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A key challenge for cost-effective Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITSs) is the ability to create generalizable domain, learner, and pedagogical models so they can be re-used many times over. Investment in this technology will be needed to succeed in developing ITSs for team training. The purpose of this chapter is to propose an instructional framework for guiding team ITS researchers in their development of these models for reuse. We establish a foundation for the framework with three propositions. First, we propose that understanding how teams develop is needed to establish a science-based foundation for modeling. Toward this end, we conduct a detailed exploration of the Kozlowski, Watola, Jensen, Kim, and Botero (2009) theory of team development and leadership, and describe a use case example to demonstrate how team training was developed for a specific stage in their model. Next, we propose that understanding measures of learning and performance will inform learner modeling requirements for each stage of team development. We describe measures developed for the use case and how they were used to understand teamwork skill development. We then discuss effective team training strategies and explain how they were implemented in the use case to understand their implications for pedagogical modeling. From this exploration, we describe a generic instructional framework recommending effective training strategies for each stage of team development. To inform the development of reusable models, we recommend selecting different team task domains and varying team size to begin researching commonalities and differences in the instructional framework.

The essence of the ecological crisis is not that resources are out of reach, but that the relationship between living beings has deteriorated. For this reason, ecology cannot simply be seen as a scientific matter but rather as a genuine social problem that requires social actions.

The law in its present form falls short of managing ecological problems despite the fact that the right to a natural environment is recognized in most jurisdictions as a basic one and that international covenants have been created to protect the natural environment. Environmental law ought to bring about a reverence for life and promote the cooperation of biotic communities. A legal system given to innovation could offer foresight-based regulation, integration of the ensemble of living beings, and cooperation in the living world. One of the main challenges the law has to meet is the exploration of a theoretically established and practically viable basis for extending its influence to address the problems of future generations.

This chapter explores the ways in which cybernetics influenced the works of F. A. Hayek from the late 1940s onward. It shows that the concept of negative feedback, borrowed from cybernetics, was central to Hayek’s attempt to explain the principle of the emergence of human purposive behavior. Next, the chapter discusses Hayek’s later uses of cybernetic ideas in his works on the spontaneous formation of social orders. Finally, Hayek’s view on the appropriate scope of the use of cybernetics is considered.

I suggest that the search for Adam Smith’s theodicy is likely to be in vain. The paper begins with a brief history of approaches to evil, emphasizing the context in which they arose, and the questions authors were addressing. Approaches most relevant to Adam Smith include those of Augustine and Calvin, and the early modern theodicies of Leibniz, Samuel Clarke and William King, as well as the attacks on them by Bayle and Voltaire. Scottish Enlightenment writers were not terribly interested in theodicy, though Hutcheson and Kames did devote space to their versions of problems of evil. David Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion are often taken to be classic statement of the problem of theodicy and argument against religious belief, but his concern was to demolish rationalistic theodicies rather than religious belief or practice. The paper then turns to Smith’s writings, considering similarities and differences to these approaches to evil. Smith emphasizes the wisdom and beneficence of God, and that evils we observe are part of a larger providential plan. He makes no attempt to justify the God in the face of evil, and in this respect Smith shares more with Augustine and Calvin than he does with the early modern theodicists. Smith’s approach to evil is simple and ameliorative. Smith’s approach contrasts with early nineteenth century English political economists, from Malthus onwards, for whom theodicy was important. Whatever view we take of the theodicists project of justifying an all-powerful and good God in the face of evil may, we still struggle to make sense of economic suffering and evil.