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This paper is a keynote address prepared for a conference on “Entangled Political Economy” sponsored by the Wirth Institute. In keeping with the conventions of such an address, I look both backward and forward, while placing more emphasis on looking forward. In looking backward, I compare and contrast two orientations toward political economy: additive and entangled. In looking forward, I explore some of the analytical challenges that confront efforts to pursue a vision of entangled political economy. While these challenges are substantive in character, those efforts necessarily rest on methodological presumptions. Accordingly, the paper opens by reviewing some of those methodological presumptions before turning to the substantive articulations and challenges.

The purpose of this paper is to conceptualise the chief aspects of policy interest in blockchain technology.

The paper outlines policymaking processes in the context of innovation and technological change, assesses generic variations in policy treatment towards blockchain, and identifies manifestations of policy entrepreneurship using national case studies of blockchain policies.

Favourable policy dispositions towards blockchain technology are interpreted as political efforts to develop local, blockchain-enabled economies. So-called “crypto-friendly” jurisdictions proactively clarify regulatory and tax treatments of cryptocurrency and other blockchain applications, and trial blockchain uses in fields predominated by public sector activity. Policymakers in countries hostile towards blockchain-related activity have instigated bans or strict limitations with respect to blockchain engagement by developers and users.

Reliance upon case studies suggests the need for alternative study approaches (e.g. index construction, empirical research) as blockchain use consolidates throughout the global economy.

This paper provides insight to policymakers and blockchain practitioners regarding the attributes of accommodative policies towards distributed ledger technology.

Countries and sub-national regions exhibiting a more welcoming policy stance are more likely to attract entrepreneurs and investors in the crypto-economic blockchain space.

This paper develops a policy “crypto-friendliness” construct to assess the extent to which policymakers enact accommodative policies for blockchain development.

Prior research on political strategies has predominantly analyzed singular political activities or drivers for firms to become politically active and, overall, only scarcely obtained insights on performance consequences of political strategizing. To further develop the realm of political strategy, this study analyzes the effects of two “generic” political strategies on firms’ (1) stakeholder network development and (2) performance. Specifically, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence whether the two political strategies add to or substitute each other in their effect on the corresponding outcome variable. We find that an information strategy significantly affects the stakeholder network development, whereas no influence of a financial incentive strategy could be detected. Moreover, we find that the stakeholder network drives firm performance and, more importantly, that the two political strategies substitute each other in their effect on firm performance. Thus, we provide initial insights on the efficiency of political strategies when firms opt to execute an information strategy and financial incentive strategy simultaneously. The results of our study have important implications for research as they put a new light on the efficiency of political strategies.

Allyn Young′s lectures, as recorded by the young Nicholas Kaldor, survey the historical roots of the subject from Aristotle through to the modern neo‐classical writers. The focus throughout is on the conditions making for economic progress, with stress on the institutional developments that extend and are extended by the size of the market. Organisational changes that promote the division of labour and specialisation within and between firms and industries, and which promote competition and mobility, are seen as the vital factors in growth. In the absence of new markets, inventions as such play only a minor role. The economic system is an inter‐related whole, or a living “organon”. It is from this perspective that micro‐economic relations are analysed, and this helps expose certain fallacies of composition associated with the marginal productivity theory of production and distribution. Factors are paid not because they are productive but because they are scarce. Likewise he shows why Marshallian supply and demand schedules, based on the “one thing at a time” approach, cannot adequately describe the dynamic growth properties of the system. Supply and demand cannot be simply integrated to arrive at a picture of the whole economy. These notes are complemented by eleven articles in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which were published shortly after Young′s sudden death in 1929.

Traditional public choice analysis implicitly views political outcomes as the intention of a single-minded person. This view is seriously misguided. Rather than viewing politics as being done by one person or a group of persons acting in concert, this chapter presents an Austrian economist’s thoughts on what an Austrian theory of public choice would look like. Particular attention is paid to the emergent, rather than additive, quality that political outcomes exhibit.

The difficulties that MR poses for comparativists were anticipated 40 years ago in Sidney Verba's essay “Some Dilemmas of Comparative Research”, in which he called for a “disciplined configurative approach…based on general rules, but on complicated combinations of them” (Verba, 1967, p. 115). Charles Ragin's (1987) book The Comparative Method eloquently spelled out the mismatch between MR and causal explanation in comparative research. At the most basic level, like most other methods of multivariate statistical analysis MR works by rendering the cases invisible, treating them simply as the source of a set of empirical observations on dependent and independent variables. However, even when scholars embrace the analytical purpose of generalizing about relationships between variables, as opposed to dwelling on specific differences between entities with proper names, the cases of interest in comparative political economy are limited in number and occupy a bounded universe.² They are thus both knowable and manageable. Consequently, retaining named cases in the analysis is an efficient way of conveying information and letting readers evaluate it.³ Moreover, in practice most producers and consumers of comparative political economy are intrinsically interested in specific cases. Why not cater to this interest by keeping our cases visible?

The main purpose of this paper is first to discern the overwhelming influence of Kantian thought in the development of mainstream political economic doctrines. In this we will show that the Kantian philosophical influence has introduced an abiding element of duality in all matters of the western liberal theory of social contract and political economy. The nature of Kantian moral philosophy will be shown to have left the study of political economy by and large ethically neutral by treating the role of morals, ethics and values exogenously to the economic system. We will then introduce some substantive elements of an alternative approach to the treatment of ethics and values in the socio‐economic system. We will show that in the alternative approach to the study of social contract theory and political economy the ethical considerations appear as endogenous elements and strongly negate the Kantian principle of duality and individualistic rationalism.