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Marx expected the socialist revolution to take place in a highly industrialized society. In his theory the creation of the industrial society was the “historical task” of Capitalism. The “historical task” of Socialism was the equitable distribution of the fruits of industrialization. This sequence was inherent in his dialectical and historical materialism. For this reason, argues that it would be rash to pass judgement on Socialism in the light of the Russian experience. The Russian experience may well have been a “special case”.

Plagiarizes Jonathan Swift to produce a tongue‐in‐cheek proposal for the relief of the burden of children to the poor and so create benefits for the state. Claims satirically that the scheme would solve a number of societal problems.

The author argues that we must stop and take a look at what our insistence on human labour as the basis of our society is doing to us, and begin to search for possible alternatives. We need the vision and the courage to aim for the highest level of technology attainable for the widest possible use in both industry and services. We need financial arrangements that will encourage people to invent themselves out of work. Our goal, the article argues, must be the reduction of human labour to the greatest extent possible, to free people for more enjoyable, creative, human activities.

The author examines the rise of the centralized state and its effect on the power of aristocracy during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in the British Isles and in France and its eastern periphery. He defines states as entities with political power over a delimited territory, and he chooses to give most attention to the centralization (p. 11) and the differentiation of power (p. 23).

Combines theory with practice, based on experiences rather than philosophical speculation. The question posed is whether technological innovation must be regarded as an exogenous or endogenous variable in economic models. Neoclassical economics, even in such modified versions as developed by Samuelson and Solow, regard technology, labour economics and social change, exogenous. The belief is that they are endogenous, and innovations in the technological sphere are no less influenced by economic factors than the economy by technological developments. Examines the related decision‐making processes in one of the major electronics multinationals in order to obtain more insight into the complex interaction between economic and technological changes.

Describes the fear of inflation which has frustrated European employment policies since the early 1970s. States that the concurrence of much unemployment with inflation did not elicit new ideas and that governments postulated that excessive spending, social security payments in particular, is the main cause of both: this legitimized severe restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, but expected results failed to appear. Finds that inflation did indeed abate but the increase in unemployment did not. Suggests that, because the services required for improving human capital are a prerequisite for economic progress, it follows that the state has to guarantee at least minimum conditions for ready access to services. For a calculating government, this is difficult to implement. That is why the dominating calculating principle in politics (a sort of monetarist bookkeeping attitude) undermines the economic performance of a country and threatens democracy. Yet the monetarist economic framework persists. Moreover, indicates the Maastricht Treaty actually establishes a legal and economic framework by which price stability takes precedence over growth, reduction of unemployment and social welfare considerations. Feels that a re‐examination of the true causes of inflation and unemployment has become imperative.

Top managers of multinational enterprises are continuously confronted with “make‐or‐buy” decisions. These choices have to be made after corporate strategy has already been determined and the measures to realize the corporate aims have been taken. Elucidates why the decision to make components and/or production equipment in‐house, instead of buying them from professional suppliers, may more often than not be subversive of multinational corporations′ (MNCs) core activities. Relies on a case study at a research and development department of Philips International (The Netherlands). Illustrates how the decision to make production equipment in‐house evokes further decisions which are in conflict with the actual corporate strategy. The decision of a producer of consumer electronics to develop production equipment in‐house, instead of buying it in the marketplace, imposes on top management the need to decide whether or not to add this equipment to its consumer product range. The problem is that an affirmative decision may well give rise to a shift in the company′s core activities. Consequently, “make‐or‐buy” decisions are a potential threat to strategic core activities and top management would be well advised to be aware of this.