financial Officers and 3 regulators) and thematically analysed the interviews. They use the frame of “Paradox of Transparency” to explain the findings.

Auditors perceive that the overall quality control of their audits has improved both in the planning and execution stages, and such improvement can mostly be attributed to the coercive pressures from professional bodies and regulators. Nevertheless, audit fee remains unchanged. Auditors disclose industry generic items and descriptions of KAMs, sometimes masking the real problem areas of the clients. Even after improving the performative audit quality, transparency of audit reporting has not improved. Issues that warrant going concern qualifications or audit report modifications are now reported as KAMs. Hence, KAMs reporting might make the audit report less transparent.

Localised audit environments and institutions affect the transparency of KAMs reporting. Without attention to corporate governance and auditors’ independence issues, paradoxically, performative improvement in audit quality (due to the KAMs reporting requirement) does not enhance the transparency of audit reports.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to provide field-level evidence in Bangladesh and other developing countries about the perceptions of auditors, financial report preparers and regulators on the effects of KAMs reporting on audit efforts, fees, quality and report transparency.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between nonaudit services (NAS) and out-of-period adjustments (OOPAs). Over the years, the number of OOPAs has risen while the number of restatements has decreased. This could indicate an improvement in financial reporting quality. It could also indicate the use of a type of stealth restatement for opportunistic purposes. These less prominent restatements are more likely to go undetected and could perpetuate opportunistic disclosure and mitigate the likelihood of unfavorable market reactions.

The authors use a two-stage multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship between NAS and the reporting of an OOPA. The authors use prior research on NAS to guide the model development. The authors perform several robustness checks including different types of NAS and different characteristics of OOPAs.

The results indicate that NAS has a significantly negative association with the existence of OOPAs. The core findings suggest that NAS does not impair auditor independence. Rather, greater amounts of NAS may contribute to knowledge spillover, which leads to higher financial reporting and audit quality. The results are robust to several additional tests.

The results raise interesting implications for regulators, executives, auditors, investors and future research. The authors provide insight into the relationship between NAS and auditor independence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, prior research has not considered the effect of NAS on OOPAs. The authors contribute to the literature by providing evidence that OOPAs, a form of stealth restatements, is an important consideration in audit quality research.

The literature on the influence of audit committees (AC) and cosmetic accounting (CA) is scarce. AC plays a unique and vital role in boosting earnings reliability in countries with weaker application of accounting standards or weaker legal protection for investors. AC, therefore, are considered to be one of the essential tools available to directors in supervising management decisions regarding financial reporting. This paper aims to examine the influence of AC characteristics (ACC) on CA and how this relationship is moderated by the audit fee.

This study used probit regression to analyze 1,218 firm-year observations of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2020.

The results show that AC financial accounting expertise, AC independence, female AC membership and AC tenure were negatively related to CA. The negative relationship is highly pronounced when a firm incurs higher audit fees, and audit fees moderate the relationship between ACC and CA. Results for the robustness checks show that only AC independence was significant, and the results of other characteristics were not significant.

This research was conducted in an Iranian setting where the formation of ACs is on the verge of regulation; therefore, the data used for the study only contains the seven-year period of ACs’ statutory activity. In addition, a lack of consensus on the precise measures of an AC’s effectiveness could be considered as a restrictive factor.

The findings provide an initial insight into the effect AC on CA and moderating effect of audit fee on the relationship between ACC and CA.

This paper aims to examine whether family business groups’ (FBG) having the same network auditor among their affiliates mitigates earnings manipulation (EM).

This paper used unbalanced panel data from the years 2010–2019. The sample of the study is composed of 327 nonfinancial listed Pakistan Stock Exchange firms, consisting of 187 FBG-affiliated firms and 140 nonaffiliated firms. The ordinary least square and generalized least square regressions have been used to check the hypothesized relationship. Furthermore, the propensity score matching technique is used to ascertain comparable companies’ features and to control the potential endogeneity problem. Finally, the results are robust to various measures of EM and FBG’ proxies.

The findings of the study show that the same network auditor is reducing EM in FBG affiliates. In addition, the BIG4 same network auditors are also instrumental in constraining EM as compared to non-BIG4 audit firms. Overall, the results of this study depict that the same network auditor in FBG’s affiliated firms significantly influences EM. These results are robust with respect to generalized least squares and the endogeneity problem.

This research study has two important implications for the interested parties. First, although the authors find in this research study that the same network auditor is negatively associated with EM in the FBG-affiliated firms, however, FBG-affiliated firms might use opportunistically the real activity manipulation. Second, regulators highlight the change in audit partner/firm rotation, though the study findings indicate that regulators and practitioners may consider the benefits associated with the same network auditors for FBG.

This research study adds a new investigation to previous literature by examining the role of the same network auditors in the EM of the FBG’ affiliates. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to bring new knowledge by investigating the role played by the same network auditors along with the BIG4 same network audit firms in constraining EM in FBG.

This paper aims to examine whether the audit committee moderates the relationship between audit quality and market reactions.

