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This paper aims to explore corporate governance (CG) and succession planning in family-owned businesses in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Semi-structured interviews are conducted with 16 owners and heirs of UAE family businesses. The interviews – face-to-face and asynchronous electronic – are conducted instead of a questionnaire to get an in-depth analysis of the topic in the context of both medium- and large-sized family businesses.

The responses are mixed with regard to governance challenges (duality, gender, internal control, transparency, etc.). The majority of the interviewees indicate that succession planning remains one of the biggest challenges for family businesses in the UAE. Fifteen of the sixteen interviewees document that a sound succession strategy must be in place to ensure the continuity of the business and prevent future disputes among potential successors. Similarly, the respondents also emphasise the importance of transparency and accountability for the sustainability of family businesses. The sustainability of family businesses relies on many aspects, such as national regulations, corporate systems and the succession process. Finally, most of the respondents from medium-sized companies opined that incorporating CG is a time-consuming and expensive process.

The interviewees supported stewardship theory in case family members are occupying positions on the board as they have more long-term commitment and a greater sense of belonging to the business (socio-emotional wealth) compared to non-family members. The interviewees acknowledge that the lack of professionalism and conflicts of interest among family members can be offset by recruiting non-family members.

Family businesses are particularly significant in the Arab world as they account for over 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) and use above 80% of the workforce which make them interesting research subject. In addition, this paper explores the CG challenges faced by both large- and medium-sized family businesses in the UAE within the theoretical framework of stewardship theory.

For investors to wholeheartedly entrust their finances to the supposed executives, there is the need to set up policies to checkmate the excesses of such executives, hence clawback policy. This study aims to explore the perceptions of professionals regarding the impact of clawback provisions on earnings management (EM) and financial reporting quality in the context of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The application of a qualitative approach in an EM is of great significance in this study. For convenience, perceptions of the professionals were collected through semi-structured face-to-face interviews, internet forums and telephone conversations from which the data were initially transcribed and analyzed using thematic analysis.

The findings of the study indicate that clawbacks will have a significant impact on EM and financial reporting quality, and apart from this, other firm-level factors have also been supporting clawbacks.

EM has been a widespread practice; this research may potentially assist directors and regulatory bodies to comprehend factors that should be considered to reduce it. It may also provide practical insights from professionals regarding clawbacks and their bearing on EM and the quality of financial information from an emerging economy perspective.

A significant gap in the contemporary literature regarding the impact of clawback provisions on EM and financial reporting quality has been filed by this work, in the context of the UAE economy. Consequently, it provides a great insight into the effect of clawback in a business setting and how it can help checkmate the excesses of company executives.

The chapter examines the perceptions of a range of stakeholders regarding the ethics of earnings management (EM) by Libyan commercial banks. EM ethics research has largely been based on a questionnaire developed by Bruns and Merchant (1990). This chapter addresses the issue in two different ways. First, it directly examines the interviewees’ perceptions on whether EM is ethical or not. Second, stakeholders’ perceptions are surveyed using a set of questions that consider, for example, the effect of EM on others’ interests and whether EM is ethical if applied within General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the law. A total of 28 semi-structured interviews were carried out with stakeholders comprising: preparers of financial statements, users, regulators, and academics. A questionnaire survey of stakeholders which yielded 102 responses (response rate 53%) was also carried out. Interview findings indicated that 50% of the interviewees have the view that EM is ethical. Questionnaire results, on the other hand, revealed that EM is agreed, on balance, to be perceived as unethical. However, if applied within GAAP and the legal framework it is perceived, on balance, to be ethical. The chapter provides insights into stakeholders’ perceptions of EM ethics. The findings are of particular relevance to the users, and specifically, the external auditor as well as current and potential investors. EM practices, according to the literature, degrade financial reporting quality and may affect economic decisions. Auditors should be aware that EM may be regarded as an ethical practice and therefore more scrutiny might be required. In terms of accountability a manager should be held accountable not only to shareholders but also to society as a whole.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the revised Code of Corporate Governance 2017 (CCG-2017) clauses pertaining to board independence, mandatory inclusion of female directors, audit committee (AC) chair independence and directors’ expertise on earnings manipulation.

Using an unbalanced panel of 323 listed companies from 2015 to 2019, this study uses panel data regression models with a robust methodology called difference-in-differences to tackle the potential endogeneity.

This study’s findings show that, as compared to the pre-CCG-2017 period, board- and AC-related variables increased significantly in the post-CCG-2017 period. Furthermore, financial experts on the board and board independence have a negative effect on discretionary accruals (DAs), whereas female directors and DAs are positively related, as is real activity manipulation. The AC-related variables, such as AC independence, expertise in AC, and AC chair independence, are significantly different from the preperiod to the postperiod, whereas their relationship is not according to the hypotheses of the study. Moreover, these results are robust to additional analysis of the alternative proxies for female directorship and the endogeneity problem.

The findings of this study have implications for regulators and practitioners who are concerned with the functions of the board of directors (BOD). The findings of this research study show that earnings management (EM) may be reduced by independent and expert directors. However, board gender diversity is not reducing the EM. Therefore, the decision to appoint female directors to the board should be based on their business and professional attributes rather than simply filling quotas or blindly adhering to regulations. Moreover, the findings of this research may assist the regulator in encouraging listed firms to enhance board governance via independence, diversity and competency, which are useful for effective monitoring.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing the first evidence of country-specific regulation (CCG-2017), concerning the BOD and AC-related clauses on EM in Pakistan, which is missing in the relevant literature general and in Pakistan in particular.