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The author argues that we must stop and take a look at what our insistence on human labour as the basis of our society is doing to us, and begin to search for possible alternatives. We need the vision and the courage to aim for the highest level of technology attainable for the widest possible use in both industry and services. We need financial arrangements that will encourage people to invent themselves out of work. Our goal, the article argues, must be the reduction of human labour to the greatest extent possible, to free people for more enjoyable, creative, human activities.

The purpose of this study is to review the capital budgeting literature over the past decade.

Specifically, over the years 2004–2013, we review works appearing in the major academic journals in accounting, finance, and management. Further, we review the specialized academic journals in management accounting. We examine the frequency of articles by journal and year published, the type of research method applied, and the topic area studied. We then review the research findings by topic area.

We find 110 articles appearing in the selected journals. While the articles increase in frequency, the research methods applied are predominantly analytical and archival in nature with relatively few experiments, case studies, or surveys. Some progress is observed for capital budgeting techniques and new methods for structuring uncertainty. The studies find that the size of capital budgets is about right for companies with high financial reporting quality, for liquid companies, during periods of normal cash flow, when the budget is financed by equity, for companies when they first go public or first go private. Tax rates and financial reporting methods for depreciation and tax expenses distort capital budgets. Organization structure and performance measurement can distort capital budgeting. Individual differences, especially optimism and honesty, can influence capital budgeting decisions.

This review is limited to the major journals in accounting, finance, and management; and the specialized journals in management accounting. There is much research to be done on capital budgeting, especially case studies of actual practice and experiments related to individual and group decision processes.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether underpricing can serve as a signal of quality in a financing-investment environment and to compare it under the two institutions for financing offers that are commonly observed in corporate financial markets: take-it-or-leave-it offer (TLO) and the competitive bidding offer (CBO).

The research paper uses experimental economics methodology and laboratory experiments to investigate the research question.

The results suggest that underpricing can serve as a signal of quality but not sustainable as a repeat strategy. Over time, the high-quality firms converge to a pooling strategy rather than bearing the cost of signaling. Additionally, underpricing is lower under CBO than under TLO institution due to competitive bidding. Signaling under CBO institution may be less salient due to possible mimicking by the low-quality firms.

This paper presents a first experimental investigation of the underpricing-signaling hypothesis in a financing-investment environment under asymmetric information. The choice of institution in a financing environment produces qualitatively and strategically different behavior among firms and investors.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the variables that significantly affect dividend policy.

This research uses a type of comparative causal research (causal-comparative research), where the fact or event is identified as an influenced variable (dependent variable) and the variables that influence (independent variable) are investigated. In this study, the authors want to examine the effect of collateralizable assets, growth in net assets, liquidity, leverage and profitability of dividend policy by using quantitative approach. The data used are secondary data obtained from Indonesia Stock Exchange website with website address: www.idx.co.id.

The results showed that collateralizable assets have a negative, but not significant, effect on dividend policy. This shows that the high collateralizable assets do not affect the policy of the dividend of manufacturing companies. The second variable, growth in net assets, has a negative and significant effect on dividend policy. This shows that the higher growth in net assets will lower the dividend policy of manufacturing companies. Furthermore, the results show that liquidity has a negative and significant effect on dividend policy. This indicates that higher liquidity will lower the dividend policy of manufacturing companies. Furthermore, result that leverage has a negative and significant effect on dividend policy is obtained. This suggests that the higher leverage will lower the dividend policy of the manufacturing company. And lastly, profitability has a negative, but not significant, effect on dividend policy. This shows that high profitability does not affect dividend policy of manufacturing companies.

The authors contribute to prior research by providing the empirical evidence on the impact of collateralizable assets, growth in net assets, liquidity, leverage and profitability on dividend policy in Indonesia market as an emerging market.

A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure (high versus low) and accountability to constituents (not‐accountable‐to‐constituents versus accountable‐to‐constituents) on the competitiveness of negotiators' interaction and on the outcome (i.e., agreement or impasse) of the negotiation. Using a newly developed negotiation game with the payoff structure of a game of chicken, we predicted and found an interaction effect. Based on the pattern of results we conclude that the effect of time pressure is contingent on the accountability to constituents of the negotiator. When negotiators are negotiating only for themselves, time pressure makes the negotiators act less competitive, and a higher proportion of the negotiations will result in an agreement. In contrast, when negotiators are negotiating on behalf of their con‐stituents, time pressure will result in more competitive interaction and in a higher proportion of impasses.

