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Reviews the international response to Marktform und Gleichgewicht, and questions the reactions of astonishment by some critics, including Scherer, concerning Stackelberg’s explanation of disequilibrium of certain market structures. Defends Stackelberg’s standpoint by considering the specific historical context. Looks at Cournot’s continuity thesis and challenges the assumption of analogous market configurations. Suggests that Stackelberg’s theoretical derivations may have been intended to provoke further scientific study.

This article is concerned with the role of theory in explaining the inter‐industry variation of vertical integration (VI). Why, for example, is the world aluminium industry highly integrated (Stukey, 1983) whereas the tin industry is not (Hennart, 1982)? The article is not concerned with explaining differences in the average level of VI across countries, although these are undoubtedly significant (Chandler and Daeins, 1980).

In 1933, Edward H. Chamberlin published the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1962). The work, based upon a dissertation submitted for a PhD degree in Harvard University in 1927 and awarded the David A. Wells prize for 1927–28, has since become a milestone in the development of economic thought. Its impact on industrial organisation theory, general equilibrium and welfare economics, international trade theory and, to a greater or lesser degree, all other branches of economic analysis, has been pervasive and enduring. The ideas set out in the book have been developed, expanded and refined in ways too numerous to be identified precisely, and the books and articles which take Chamberlin's contribution as a starting point arguably exceed in number those on any other single subject in the lexicon of economics.

Prior research suggests that there is enough residual uncertainty in conflict situations so that a person's attitude towards risk may influence his or her conflict behavior. This paper explores the level of dyadic conflict arising from negotiation between partners having different combinations of risk propensities. Dyadic conflict was measured as the sum of each dyadic partner's conflict score using the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory‐I. Risk propensities of negotiators were induced The results from the experiment provide clear evidence in support of the research hypothesis that in a dyad, the greater the disparity between the negotiating partners in their risk‐taking propensities, the greater will be the levels of dyadic conflict. The result suggests that conflict models of negotiating under uncertainty need to include risk propensities of the players to expand their descriptive power.

Lays out a framework for analysing ethics in organizations. Relying on methodological individualism, introduces five building blocks for the framework: self‐interest, individual rationality, sequential rationality, incentive compatibility, and reputation. Uncritical use of the self‐interest model may induce framing effects, blinding less cautious users to important ethical dimensions. Illustrates the richness and “ethical flavour” of an appropriately considered self‐interest model through focusing one of the individual agent’s real interests in a broad sense, through the use of the time factor in the building blocks, and through suggesting how the individual agent can interpret the value systems in her surroundings.

Discusses Heinrich von Stackelberg as a mathematical economist, referring to his book Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Presents the main theories of rivalrous interaction among business firms and the problems of oligopoly and monopoly. Notes how Stackelberg used indifference curves to map the intersecting interests of rival sellers or buyers. Discusses Stackelberg’s isoprofit diagrams and the pattern of market interactions now called Stackelberg leadership.

Should the central bank target asset price inflation? In their 1999 paper Bernanke and Gertler claimed that price stability and financial stability are “mutually consistent objectives” in a flexible inflation targeting regime which “dictates that central banks … should not respond to changes in asset prices.” This conclusion is straightforward within their framework in which asset price inflation shows up as a factor “augmenting” the IS curve. In this chapter, we pursue a different modeling strategy so that, in the end, asset price dynamics will be incorporated into the NK Phillips curve. We put ourselves, therefore, in the best position to obtain a significant stabilizing role for asset price targeting. It turns out, however, that inflation volatility is higher in the asset price targeting case. After all, therefore, targeting asset prices may not be a good idea.

This paper is focused on my search over nearly 60 years for an understanding of marketing – not just as a management technology, but as a social discipline which gives meaning and purpose to the technology.

This paper illustrates my life as an academic in context, which began with a strong focus on marketing in contemporary management and went on to conclude that marketing is much more than management. It was my travels across the world to widely differing markets and marketplaces that led me to this conclusion. I saw individuals, groups and organizations linking with each other in the voluntary exchange of economic and social value, self-organizing into increasingly complex networks that in the end become the institutions that frame marketing action.

I gradually came to see marketing in a much wider, intensely human setting, and to realize some of the complexities of the networks that marketing activities generate.

My story may be of assistance to younger scholars beginning a career in marketing.

Marketing is much more than management and if re-framed should/could stand alongside other social sciences in considering social and economic policy.

To build on my recollections of an unplanned life spent in search of marketing to highlight the need for younger scholars to think about marketing in a dynamic ever-changing systems setting.