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In their well-known contribution to the “varieties of capitalism” debate, Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001, Ch. 1) highlight the distinction between a “coordinated market economy” as exemplified by Germany and a “liberal market economy” as exemplified by the United States. Under the heading, “Liberal Market Economies: The American Case”, Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 27), argue:Liberal market economies can secure levels of overall economic performance as high as those of coordinated market economies, but they do so quite differently. In LMEs, firms rely more heavily on market relations to resolve the coordination problems that firms in CMEs address more often via forms of non-market coordination that entail collaboration and strategic interaction. In each of the major spheres of firm endeavor, competitive markets are more robust and there is less institutional support for non-market forms of coordination.

Analysis of organizational decline has become central to the study of economy and society. Further advances in this area may fail however, because two major literatures on the topic remain disintegrated and because both lack a sophisticated account of how social structure and interdependencies among organizations affect decline. This paper develops a perspective which tries to overcome these problems. The perspective explains decline through an understanding of how social ties and resource dependencies among firms affect market structure and the resulting behavior of firms within it. Evidence is furnished that supports the assumptions of the perspective and provides a basis for specifying propositions about the effect of network structure on organizational survival. I conclude by discussing the perspective’s implications for organizational theory and economic sociology.

John Andrews Fitch spent a year studying labor conditions in the steel industry around Pittsburgh during 1907 and 1908. The results of his research became The Steel Workers, one of six volumes in the Pittsburgh Survey, a groundbreaking 1910 analysis of conditions faced by working people in a modern industrial city. Introducing his discussion of common employment practices in the steel industry, Fitch declared, “A repressive regime…has served since the destruction of unionism, to keep the employers in the saddle.” He traced the origins of management’s arbitrary power to the Homestead lockout of 1892, when Carnegie Steel destroyed the last stronghold of organized labor in the mills of western Pennsylvania. During his stay in Pittsburgh, Fitch saw the results of fifteen years of management domination. “The steel worker,” he wrote, “sees on every side evidence of an irresistible power, baffling and intangible. It fixes the conditions of his employment; it tells him what wages he may expect to receive and where and when he must work. If he protests, he is either ignored or rebuked. If he talks it over with his fellow workmen, he is likely to be discharged” (Fitch, 1989, pp. 206, 232–233).

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how in recent years the rediscovery that extreme inequality is returning to advanced economies and has become widespread. What is at issue are the causes of this inequality. It is becoming clear that the wider population, particularly in Anglo-American economies have not shared in the growing wealth of the countries concerned, and that the majority of this wealth is being transferred on a continuous and systemic basis to the very rich. Corporate governance and the pursuit of shareholder value it is argued has become a major driver of inequality.

The current statistical evidence produced by leading authorities including the US Federal Reserve, World Economic Forum, Credit Suisse and Oxfam are examined. The policy of shareholder value and the mechanisms by which the distributions from business take place are investigated from a critical perspective.

While the Anglo-American economies are seeing a return to the extremes of inequality last witnessed in the 19th century, the causes of this inequality are changing. In the 19th century great fortunes often were inherited, or derived by entrepreneurs from the ownership and control of productive assets. By the late 20th century as Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) and others have highlighted, the sustained and rapid inflation in top income shares have made a significant contribution to the accelerating rate of income and wealth inequality.

The intensification of inequality in advanced industrial economies, despite the consistent work of Atkinson and others, was largely neglected until the recent research of Picketty which has attracted international attention. It is now acknowledged widely that inequality is a serious issue; however, the contemporary causes of inequality remain largely unexplored.

The significance of inequality, now that it is recognized, demands policy and practical interventions. However, the capacity or even willingness to intervene is lacking. Further analysis of the debilitating consequences of inequality in terms of the efficiency and stability of economies and societies may encourage a more robust approach, yet the resolve to end extreme inequality is not present.

The analysis of inequality has not been neglected and this chapter represents a pioneering effort to relate the shareholder value orientation now dominant in corporate governance to the intensification of inequality.

This article reflects on the lack of focus on history characterizing the strategic management field. Reasons and consequences of such a peculiar situation need to be pointed out in order to develop a better history-grounded research approach inside the field.

In terms of (the missing) history of thought, a fear of history seems to characterize the field, for a more aware historical understanding of strategic management and practices is likely to question not only notions and concepts, but the very perception of the field as a practically oriented discipline. A lack of historical reflection is usually preferred, wherein strategic management seems to come out of the blue, ignoring its inner evolution over time, and the relationships with previous bodies of knowledge in the business realm, such as for instance administrative sciences and accounting.

In terms of the history of practice the situation is – if possible – even worse, with an obscure understanding of contexts and features of managerial practices in the past. Archival research is called for here, drawing on two research projects on pre-industrial revolution context (the Spanish Royal Tobacco Factory in the XVIII century, and the Venice Arsenal in the turn of the XVI century), in order to examine how prior management practices can influence and inform our present understanding of the discipline of strategic management. A less simplistic view of managing practices in the past emerges, which challenges the commonly held cycle of innovation and discontinuity perpetually alleged in the strategic management field to legitimize its own existence as a research area.

While strategic management tools show a potential contribution to historical understanding in this archival research, a more historically aware understanding of the evolution of the field is thus intended as a way to falsify strategic management theory.

In the “shareholder primacy” (SP) view of the modern corporation, shareholders are endowed with ownership rights over the corporation. This view stems from the property rights and agency theories of the business firm formulated by financial and business economists in the 1970s and 1980s, which subsequently fed into US corporate law debates. It relies on positive legal assumptions that have largely been debunked by legal scholars, and on normative economic ideas that are equally problematic. However, SP is still very influential – if not the dominant paradigm of corporate governance, especially in the United States. The goal of the present study is to come back to the theoretical debates around the foundations of the SP paradigm to seek to identify key ideational properties that may explain, in part, the resilience of such paradigm in policy, scholarship and business practice. In particular, this paper proposes that one important reason for the persistence of the SP ideology lies in the latter’s foundation on the radically contingent nature of shareholders’ claims over the corporation.

Our objective is to test the consistency between share capital financialization, implementation of responsible restructuring and sustainable development policy, focusing more particularly on the implementation of corporate social commitments. In order to develop a model that puts these three processes (restructuring, financialization and social policy) in perspective, we proceed in two steps: we examine the consequences of financialization on both the restructurings and on HRM practices and then the consequences of restructurings due to financialization on employment, the evolution of labour management and the functioning of HRM as seen in management literature. The methodology used to test this model on the Accor Group case is presented.

To lay the ground for a future diversification of academic finance in line with on-going sustainability issues.

We situate academic finance within the broader spectrum of social sciences and highlight its ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. This brings out the limitations of paradigmatic unity in finance and the ideological aspects of academic finance, and allows us to characterise diversification in finance with reference to the nested epistemological structure of scientific discourse.

We define the diversification of academic finance as a process by which (i) finance research is extended to other existing paradigms in social sciences; (ii) new research metaphors are developed within the current paradigm and (iii) puzzle-solving robustness is achieved. We develop a new research agenda which are divided down into themes, paradigmatic hypotheses, and research questions.

We do not test any particular implications of our research agenda.

This chapter will be a useful reference for any researcher or practitioner seeking to contribute to the diversification of academic finance, and make finance work for society.

This chapter looks at academic finance from an interdisciplinary angle in order to bring out its limitations and carve out an innovative research agenda.