Overall, public and private interactive networks could be a more powerful force for change than the computer, the railway, or the small electric motor, forming a “teleeconomy”, under a set of rules that form “electronic capitalism”. In this second of two articles (for the first see foresight, Vol 2, No 1, February 2000) consequences of the emerging economic behaviours laid out in the first article are examined. First, the new rules are explored in detail. They describe the dynamo of electronic trading and the characteristics of a specific form of capitalism. The article then considers impacts of the tele‐economy on sectoral balances, economic power and wealth distribution. Lastly, the new players – the electronic tiger – and the safeguards required are examined. The hub of the dynamo will be in the developing economies where some four billion new global consumers await economic enfranchisement via personal investment, as well as access to new consumer markets and electronic work channels.

Rapidly increasing the proportion of installed wind power capacity with zero carbon emission characteristics will help adjust the energy structure and support the realization of carbon neutrality targets. The intermittency of wind resources and fluctuations in electricity demand has exacerbated the contradiction between power supply and demand. The time-of-use pricing and supply-side allocation of energy storage power stations will help “peak shaving and valley filling” and reduce the gap between power supply and demand. To this end, this paper constructs a decision-making model for the capacity investment of energy storage power stations under time-of-use pricing, which is intended to provide a reference for scientific decision-making on electricity prices and energy storage power station capacity.

Based on the research framework of time-of-use pricing, this paper constructs a profit-maximizing electricity price and capacity investment decision model of energy storage power station for flat pricing and time-of-use pricing respectively. In the process, this study considers the dual uncertain scenarios of intermittency of wind resources and random fluctuations in power demand.

(1) Investment in energy storage power stations is the optimal decision. Time-of-use pricing will reduce the optimal capacity of the energy storage power station. (2) The optimal capacity of the energy storage power station and optimal electricity price are related to factors such as the intermittency of wind resources, the unit investment cost, the price sensitivities of the demand, the proportion of time-of-use pricing and the thermal power price. (3) The carbon emission level is affected by the intermittency of wind resources, price sensitivities of the demand and the proportion of time-of-use pricing. Incentive policies can always reduce carbon emission levels.

This paper creatively introduced the research framework of time-of-use pricing into the capacity decision-making of energy storage power stations, and considering the influence of wind power intermittentness and power demand fluctuations, constructed the capacity investment decision model of energy storage power stations under different pricing methods, and compared the impact of pricing methods on optimal energy storage power station capacity and carbon emissions.

1. Electricity pricing and capacity of energy storage power stations in an uncertain electricity market.

2. Investment strategy of energy storage power stations on the supply side of wind power generators.

3. Impact of pricing method on the investment decisions of energy storage power stations.

4. Impact of pricing method, energy storage investment and incentive policies on carbon emissions.

5. A two-stage wind power supply chain including energy storage power stations.

Electricity pricing and capacity of energy storage power stations in an uncertain electricity market.

Investment strategy of energy storage power stations on the supply side of wind power generators.

Impact of pricing method on the investment decisions of energy storage power stations.

Impact of pricing method, energy storage investment and incentive policies on carbon emissions.

A two-stage wind power supply chain including energy storage power stations.

Are we now entering the era of a new type of economy, with new rules? What we perceive is more than just an addition to today’s economics. By removing the effects of distance, and giving more equal access across nations and classes, networks will effectively reengineer our basic economic equations. Electronic networks can provide access to skills, work and commerce at much lower cost, via electronic markets in jobs, products, services and education. At the same time, they introduce new economic behaviour, as a large enough quantitative change becomes a qualitative change. Electronics and optics enable the networking of human capital, expanding its application and accelerating its enrichment via education. So knowledge‐based operations may slowly replace traditional capital‐based assets. Consequently, the conventional process for the creation of wealth with its prerequisites for capital investment is revised:economic value in traditional fixed assets is replaced by “electronic assets”. At the same time, the network effect pushes the market mechanism to its limits, through a step‐change in breadth of access, reduced costs of entry and pace of trading. National differences and national markets, all the trappings and devices of commercial locality, are challenged. In this first of two articles, the initial conditions and the evidence for change are examined and the emergence of a new form of economy, or “tele‐economy”, is reviewed. Following from this, a view of the form of capitalism driving the economic environment – “electronic capitalism” – is put forward. The second article, to be published in a forthcoming issue of foresight, examines the consequences and conclusions on assets, wealth accumulation, national players and the benefits and dangers of a tele‐economy.