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EY's audit of German company Wirecard raises many questions about the quality of its audit. The scope and depth of the audit deficiencies have led some to call it: Germany's Enron. The authors review the facts of the case and raise broad-based questions that address EY's audit: what it did wrong, what other steps it might have taken to enhance the audit, and whether it can be characterized as a failed audit. The case provides learning objectives, implementation guidance, and answers to these questions. The authors believe that it can be used at both the undergraduate and graduate levels in courses dealing with accounting ethics, fraud in financial statements, and auditing.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how the Wirecard scandal has highlighted the need for further reforms in Germany and Europe, exposing institutional and market oversight weaknesses, particularly in terms of market integrity and investor protection.

To provide a comprehensive picture of the situation, this paper is based only on relevant studies, which focus on the topic of interest, namely, the context of the Wirecard collapse in June 2020. It also examines how internal and external governance and monitoring mechanisms failed to uncover major fraud within the German payments group earlier.

This study shows that this is by no means an isolated or unpredictable incident, and the allegations of accounting fraud had been known for several years, thanks to warnings from the Financial Times. In addition, the paper reviews the serious shortcomings revealed in the Wambach report. The report provided private details of the Wirecard audit and documents on the relationship between Wirecard management and the auditor. All of this can serve as a reference point for institutional and market oversight architecture in Germany and Europe and pave the way for future research.

The paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the implications of the Wirecard scandal and the lessons that can be learned from what was one of Germany’s biggest corporate scandals especially at a time when many are already affected by the impact of COVID-19 on the entire financial services industry.

A total of 25 years of research on the audit society has provided rich and engaging accounts of the ways in which rituals of verification have conditioned organizations and individuals to think and act. In contrast, this paper aims to explore the possibility of conditions through which things and spaces are enacted to be non-auditable.

Using the concept of proliferation and rarefaction (Callon and Law, 2005), the paper adopts a case-comparison design to explore two empirical sites. The first investigates a vast excess of audit structures against the case of the biggest corporate fraud in German accounting history, the Wirecard scandal. The second discusses the configuration of Tinder, the most popular provider of mobile dating and the absence of visible verification mechanisms.

The paper argues that things can become non-auditable through two mechanisms. Based on the two empirical sites, non-auditability can happen through an overload of auditable resources or, through the withdrawal of required resources. The paper discusses the consequences of this finding and suggests avenues for future research on non-auditability.

While accounting scholars have extensively addressed the audit explosion and traced how audit practices have journeyed into ever more novel terrains, this paper discusses forms of escape from the value-subverting and reductive accounts incorporated in the audit society. It thereby points to conditions under which accounting ends.

Scandals regularly sweep through organizational fields: they wreak havoc in markets, vaporize billions of dollars in firm value, bring down giant corporations, get CEOs fired, alter the evolution of technologies, and trigger major changes in society. In spite of their significance for organizational life, scandals have received remarkably limited attention in management research. I build on the social sciences’ sparse but growing stream of research on scandals to explore the concept beyond its usual representation as a discrete event. I propose that an organizational scandal may be understood as an interactional process associated with the disclosure of alleged organizational misconduct that involves: a public struggle between alleged perpetrators and social control agents over the framing of organizational misconduct; moralizing by audience members; collective effervescence at the societal level; and the potential rewriting of the moral rules applicable to organizations and their members.

This chapter introduces the fundamentals of portfolio and financial consumer protection from frauds in the cryptoasset space. Cryptoassets pose new risks to portfolios and financial consumers: idiosyncratic risks stemming from their unique features and systematic risks arising from transitioning from centralized to decentralized finance. Market experience indicates that these risks threaten every portfolio and financial consumer holding cryptoassets. In the consumer protection framework, cryptoasset risks are higher than traditional asset risks. Cryptoassets fall outside the regulatory domain in many jurisdictions. Moreover, their decentralized nature, technological attributes, and the momentum of financial technology cause asymmetric technology, disarming system-based portfolio and consumer protection mechanisms against frauds and abuses. Hence, the idiosyncratic and systematic risks of cryptoassets highlight the importance of developing more vigilant self-protection mechanisms.

This paper aims to highlight the role and impact of corporate governance in combating fraud by drawing on insights from the literature, identify gaps in the literature and suggest new directions for future research.

The paper is based on a comprehensive general literature review using multiple search engines and databases.

This paper finds that effective corporate governance can help reduce fraud risk, prevent fraud and detect fraud, particularly corporate fraud, insider fraud and asset diversion. Some companies use corporate governance mechanisms to bolster their reputation following fraud detection. Ineffective corporate governance increases fraud risk, provides the opportunity for perpetrating fraud and reduces the likelihood of fraud detection. The paper sheds light on several governance mechanisms that could help in mitigating fraud risk, as reported in the literature. The paper categorises these governance mechanisms into four broad governance aspects, including board leadership and the role of ethics; (b) board characteristics, composition and structure; ownership structure; accountability. The paper proposes a guide summarising these broad fundamental governance aspects, including specific anti-fraud controls and examples of how organisations could enhance ethical cultures and the tone at the top.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to elucidate the role of corporate governance in countering fraud and develop guidance in this area. The proposed guidance could be helpful to businesses leaders, policymakers, researchers and academics alike.

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of audit committee financial experts on the risk of financial corruption in public companies.

A time-lagged, matched-pairs sample of 352 corporations was utilized to test the study's hypotheses (176 financially corrupt firms plus 176 compliant firms). To uncover financially corrupt firms, 2,895 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases from the Securities and Exchange Commission were thoroughly evaluated.

The results show that financial experts on audit committees generally increased financial corruption. However, the impact was reversed when audit committees had three or more financial experts, showing that having at least three financial experts reduced financial corruption.

The study's findings call into question the long-held practice of appointing at least one financial expert to audit committees. This study offers a novel approach to improve corporate oversight and reduce financial corruption by having at least three financial experts on audit committees.

This paper aims to review 68 archival studies on the impact of audit committees (ACs) on firms’ consequences [(non)financial reporting, performance and audit quality] in European firms.

Applying a stakeholder agency-theoretical framework, the author differentiates between three categories of AC variables: presence; composition; and resources, incentives and diligence.

The author finds that AC composition, (non)financial reporting and audit quality are dominant in the literature review. Other inputs or outputs are either too low in amount or yielded heterogeneous results, hindering clear tendencies. However, there are indications that financial expertise is positively related to financial reporting and audit quality, in line with agency theory and European regulatory assumptions.

In the discussion of potential future research, the author emphasizes, among others, the need for the recognition of innovative and sustainable AC variables, inclusion of moderator and especially mediator variables and reaction to endogeneity concerns by advanced regression models.

As the European Commission currently discusses extended regulations on AC duties and composition, this literature review highlights the huge impact of financial expertise on financial reporting and audit quality. In view of the increased monitoring duties of sustainability reporting, both business practices and regulatory bodies should increase the sustainability expertise of ACs.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on attributes of AC and their impact on firms’ outputs in the European capital market, based on a differentiation between mandatory one-tier/two-tier systems and the choice model. The findings support the promotion of European evidence-based regulations, such as the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive.