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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer in a retailer–e-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference.

This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain comprising of a retailer and an e-tailer engaged in competition. Game-theoretic models are developed to model the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal price, optimal order quantity and optimal profit under (1) equal wholesale price strategy and (2) discriminatory wholesale price strategy. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product.

It is beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt a discriminatory wholesale price strategy for products having both high online channel preference and low online channel preference. However, equal wholesale price strategy is beneficial for the e-tailer and the retailer in the case of products having high online channel preference and in the case of products having low online channel preference, respectively.

The study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product when the manufacturers are supplying to heterogeneous retailers.

There is scant literature on the wholesale price strategy of the manufacturer considering the heterogeneous downstream retailers. This paper contributes the literature by bridging this gap. In addition, the study establishes a link between the wholesale price strategy and online channel preference of the product.

Nowadays, uncertainty in market demand poses considerable risk to the retailers that supply the market. On the other hand, the risk-averse behaviors of retailers toward risk may have evolved over time. Considering a supply chain including a manufacturer and a population of retailers, the authors intend to investigate how the population of retailers tends to evolve toward risk-averse behavior. Moreover, this study aims to evaluate the effects of wholesale-retail price of manufacturer on evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the retailers.

Due to market uncertainty, a supply chain with a population of risk-averse and risk-neutral retailers was investigated. The wholesale pricing strategy is determined by a manufacturer acting as a leader, while retailers who make order quantity decisions act as followers. An integrated Cournot duopoly equilibrium and evolutionary game theory (EGT) approach has been used to model this situation.

A numerical real-world case study using Iran Khodro Company is analyzed by applying the proposed EGT approach. The study provides managerial insights to the manufacturer as well as retailers in developing their strategies. Results showed that risk behavior of retailers significantly affects optimal wholesale/retail price, profits and ESS. In the long term, the retailers tend to have a risk-neutral behavior to gain more profit. In the short term, if a retailer choses risk-averse strategy, in the long term, it will change its strategy to obtain more profit and remain in the competitive market.

The contributions in this research are fourfold. First, ESS concept to investigate the risk-averse or risk-neutral attitudes of the retailers was used. Second, the uncertain risk behavior of the competing retailers was considered. Third, the effect of varying wholesale pricing was investigated. Fourth, the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices have been obtained by considering uncertainty demand and risk.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.

This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.

Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.

The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.

This paper analyzes the advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain where the e-retailer provides wholesale contract or agency contract to the fresh products supplier.

This paper constructed a two-period sequential-move game of fresh products supply chain members.

This analysis showed that the supply chain members had different preferences for contracts under different market conditions. The advance selling of fresh products was not a decision of the seller, but also required the support of other supply chain members. And the advance selling strategy was not always beneficial to all supply chain parties. Under the two contracts, there were market conditions in which the profits of supply chain members were Pareto-improved through the implementation of advance selling.

The model presented in this study focuses solely on the context of monopoly, overlooking the competition from alternative suppliers or retailers. Consequently, exploring the competitive landscape within the fresh products supply chain, particularly in relation to pre-sale pricing, emerges as a crucial avenue for further investigation. By employing empirical research methods, valuable insights are gleaned, thereby significantly augmenting the existing body of relevant theories.

The decision to pre-sell fresh products should be based on market conditions. Supply chain members can control production costs and fresh products circulation losses to maximize profits.

From the perspective of game theory, this study analyzed the optimal advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain members under two kinds of contracts. These results can provide practical implications for fresh products suppliers and e-retailers.

In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation output. In order to improve the grid-connected quantity of green power, the purpose of this paper is to design the pricing mechanism for renewable energy power generator with revenue-sharing contract in a two-stage “multi-single” electricity supply chain which contains a single dominant power retailer and two kinds of power suppliers providing different power energy species.

Considering the dual uncertainties of renewable energy power output and power market demand, the authors design the full-cooperative contract decision-making model, wholesale price contract decision-making model and revenue-sharing contract decision-making model to compare and optimize grid-connected pricing in order to maximize profit of different parties in power supply chain. Then, this paper performs a numerical simulation, discusses the existence of the equilibrium analytical solutions to satisfy the supply chain coordination conditions and analyzes the optimal contract parameters’ variation characteristics and their interaction relationship.

The authors find that the expected profits of the parties in the hybrid power supply chain are concave about their decision variables in each decision-making mode. The revenue-sharing contract can realize the Pareto improvement for all parties’ interest of the supply chain, and promote the grid-connected quantity of green power effectively. The grid-connected price will reduce with the increase of revenue-sharing ratio, and this impact will be greater on the renewable energy power. The greater the competition intensity in power supply side, the smaller the revenue-sharing ratio from power purchaser. And for the same rangeability of competition intensity, the revenue-sharing ratio reduction of thermal power is less than that of the green power. The more the government subsidizing green power supplier, the smaller the retailer sharing revenue to it.

Facing with the dual uncertainties of green power output and market demand and the competition of thermal power in hybrid electricity market, this study can provide a path to solve the problem of renewable energy power grid-connecting. The results can help green power become competitive in hybrid power market under loose regulations. And this paper suggests that the government subsidy policy should be more tactical in order to implement a revenue-sharing contract of the power supply chain.

This paper studies the renewable energy electricity grid-connected pricing under the uncertainty of power supply and market demand, and compares different contract decision-making strategies in order to achieve the power supply chain coordination. The paper also analyzes the competition between thermal power and renewable energy power in hybrid electricity market.

The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.

This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.

The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.

The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to help the manufacturers to find the optimal decisions regarding the choice of channel member for information sharing.

A game‐theoretical model plus Bayesian forecasting is developed to determine the optimal decisions for the manufacturer.

The results show that the optimal strategy for the manufacturer is to engage in information sharing with one small retailer exclusively, such that the manufacturer can gain the most benefit from information sharing arrangement in a marketing channel with a dominant retailer.

The present study is analyzed by a theoretical model. Future research can explore the same study by collecting data to engage in an empirical test.

This paper provides a useful model framework and pricing strategy for upstream manufacturers who are engaging or planning to engage in information sharing with their retailers.

This paper provides practical and solid advice and examples demonstrating the optimal decisions regarding the choice of channel member for information sharing to best benefit of the manufacturer.

The spot market has been gradually recognized as an important alternative purchasing source. To maintain a flexible replenishment strategy, call, put and bidirectional option contracts, as a risk hedging, are in combined usage with the spot market, respectively. The purpose of this paper is to analyze a finite-horizon replenishment problem with option contracts in the context of a spot market.

Based on stochastic dynamic programming, the firm’s optimal replenishment policy with either call, put or bidirectional option contracts is always shown to be order-up-to type, characterized by an upper threshold and a lower one. The corresponding policy parameters in different cases are calculated through an approximate algorithm. This research highlights the effectiveness of option contracts on the firm’s operational strategies and overall profitability.

This study reveals that the firm is better off with option contracts than without them. When the price parameters are the same for different option contracts, bidirectional option contracts are the best choice among these flexible contracts; otherwise, unilateral option contracts might be either better or worse than bidirectional ones. In addition, if low inventory costs and high spot price volatility are confronted, the firm prefers to call option contracts rather than put ones; otherwise, there exists an opposite conclusion.

In addition to highlight the advantage of option contracts over wholesale price contracts, this paper provides interesting observations with respect to the effect of different option contracts on the firm. Many significant insights derived from this research do not only contribute to the provider’s feasible design of the supply contracts, but also contribute to the user’s rational operational strategies for higher profitability.

This study analyzes supplier development investment decisions under a triadic setting (two buyers and a common supplier). In a triadic setting, the supplier development investment decision of one buyer can have a spillover effect of the benefits on other buyer. Therefore, it is utmost important for the investing buyer to understand the impact of benefit spillover on other competing buyers'. Therefore, one of the purposes of this study to analyze the supplier development investment decision of buyers under two scenarios. First, under cooperative development structure where both buyers jointly invest in supplier and share equal benefits. Second, non-cooperative investment structure where both buyers individually invest in supplier development and share unequal benefits.

In order to assess the impact of supplier development investment decisions on the profitability of buyers and the common supplier, the authors used game-theoretic approach. The authors design a Stackelberg leader-follower game where the supplier acts as Stackelberg leader and buyers follow the supplier's pricing decision to maximize their profit level. Additionally, both buyers decide either to cooperate or non-cooperate while investing in supplier development.

The results show that the cooperative investment is always an optimal strategy for buyers and supplier. Interestingly, the efficient buyer's share of investment level is lower under non-cooperative investment structure and he is better-off due to its capability of taking advantage from the other buyer's investment. However, the inefficient buyer, on the other hand, is worse-off under non-cooperative investment. Furthermore, comparative analysis between the two shows that initially, the buyer who extracts more profit because of the other buyers' development investment tends to prefer the non-cooperative development investment set up. However, after a certain point, the same buyer is better-off under cooperative development investment through cooperation, and sharing equal benefit of the supplier's development, as the supplier in turn, starts charging a higher wholesale price under non-cooperative investment case.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, extant literature on supplier development has mostly focused on. One supplier-one buyer; thus, the learning spillover effect has almost been unexplored. In real-life, different buyers often purchase from the shared supplier. Therefore, it is important to analyze the spillover of supplier development benefits due to investment of one buyer on other buyer and deriving the condition under which buyers would be incentivized to invest jointly or individually.