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This study aims to investigate window dressing as practiced by commercial banks in Kuwait, using monthly aggregate balance sheet data covering the period January 1993 to December 2017.

This study applies the structural time series model to decompose an observed time series into unobserved components based on monthly data covering January 1993 to December 2017 on the consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in Kuwait.

The empirical results indicate that Kuwaiti commercial banks indulge in upward window dressing to boost size and liquidity. This kind of behaviour is indicated by a statistically significant rise in assets under the control of banks in December, followed by a statistically significant decline in January. The operation is funded by borrowing, leading to a December rise and a January fall in foreign and other liabilities, which are also under the control of commercial banks.

This study uses a novel methodology to detect window dressing based on the seasonal behaviour of balance sheet items. This study suggests a unified framework for the motives, targets, types and consequences of window dressing and how they are related.

U.S. venture capital financings of U.S. entrepreneurial firms with up to 213 observations are consistent with the proposition that convertible preferred equity is the optimal form of venture capital finance. This paper introduces new evidence from 208 U.S. venture capital financings of Canadian entrepreneurial firms. In contrast to U.S. venture capital investments in U.S. entrepreneurial firms, U.S. venture capitalists finance Canadian entrepreneurial firms with a variety of forms of finance. The differences between domestic and international U.S. venture capitalist financing structures are not attributable to differences in the definition of the term ‘venture capital’. The data point to the importance of institutional determinants of venture capitalist capital structures within the U.S. and abroad. Among other things, the data indicate that U.S. venture capitalists often do not choose convertible preferred shares in the absence of tax considerations in favor of that financing vehicle.

Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have mandated mutual fund disclosure regimes to help investors make better investment decisions to strike an optimal balance between the investors' interest in more timely and accurate portfolio holdings disclosure and the cost associated with making and disclosing the holdings information available to investors. Many academics and practitioners point out that, despite all the regulations on portfolio disclosure, fund managers can still engage in practices that go against the spirit of the rules without violating the letter of the law. The purpose of this paper is to address the empirical question of whether the practice exists, using holdings data for more than 3,000 equity mutual funds during the time period from 1995 to 2004.

In this paper, the authors examine window dressing by mutual fund portfolio managers, using holdings data covering more than 3,000 equity mutual funds from 1995 to 2004. The authors first investigate whether the fund holdings are materially different from universe holdings across performance quintiles based on holdings in the month of disclosure and in the following month. The second part of the analysis examines funds' patterns of buying and selling. Finally, the measure of “Buying Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” is examined, with a specific focus on the holdings data for the fourth quarter.

An examination of fund holdings finds no statistically significant evidence of systematic window dressing, either at the aggregate level or within subsamples of funds based on size or past performance. Rather, it was found that fund managers tend to chase momentum. A combination of investor sophistication and market oversight may serve to be effective in dissuading fund managers from engaging in the practice.

The authors' data are at the individual fund level, based on equity mutual funds holdings data provided to Morningstar on a quarterly or monthly basis (according to Elton et al., the Morningstar database provides timely and accurate mutual fund holdings information). These data allow us to infer better the investment manager intent vis‐à‐vis using 13F data, which is aggregate data across various fund families and separate accounts, or aggregate pension fund equity holdings data that includes aggregate holdings of multiple portfolio managers. In addition, the authors comment on the significance of the regulatory checks and balances that are designed to restrict fund managers' ability to window‐dress their portfolios. In summary, the combination of quantitative evidence from empirical tests and an examination of the legal framework under which mutual fund portfolio managers operate, lead to the conclusion that window dressing is not prevalent in the industry.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how sub-suppliers decouple the implementation of sustainable supply management practices in supply chains, and what institutional logics permit these suppliers to do so.

Following a qualitative design, we conducted 23 in-depth semi-structured interviews with owners and managers of apparel sub-suppliers. To corroborate research findings, the views of owners and managers were triangulated by further interviewing 18 key representatives of wide-ranging institutional actors.

The findings suggest that owners and managers of sub-suppliers use two decoupling responses: (1) consensual strategy to compromise sustainability requirements (2) concealment strategy. In addition, this paper identifies multiple institutional types of conflicting logics: instrumental logic, legitimacy logic complexity and gaps in normative logic, which interplay amongst sub-suppliers whereby permit to decouple the implementation of supply management practices.

While the current paper provides an early contribution from the perspectives of second-tier and third-tier suppliers, future research could be extended to include further upstream sub-suppliers and downstream tiers including the end consumers.

It is important for brand-owning retailers and first-tier suppliers to predict sub-suppliers' decoupling behaviour and conflicts for supply management practices implementation since they may present potential vulnerability for buyers and lead suppliers.

This study extends the application of institutional theory and contributes to the literature on extended suppliers' supply management practices in a developing country context, which is an under-researched area.

The purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative approach to measure the cost-benefit tradeoff, by analyzing stockholders’ reactions to the announcement and vote on the proposed rule. More specifically, the authors use event study methodology to investigate the stock price reaction on two key dates; that is, the announcement date and the voting date of the proposed short-term borrowing disclosure regulation, and argue that positive abnormal stock returns indicate that the expected benefits of the regulation outweigh the compliance costs. A negative reaction would indicate that, in the eyes of investors, the costs of compliance exceed the expected benefits.