Using fixed effects and the GMM model for robustness, the study used 472 publicly listed firms on South Africa’s Johannesburg stock exchange spanning a period of six years from 2014 to 2019.

Results obtained show that audit quality impacts market reactions through share price and adjusted market returns. And, that the audit committee moderates the relationship between audit quality and market reactions in South Africa’s publicly listed firms. An effective audit committee is expected to play a crucial role in overseeing the audit process, ensuring the independence of auditors and promoting transparency and accountability which in turn impacts asset prices.

The study implies that governments and regulatory bodies in other developing economies could strengthen regulations about companies’ Acts, how firms regulate themselves and more so audit committees. Firms can also strive to make sure that audit committees are staffed with experts to promote higher audit quality and investor attention to get access to the much-alluded capital.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the study adds value by being the first to explore the subject matter of the importance of audit committees in defining audit quality and market reactions in publicly listed firms. The research adds to the body of knowledge on corporate governance and audit quality. It provides a case study specific to the South African context, contributing to the global literature on these topics.

This study aims to examine whether the newly available auditor tenure information is associated with non-GAAP earnings, as the recent requirement to disclose the initial year of auditor-client relationship in audit reports may give the impression that longer auditor tenure may be related to lower audit quality.

Using a sample of firm-quarters from 2017 to 2020, the authors conduct both univariate and regression analyses. We use hand-collected data for auditor tenure, SEC comment letters, and non-GAAP variables.

First, the authors find that the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings monotonically increases with auditor tenure on a univariate basis. Second, auditor tenure is negatively associated with aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Third, the authors document evidence of aggressive reporting in general; that is, items excluded in calculating non-GAAP earnings are associated with future performance. However, the association declines with longer auditor tenure. Finally, the authors report evidence that the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter that contains non-GAAP comments decreases with longer auditor tenure.

The results show that regulators need to consider both GAAP and non-GAAP disclosures’ costs and benefits when enacting auditor tenure regulation. Investors can benefit from the findings in evaluating the quality of non-GAAP earnings. The findings are also relevant to the SEC when allocating limited resources in monitoring non-GAAP reporting.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study showing that auditor tenure is associated with the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Given that financial reporting quality should be understood as a comprehensive system comprising both mandatory and voluntary disclosures, this study complements the literature that examines the effect of auditor tenure on financial reporting quality using GAAP reporting.

Exploiting a unique measure of hostile takeover exposure principally based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, the authors investigate how external audit quality is influenced by the discipline of the takeover market. External auditors and the takeover market both function as important instruments of external corporate governance.

The authors execute a standard regression analysis and run a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, namely, propensity score matching (PSM), entropy balancing, an instrumental-variable analysis, Generalized method of moment (GMM) dynamic panel data analysis and Lewbel's (2012) heteroscedastic identification.

The authors’ immense sample spans half a century, encompassing nearly 180,000 observations and 17 takeover-related state legislations, one of the largest samples in the literature in this area. The authors’ results suggest that firms with more takeover exposure are significantly less likely to use Big N auditors. Therefore, a more active takeover market results in poorer external audit quality, corroborating the substitution hypothesis. The discipline of the takeover market substitutes for the necessity for a high-quality external auditor. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation lowers the probability of using a Big N auditor by 4.29%.

The authors’ study is the first to examine the effect of the takeover over market on audit quality using a novel measure of hostile takeover susceptibility mainly based on the staggered implementation of state legislation. Because the enactment of state legislation is beyond the control of any firm individually, it is plausibly exogenous. The authors’ results therefore probably reflect a causal influence rather than merely a correlation.

While existing research explores the impact of audit market competition on audit fees and audit quality, there is limited investigation into how competition in the audit market influences auditors' writing style. This study examines the relationship between audit market competition and the readability of audit reports in Iran, where competition is particularly intense, especially among private audit firms.

The sample comprises 1,050 firm-year observations in Iran from 2012 to 2018. Readability measures, including the Fog index, Flesch-Reading-Ease (FRE) and Simple Measure of Gobbledygook (SMOG), are employed to assess the readability of auditors' reports. The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is utilized to measure audit market competition, with lower index values indicating higher auditor competition. The concentration measure is multiplied by −1 to obtain the competition measure (AudComp). Alternative readability measures, such as the Flesch–Kincaid (FK) and Automated Readability Index (ARI) are used in additional robustness tests. Data on textual features of audit reports, auditor characteristics and other control variables are manually collected from annual reports of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The regression analysis results indicate a significant and positive association between audit market competition and audit report readability. Furthermore, a stronger positive and significant association is observed among private audit firms, where competition is more intense compared to state audit firms. These findings remain robust when using alternative readability measures and other sensitivity checks. Additional analysis reveals that the positive effect of competition on audit report readability is more pronounced in situations where the auditor remains unchanged and the audit market size is small.

This paper expands the existing literature by examining the impact of audit market competition on audit report readability. It focuses on a unique audit market (Iran), where competition among audit firms is more intense than in developed countries due to the liberalization of the Iranian audit market in 2001 and the establishment of numerous private audit firms.