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I reexamine the conflicting results in Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) and Lennox, Lisowsky, and Pittman (2013). Frank et al. (2009) conclude that firms can manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same period, implying a positive relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. Lennox et al. (2013) conclude the relation is negative and aggressive book reporting informs users that aggressive tax reporting is less likely. I identify four key differences in the research designs across the two studies, including measures of aggressive book reporting, measures of aggressive tax reporting, sample time periods, and empirical models. I systematically examine whether each of these differences is responsible for the conflicting results by altering the key difference while holding other factors as constant as possible. I find the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting is driven by the measure of aggressive book reporting, as the relation is positive for some subsets of firms and negative for others. Firms accused of financial statement fraud have a negative relation while nonfraud firms exhibit a positive relation. Using discretionary accruals, I also look for, but do not find a “pivot point” in the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting. I provide a better understanding of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting by identifying research design choices that are responsible for prior results. I show that measures of both discretionary accruals and financial statement fraud are necessary to gain a more complete picture of the relation between aggressive book and tax reporting.

This chapter investigates the effect of moral reasoning of tax professionals on the aggressiveness of their reporting recommendations. The findings of the study indicate moral reasoning influences the aggressiveness of tax reporting decisions separate from the influence of client pressure. As the level of moral reasoning increases, the aggressiveness of the reporting position is found to0 decrease. Contrary to prior research, client pressure is not related to tax reporting aggressiveness. Failure to observe this relationship may signal a shift in behavior resulting from the intense public and regulatory scrutiny at the time of data collection which was in the immediate aftermath of the Enron scandal.

We investigate how different cognitive conceptualizations of reference point and tax withholdings jointly influence aggressive tax filing. We utilize a field study with responses captured from actual taxpayers immediately after filing their returns. Consistent with both prospect theory and mental accounting perspectives, we hypothesize and find evidence that more aggressive filing decisions depend on mental categorization of whether taxpayers expect a tax refund or owe additional taxes relative to their expected asset position (EAP). We find a joint and additive impact of EAP with a cognitive link made between taxes and the categorization of amounts owed. Our findings suggest that more aggressive filing behavior is found in taxpayers in a tax loss position relative to their EAP and in those that do not separately categorize taxes owing from their own resources. By highlighting the importance of EAP and the cognitive separation of taxes owed, we provide insight for revenue agencies to use cognitive framing strategies to mitigate aggressive taxpayer behavior. The cognitive framing of EAP may be influenced by the use of installment payments and tax withholdings, but also may be affected by communications that alter taxpayers' expectations of taxes owed.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relation between tax reporting and financial reporting, their influence on transparency, and empirical implications.

We investigate the interaction of debt covenants and tax accounting on the adoption of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). We examine how firms respond to the potential tightening of covenant slack upon FIN 48 adoption and whether these actions are penalized by creditors and anticipated by equity markets. We find that upon FIN 48 adoption, the majority of sample corporate borrowers increase their tax reserves and reduce equity. Firms close to debt covenant violation were even more likely to increase tax reserves upon FIN 48 adoption; however, the size of the adjustment was relatively smaller, suggesting that the FIN 48 standards limited, but did not eliminate, firms use of discretion in reporting uncertain tax positions to avoid costly covenant violations. For firms near net worth debt covenant violation, the act of decreasing equity upon FIN 48 adoption imposes real economic costs, as the average cost of debt increased by 43 basis points. Finally, we extend prior research on the market response to FIN 48 by showing how the market response to FIN 48 adoption is a function of debt covenant slack and tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the cumulative abnormal return at the FIN 48 exposure draft release date is negative only for tax aggressive firms that are close to debt covenant violation.

We examine the relationship between tax-related accounting misstatements and changes in the uncertain tax benefits accrual account in the year of the disclosure of a misstatement. We find that the disclosure of a tax-related misstatement is associated with an increase in unrecognized tax benefits during that year. We show that the increase in unrecognized tax benefits in the year of disclosure is from uncertain tax positions taken in prior periods. Overall, this finding is consistent with increase in financial reporting conservatism upon disclosure of tax-related accounting misstatement.

This study examines short selling as one external determinant of corporate tax avoidance. Prior research suggests that short sellers have information advantages over retail investors, and high short-interest levels are a bearish signal of targeted stock prices. As a result, when short-interest levels are high, managers have been shown to take actions to minimize the negative effect of high short interest on firms’ stock prices. Tax-avoidance activities may convey a signal of bad news (i.e., high stock price crash risk). We predict that, when short-interest levels are high, managers possess incentives to reduce firm tax avoidance in order to reduce the associated stock price crash risk. Consistent with this prediction, we find that short interest is negatively associated with subsequent tax-avoidance levels. This effect is incremental to other factors identified by prior research. We conclude that short selling significantly constrains corporate tax avoidance.

This paper examines the relationship between environmental uncertainty and tax avoidance at the firm level. We posit that managers faced with more uncertain environments are likely to engage in more tax avoidance activities. We find a significant and negative relationship between environmental uncertainty and effective tax rates, and our results persist through a battery of robust checks. We further find that managerial ability mitigates the above relationship. Moreover, we find that small, highly leveraged, and innovative firms operating in uncertain environments engage in more tax avoidance.

Against the background of increasing regulation and spotlight on the tax position of MNEs, this study explores the relationship between tax and performance measurement. The paper is informed by a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in 2006 with 26 senior tax executives from 15 Silicon Valley-based companies. We also draw on documentary evidence including the relevant 10K reports and take an interpretive approach to the analysis. Many of the performance measures referred to in prior literature were employed in the companies. There was no evidence to suggest the profit centre performance measurement model is being adopted by MNEs for their tax departments. Two distinct aspects particularly exercised the interviewees, that is, the effective tax rate (ETR) and post-tax versus pre-tax performance measurement. Many interviewees did not perceive the ETR as being an appropriate measure of performance, yet they recognised its importance internally and externally. Many companies worked on the basis that there is an ‘acceptable range’ of ETRs which won’t give rise to any unwanted questions. Most interviewees shared the view that a post-tax basis of measuring performance of business units might only serve to increase tax risks, preferring instead for the in-house tax executives to remain the exclusive tax knowledge experts. This study contributes to the diversification of tax research within accounting by demonstrating how qualitative work can provide unique insights. It enhances our understanding of how performance measurement of tax might influence the tax-planning behaviour of in-house tax executives and cautions against exclusive reliance on the ETR as a measure of the effect of tax planning.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.