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This chapter considers and highlights a different approach to dealing with the white-collar and/or corporate offender that departs from the more commonly used punitive approach utilized by the American criminal justice system. Currently, terms of incarceration for individual offenders and the use of hefty fines and strict regulations against organizational defendants are commonly used draconian punishments. Therefore, this article is designed to remind readers of another viable approach to dealing with white-collar and/or corporate crime, one which utilizes a compliance or cooperative strategy of social control; that is the use of a system of restorative justice.

The focus of this paper is to provide an understanding to the economics of accounting crime. The accounting crime is considered to be part of the white-collar crime, where economists believe that white-collar criminals are rational men. Thus, this paper assumes that a person commits an accounting crime is a rational man. In making choices, the criminal managers take account of expected gains and costs from various available actions. If they estimate that there is a net gain from their actions, they do commit an accounting crime. External pressures, internal pressures, capital requirements, and compensation pressures are the circumstances that may lead managers to commit an accounting crime. The paper concludes by arguing that if white-collar criminals know that costs of their action are more than the benefits of the action, as a rational man they will not take that action. Thus, the most important step to prevent white-collar crime is to make the cost of the crime so high that it will never generate an estimated net gain for white-collar criminals.

To explore the moral position of Baumol’s theory of productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship; Ross’s (1907) concept of the ‘criminaloid’ and Sutherland’s (1949a, 1949b) theories of white-collar crime, as applied to ‘popular illegalities’ (Lea, 2003) and the activities of entrepreneurs who operate primarily as small/medium enterprise (SME); artisans; and tradespeople as they interact with an emerging affluent working class.

Provides a framework of key texts that explore the concepts of morality, legality and ethics when applied to the theoretically unexplored concept of criminal entrepreneurism, as a function of working class survival and capital accumulation. Research for this chapter included the analysis of government reports into the illicit activities of ‘professional’ and ‘non-professional’ bodies; personal observation of street corner shops.

Provides a critical analysis of theories that advocate rule avoidance and evasion as an acceptable process of developing successful entrepreneurs and the controversial theories of white-collar crime that focus on ‘high status’ actors operating at the corporate level. It identifies a necessary relationship and complicity between clients (victims) and practitioners as key elements in the commission of deviant acts, as victims expand their social, economic and cultural capital.

By combining philosophies of entrepreneurism, theories of white, blue and collarless crime and a reconsideration of moral business principles, this chapter introduces a new construct of deviancy as a ‘positive’ outcome that reject the need for criminal justice agencies intervention.

This chapter seeks to classify condominium crime, explain its neglect in light of the growth of condo living in cities and closely consider the prospects for greater visibility and legal regulation of these acts. We deploy traditional dichotomies of white-collar/street crime and insiders/outsiders to construct a two-dimensional typology of condo crime and illustrate each type using empirically grounded examples from extensive qualitative research in Ontario and New York State entailing analysis of media accounts, condo owner association and corporation websites, and numerous interviews with owners, board directors and industry actors. We argue that the condo form retains peculiar characteristics that tend to prevent public reporting of condo crimes and leaves the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. street criminals) in the spotlight while other, potentially more damaging, acts are neglected. We conclude by discussing barriers to knowing the extent of condo crime and their relationship to legal regulation.

Purpose — The purpose of this chapter is to study the pattern of rogue trading, paying special attention to the aspects of the dishonest behavior of perpetrators.Design/methodology/approach — The chapter discusses selected cases of rogue trading that received the largest coverage by the mass media.Findings — No unique pattern of rogue trading schemes can be identified; however, certain similarities can be brought up based on the discussed cases. There are many aspects of dishonesty involved in fraudulent trading besides illicitness of unauthorized trading as such.Research limitations/implications — The chapter is based largely on a literature review and available data on the instances of rogue trading; probably, there is a vast amount of rogue trading cases undisclosed in order to draw a bigger picture.Originality/value — We apply the framework of white-collar crime process by McKay, Stevens, and Fratzl (2010) in order to clarify whether rogue trading schemes match the development of a typical white-collar crime. Conclusions are built on the analysis of several cases.

The chapter focuses on the personal characteristics of top executives in companies involved in corporate financial crime as well as the introduction of human governance as one of the mechanisms in preventing corporate misbehaviour. This chapter discusses directors’ and top management teams’ personal characteristics – in the context of corporate governance – that may influence the occurrence of corporate financial crime. The study further proposes the human governance factor as a possible mechanism to improve corporate governance in preventing such misbehaviour. This chapter highlights the personal characteristics of top executives, which may become the indicators of corporate financial crime, as well as human governance, which is shown to be one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance for corporate financial crime prevention.

The twenty-first century has seen a wave of white-collar and corporate crime scandals and the economic crisis associated with the home mortgage foreclosure debacle is but one prominent example. Understanding who is to blame for this crisis and what steps can be taken in the future to limit a reoccurrence are important topics of inquiry. Similarly important is understanding public perceptions associated with the mortgage foreclosure crisis, especially since public sentiments are potentially important in influencing crime control policy. Using data from a random sample survey of American adults, this chapter examines the degree to which the public blames banks/lenders as opposed to individual homebuyers for the American foreclosure problems as well as the extent to which they favor specific control and prevention strategies such as government limitations on executive pay or bonuses and legislation aimed at increasing the regulation of business.

Corporate crime affects the stability of the international financial system and the business world system has made considerable efforts to fight all aspects of corporate crimes. Fraud and white-collar crime has increased considerably over the recent years and this trend is expected to continue.

This chapter defines corporate crime and its categories as well as considering the ways in which such crime occurs. This is set within the context of other failures such as Enron.

These crimes are considered in the context of ethical behaviour but it is reported that the various measures taken to dissuade these crimes at various levels just have not seems to reduce such crime.

In many respects this chapter introduces the contexts and acts as preparation for the other chapters in the book and so is not exhaustive in scope.

Since not all fraud and abuse is discovered and reported, the cost of fraud to businesses is hard to be estimated.

The chapter discusses the context in which corporate crime occurs.

This chapter examines four possible relationships between the credit crunch and corporate crime. A first relation is that cases of accounting fraud have contributed to the causes of the crisis. Because of these accounting scandals, the trust in large corporations and the financial sector possibly eroded. A second possible relation is the reverse: the crisis leads to more corporate crime. As a result of the crisis, companies run into financial difficulties. In their despair, they possibly cut costs by not complying with business regulations, or they may try to gain illegal profit through fraud. The third relation is the criminalization of more unethical corporate behavior. The moral outrage regarding the behavior of banks and insurance companies that contributed to the crisis might lead to an increased labeling of “risky” or “greedy” behavior of corporate executives as criminal. This results in more legal regulation. The fourth and final relation is that these amplification effects will lead to the discovery of more corporate crime.

This chapter presents four theories that hypothesize race/ethnicity disparities in sentence outcomes. Empirical studies assessing the relationship between defendant’s race/ethnicity and sentence severity are discussed.

I focus on federal sentencing in terms of support or non-support of the theoretical perspectives.

Sentence disparity linked to defendant’s race/ethnicity are observed as net main effects, as a component in joint-conditioning effects with other extralegal defendant characteristics, and as a variable that conditions the effect of process-related mechanism of discretion, and legally relevant case characteristics, and as indirect effects.

Theories share substantial conceptual overlap in specifying the relationship between defendant’s race/ethnicity and predictions of the effect of defendant’s race/ethnicity on sentence severity.