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This paper aims to introduce a new class of entire functions whose zeros (z_k)_k≥1 satisfy ∑_k=1^∞Im z_k=O(1).

This is done by means of a Ritt's formula which is used to prove that every partial sum of the Riemann Zeta function, ζ_n(z):=∑_k=1ⁿ1/k^z, n≥2, has zeros (s_nk)_k≥1 verifying ∑_k=1^∞Re s_nk=O(1) and extending this property to a large class of entire functions denoted by A_O.

It is found that this new class A_O has a part in common with the class A introduced by Levin but is distinct from it. It is shown that, in particular, A_O contains every partial sum of the Riemann Zeta function ζ_n(iz) and every finite truncation of the alternating Dirichlet series expansion of the Riemann zeta function, T_n(iz):=∑_k=1ⁿ(−1)^k−1/k^iz, for all n≥2.

With the exception of the n=2 case, numerical experiences show that all zeros of ζ_n(z) and T_n(z) are not symmetrically distributed around the imaginary axis. However, the fact consisting of every function ζ_n(iz) and T_n(iz) to be in the class A_O implies the existence of a very precise physical equilibrium between the zeros situated on the left half‐plane and the zeros situated on the right half‐plane of each function. This is a relevant fact and it points out that there is certain internal rule that distributes the zeros of ζ_n(z) and T_n(z) in such a way that few zeros on the left of the imaginary axis and far away from it, must be compensated with a lot of zeros on the right of the imaginary axis and close to it, and vice versa.

The paper presents an original class of entire functions that provides a new point of view to study the approximants and the alternating Dirichlet truncations of the Riemann zeta function.

1.1. Logical Necessity of the Three Dimensions as a Unit of Thought The mathematician does not look kindly on the simple question of why natural space should consist of precisely three dimensions. Instead of giving an answer he assumes a silent smile and shows us a version of space with an infinity of dimensions, as if space were some kind of toy for him to fiddle with to his heart's content.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how game theoretic solution concepts inform what classes of problems will be amenable to artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), and how to evolve the interaction between human and artificial intelligence.

The approach addresses the development of operational gaming to support planning and decision making. It then provides a succinct summary of game theory for those designing and using games, with an emphasis on information conditions and solution concepts. It addresses how experimentation demonstrates where human decisions differ from game theoretic solution concepts and how games have been used to develop AI/ML. It concludes by suggesting what classes of problems will be amenable to AI/ML, and which will not. It goes on to propose a method for evolving human/artificial intelligence.

Game theoretic solution concepts inform classes of problems where AI/ML 'solutions' will be suspect. The complexity of the subject requires a campaign of learning.

Though games have been essential to the development of AI/ML, practitioners have yet to employ game theory to understand its limitations.

As universities grapple with broadening participation of women in science, many ADVANCE funded institutions hone in on transforming search committee practices to better consider dual-career partners and affirmative action hires (“opportunity hires”). To date, there is a lack of empirical research on the consequences and processes underlying such a focus. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how two ADVANCE-recommended hiring practices, dual-career hiring and affirmative action hiring, help or hinder women’s participation in academic science.

In two experiments, the authors tested what happens to a science candidate’s evaluation and offer when that candidate reveals he or she has a dual-career partner (vs is a solo-candidate, Experiment 1) or if it is revealed that the candidate under review is the dual-hire partner or is a target of opportunity hire (vs primary candidate, Experiment 2). A random US national sample of academic scientists provided anonymous external recommendations to an ostensible faculty search committee.

Evaluators supported the job offer to a primary candidate requiring a heterosexual partner accommodation. This good news, however, was offset by the results of Experiment 2, which showed that support for the partner or affirmative action candidate depended on the evaluator’s gender. Taken together, the research identifies important personal and contextual features that sometimes do – and sometimes do not – impact hiring perceptions of women in science.

The authors believe the effects of such an emphasis on opportunity hires within ADVANCE funded institutions may be considerable and inform changes to policies and practices that help bring about gender equality.

This paper aims to focus on a little studied but important type of conflict, zero‐sum situations. These conflicts are less likely to take place than those in which participants can come to an integrative agreement, but knowing how to best strategize for zero‐sum conflicts can lead to better outcomes in these situations.

Participants in the study utilized two specific strategies – purposive or contingent – in a rock‐paper‐scissors elimination tournament. The use of the strategy and the outcome were measured in a controlled setting.

Results demonstrate that using a strategy in a win‐lose conflict situation significantly predicts success. Further, competitive individuals are more likely to utilize strategies than other personality types.

This paper builds on the theory that individuals in conflict situations have preferences, pursue goals, and behave purposefully. In particular, the paper studies the antecedents to strategies employed in a conflict situation and that strategy's effect on the outcome.

Like conflict in general, budgetary conflict is perceived by conflicting parties as a zero-sum game or distributive: one party's gain is the other party's loss. We identify an organizational culture that promotes this view as “traditional.” We propose that changing certain elements of organizational culture is sufficient to produce more integrative, nonzero-sum outcomes. We call this changed organizational culture “empowering.” We propose and test the effects of an empowering organizational culture (EOC) in contrast to the traditional organizational culture (TOC). We hypothesize that an EOC would produce more integrative conflict resolution than the typical TOC. Based on our review of the literature, we identify two elements of the EOC that are essential in producing more integrative solutions to budgetary conflict. The two elements that we simultaneously manipulate are the superior's empowering style (or lack thereof) as reflected in encouragement to freely negotiate, and the superior's intervention process in failed negotiations (a process that encourages the search for integrative solutions and avoids imposed compromises that dampen the desire to negotiate). Using a laboratory experiment, 84 subjects forming 42 dyads negotiated the allocation of discretionary budgets face-to-face. The results of the experiment confirm our hypotheses that the EOC produces more integrative budget negotiation outcomes, greater convergence, and greater satisfaction with the outcome than TOC.

Addresses the nature of the competitive advantage of the transnational corporation as an institutional form versus alternative forms of economic organization. It is argued that an important – and undertheorized – source of the TNC’s institutional superiority arises from its ability to extract rents from other significant stakeholders such as states and workers through structurally increasing bargaining power (driven by globalization) over these groups. A related issue which is considered is that of the changing sources of competitive advantage for TNCs operating in host countries and their associated distributional effects on key stakeholder groups, presented as ranging from positive‐sum to zero‐sum based on certain specific contingencies. To the extent that the particular sources of TNC competitive advantage matter in terms of their social significance, TNCs can, under certain circumstances, be understood as institutional mechanisms which exploit and extend market failures in the name of shareholder wealth rather than as agents of global allocative efficiency, thus making the question of their overall social utility contentious. Substantial public policy implications are therefore raised and briefly outlined. Some final comments are directed at the need for orthodox theories of the TNC to revisit comparative institutional and distributional considerations.

What can and should we do as managers when our sense of personal morality is at odds with our organization's strategic thrust? There are essentially seven types of strategic responses based on game theory, philosophy, and everyday pragmatics: Avoid thinking about it; obey; leave; conscientiously object; secretly go outside the company to the press or government; publicly go outside the company to the press or government; or negotiate and build a consensus for a change in strategic management. The seven case studies below offer examples of each of these choices.