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To explore how the blockchain affects the pricing and financing decisions in a low-carbon platform supply chain.

Considering the dual roles of the e-commerce platform as a seller and an initiator, a typical game-theoretical method is applied to analyze the behavior of supply chain decision-makers and the impact of key variables on equilibriums.

When loan interest rates are symmetric, whether blockchain is used or not, the e-commerce platform financing mode will always produce higher wholesale price and unit carbon emission reduction, while the retail price is the opposite. Higher unit additional income brought by the blockchain can bring higher economic and environmental performances, and the e-commerce platform financing mode is superior to bank financing mode. The application of blockchain may cause the manufacturer to change his/her financing choice. For bank financing, with the increase of loan interest rates, the advantages brought by blockchain will gradually disappear, but this situation will not occur under e-commerce platform financing.

Blockchain is known for its information transparency properties and its ability to enhance user trust. However, the impacts of applying blockchain in a low-carbon platform supply chain with different financing options are not clear. The authors examine the manufacturer's strategic choices for platform financing and bank financing, whether to adopt blockchain, and the impact of these decisions on carbon emissions reduction, consumer surplus and social welfare. The research conclusion can provide reference for the operation and financing decisions of platform supply chain under the carbon reduction target in the digital economy era.

To examine how shareholding affects optimal profits, R&D innovation, NEV market scale and social welfare in two supply chain models with partial and cross ownership patterns.

The gradual retreat of government subsidies has directly weakened the financial support available to the stakeholders of new energy vehicles (NEVs). In this context, upstream and downstream enterprises of NEV are constantly seeking new business models of cooperation to achieve possible win-wins. NEV supply chain shareholding is an emerging new practice for such explorations. However, its performance in the NEV supply chain is seldom investigated. In this paper, we employ a Stackelberg game model to investigate how partial and cross-ownership affect the optimal decisions in a NEV supply chain.

Results showed that: (1) Compared with the unilateral shareholding model, the battery supplier will benefit from cross-ownership in the supply chain, while the NEV manufacturer will not necessarily benefit from it. At the same time, cross-ownership will bring the greatest incentive for battery R&D (2) Supply chain downstream competition will not necessarily lead to the improvement of the total consumption of NEVs or the level of battery design. Pareto improvement can be brought only when one of the manufacturers holds less than a certain equity threshold. In addition, downstream competition will also not necessarily bring more benefits to the battery supplier.

At present, NEV supply chain management has attracted widespread attention from scholars from all walks of life. Previous studies have been carried out that covers topics such as pricing strategies and optimal profits and the role of NEV in the sustainable development of the automotive industry supply chain, or disparate impacts of government subsidies and carbon emission regulation on supply chain members. However, as far as the authors know, compared with the new emerging NEV corporate practice, the shareholding phenomenon between upstream and downstream in the supply chain of NEV has not been studied in the existing studies.