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Employment law recognised the value of whistleblowing with the enactment of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, protecting a ‘worker’ against dismissal and victimisation. Whistleblowers are particularly vulnerable in the gig economy as they may fall outside the statutory definition of ‘worker’ for the purposes of the whistleblowing legislation. This makes a study of whistleblowing in the gig economy pertinent. This chapter explores the statutory definition of ‘worker’ with regard to the current whistleblowing provisions and considers the barriers it presents for gig workers. Judicial interpretation of the definition is examined through an analysis of recent case law that shows much inconsistency and a conflict of judicial approach. The resulting blurred boundaries of the legal term leave a gig worker uncertain as to the level of their protection for blowing the whistle. The need for reform to protect individuals in a wide range of working relationships is clear. It is argued that the new EU Whistleblowing Directive, in protecting ‘work-related activity’, provides better protection for all whistleblowers. The role of human rights in extending the status of work is also advanced. Finally, the implications of developments in this area for key stakeholders in the gig economy are considered highlighting the importance of creative new approaches to give voice to all workers.

This chapter explores cultural factors that influence the propensity to blow-the-whistle in China, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States. This study found that culture and traditions have strong impact on the propensity of whistleblowing. This research analyzed 1,541 working adults in China, Taiwan, Russia, and the United States. Statistical analysis of self-developed questionnaires reveal that: (a) Americans have a greater disposition to engage in whistleblowing than Chinese, Taiwanese, and Russian; (b) Americans have a smallest level of fear of retaliation to whistleblowers than Chinese, Taiwanese, and Russian; (c) the intention of Chinese, American, and Taiwanese to whistle-blow is influenced to a greater degree by position of wrongdoers than that of Russian; and (d) guanxi (personal relationships or networks) has a greater effect on the propensity to whistle-blow for Chinese and Taiwanese than for Americans and Russian. Auditors and managers need to be aware that employees in different cultures respond differently to factors that influence whistleblowing activities. The results of this study will help auditors and managers better assess risk and the effectiveness of internal controls and ethical standards.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an emerging field whose norms are still being written and rewritten. The concept of CSR as we know it today¹ started in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and slowly spread to other developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The French for corporate social responsibility is Responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise (RSE), a nearly literal translation which however diverges to some extent from the original English. The concept is still unclear despite having been the subject of an increasing number of academic and professional papers, in management as well as in law journals. In the present study, we shall use the definition as set by the European Commission (2001), which defines it as ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’. The European Commission in its Communication to the Parliament (2006) has stressed the fact that ‘it is about enterprises deciding to go beyond minimum legal requirements and obligations (our emphasis) stemming from collective agreements in order to address societal needs’. The second part of the definition is often omitted, but is at the crux of the problem of determining where CSR begins and ends. Corporate practices which involve ethical, social or environmental problems are defined as CSR practices only if companies go above and beyond their legal obligations. It should also be noted that the definition does not specify which guidelines to take into account in order to identify the standards to be applied in any given circumstances.

The collision between climate science and climate policy was strikingly manifested during the Bush–Cheney Administration. Based on both the documentary record and direct observation, this chapter reviews multiple means by which the Administration controlled the flow of climate science communication from federal scientists and research programs when Administration officials saw a need to conform science communication with Administration politics. Government secrecy imposed via information control was evident, for example, in the editing of climate program reports; the suppression of official reference to an existing major climate impacts assessment; selective application of control over contacts between government scientists and the media; alteration of congressional testimony; shutting down of government Web sites; “stealth” release of reports to minimize public attention; and concealing a Supreme Court-mandated scientifically based draft document that would have triggered regulation of greenhouse gases to protect public welfare. With these political interventions, the response from the ranks of federal career science managers and research scientists varied, ranging from open criticism, anonymous leaks, and whistleblowing to silence, self-censorship, and active complicity.

This chapter aims to enhance understanding of the main drivers of internal auditors' moral courage to speak up about sensitive information and their cause-and-effect relationships. We use cognitive mapping method to analyze 20 chief audit executives' cognitive maps in Tunisia. A collective map was grounded through assembling the full individual maps. Using the Decision Explorer software for our analysis, we find that the state hope, whistle-blowing policy, self-efficacy, perceived supervisor support and independence of internal audit function are the main drivers for internal auditors' moral courage. Our findings are also supplemented by semi-structured interviews. Our chapter offers a novel methodological contribution to auditing literature as well as new empirical evidence (contribution to knowledge) on the drivers of internal auditors' moral courage.