The authors use event study analysis and apply the market model to equal-weighted portfolios of 2,450 financial and 3,985 non-financial US firms to calculate mean cumulative abnormal stock returns (MCARs, hereafter) on the announcement and voting dates. Then, the authors conduct mean difference tests on firm-level MCARs across three event windows, that is, (−30,−1), (0,+1) and (+2,+30), to confirm if the MCARs of financial firms are different from those of non-financial firms on both the announcement and the voting dates. Finally, robustness tests are performed with alternate benchmark, using value-weighted portfolios, for the market.

The authors find that the market reaction is positive and significant at the announcement date and negative and significant at the voting date of the proposed regulation of short-term borrowing disclosure regulation. Overall, the paper documents a positive market reaction, indicating the usefulness of the disclosure from the vantage point of users. Examining and comparing the results for various subsets, including commercial banks and saving institutions, bank holding companies, size quartiles, and exchange listed and OTC registrants, the authors find that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulation is undesirable.

This is first empirical study, to best of the authors’ knowledge, to explore stockholder reaction to a proposed, rather than an enforced, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation and may contribute to the SEC’s final decision on the rule. Second, given a dissimilar reaction from investors of different firms, the results suggest that the SEC needs to reconsider its one-size-fit-all approach for the proposed rule. Finally, because the proposed disclosure would affect all SEC registrants, the economic implications of the findings are important not only for stockholders, but also for regulators, as they attempt to manage systematic risk and optimize the level of market intervention.

The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, implemented since 1 January 1994, facilitates the increase of institutional investment in the real estate investment trust (REIT) market. Utilizing this particular feature in the market, we examine the time‐series effect of institutional holdings to distinguish the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis and the window‐dressing hypothesis for REITs. Consistent with the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis, we have evidence that the January premiums decreased with the level of institutional involvement for REITs. Furthermore the January premiums declined significantly for equity REITs only that attracted more institutional investors than mortgage REITs. On the other hand, the January premiums did not decrease significantly for mortgage REITs. Overall the results suggest that trading strategies to profit the higher January returns may work only when institutional investors exit and leave the market.

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine in detail the banking window dressing (WD) theory. Using data from the Greek banking industry during the euro period (2001-2013), the results suggest that there are signs of upward assets and deposits WD. Moreover, it tries to explain, using new-alternative approaches, the incentives for the WD and how the deposits WD occur.

To examine why bank managers upwardly WD the deposits and which strategy increases the regular payments cost, the author uses a Granger causality procedure and confirms the theory that the aim of increased assets report causes the deposits WD. Moreover, using a GARCH(1,1) and a methodological approach that is usually used in calendar anomalies, but is more flexible than the one usually applied, enables us not only to confirm that there is a WD but also under which mechanisms it occurs.

Bank managers prefer to pay increased regular payments due to the upward deposits WD to upwardly WD the bank assets, for the following reasons: they receive compensation depending on the assets’ volume, they gain prestige and most managers try to present increased bank assets and deposits to include them in the “too big to fail ” (TBTF) regime. The author also finds that managers increase the new offered bank premiums in the quarters’ end to attract more deposits, and in this way, the deposits WD occurs.

The findings of this study are limited to the Greek case, but the methodological approach may be applied to other cases to examine the WD theory and it could present a new-flexible way for WD research.

Examining the institutional framework, the theoretical background and the results, the author may suggest that reforms, at least in the way that the regular payment to the Greek deposits insurer are paid, should be applied. In Greece, 80 per cent of the regular DIS payments are deposited in the same financial institution. This reduction of the ratio significantly increase the deposits WD cost.

The contribution of this paper is to re-examine the WD theory and to suggest new and more flexible methodological approaches. Moreover, this is the first study that examines the WD for the Greek case.

We document the emergence of the Lead Independent Director (LID) board role in a sample of U.S. firms from 1999–2015. We find that firms that adopt an LID board role are larger and have more independent boards, higher institutional investor holdings, and an NYSE listing. Firms with greater anticipated benefits from monitoring also adopt an LID role, e.g., firms with dual CEO-Chairman, with more takeover defense mechanisms, and with higher cash holdings. Using an event study methodology, we find that investors respond positively to the adoption of an LID board role. Lastly, using instrumental variables to address endogeneity in the LID board role, we find that firms with an LID are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that the LID board role enhances firm value and improves the quality of corporate governance.

This chapter focuses on the management of ethnic diversity and investigates Diversity Management practices in an organization which is a member of the Diversity Charta in Germany and even won a prize for its outstanding Diversity Management initiatives. However, this chapter illustrates that in this company Diversity Management can only be understood as window dressing, rather than as a serious attempt to manage diversity and particularly ethnic diversity. The case study data derives from a larger study, which examined the habitus of managing ethnic diversity in Germany. The case study data consists of observations, interviews with key internal stuff as well as employees, a focus group, documentary analysis of company data (policies, annual reports, brochures, as well as employee statistics), information about company history and lastly visual data in the form of pictures.