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We show that, even with flexible domestic wages, international outsourcing may worsen the welfare of the home country and reduce the profits of all firms. If wages are…
We show that, even with flexible domestic wages, international outsourcing may worsen the welfare of the home country and reduce the profits of all firms. If wages are rigid, outsourcing is welfare-improving if and only if the sum of the “trade creation” effect and the “exploitation effect” exceeds the “trade diversion” effect. A wage subsidy may improve welfare. We also extend the model to a two-period framework. Delaying outsourcing can be gainful because the fixed cost of outsourcing may fall over time. A social planner would choose a different speed of outsourcing than that achieved under laissez-faire.
Models fiscal policy interactions between fiscal authorities and privateinvestors in the foreign exchange market in a game‐theoretic framework.Using a two‐period game, I…
Models fiscal policy interactions between fiscal authorities and private investors in the foreign exchange market in a game‐theoretic framework. Using a two‐period game, I consider the credible and noncredible announcements of the domestic fiscal authority with respect to the stance of its future fiscal policy. Each country faces a trade‐off between its current account and budget deficit objectives and time‐inconsistency arises due to lack of a sufficient number of policy instruments. For this game I derive explicitly the time consistent and precommitment policies for the domestic fiscal authority and explain that precommitment is welfare improving relative to the time‐consistent policy. In a two‐country framework, both precommitment with respect to the private sector and co‐operation between the two policymakers tend to improve welfare.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of innovative industries which face coopetition: firms compete while committing at the same time to R&D joint ventures and…
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of innovative industries which face coopetition: firms compete while committing at the same time to R&D joint ventures and other cooperative agreements. These joint activities are likely to occur in presence of complementarities on demand or supply sides; they raise specific accounting issues concerned with recognition and measurement of intangible resources committed to, and generated from them.
The paper develops a heuristic industrial economic model characterized by joint utility of outputs for custumers on the demand side, and potential complementarities in R&D activities on the supply side. The authors’ model describes different scenarios generated by alternative corporate pricing strategies. In particular, these strategies (as implemented by firms or imposed by regulators) influence both infrastructure corporate investments and the creation and stability of coopetitive relationships.
The model scenarios show that especially accounting for intangible resources – related to processes of innovation and R&D – should deserve specific attention. Firms and regulators need to properly account for both hard intangibles that have market prices of reference, and soft and ethereal intangibles that factually have not. A stock method of accounting for intangibles results then which is narrow and biased, because of its focus on hard intangibles alone. A flow method of accounting should be preferred, which tracks the cumulated investment flow of direct and indirect expenditures in innovation and development, properly allocated within and between firms.
The paper argues for regulatory frameworks that enable increasing the positive effects of cooperation while repressing collusive behaviours (technological standardization, fiscal incentives to welfare‐improving innovation and strategy, public research, costumers’ protection, and so forth). Concerning the overall industrial organization, the paper's theoretical analysis shows the need for better recognition and measurement of intangibles and complementarities in costing and pricing, for both corporate and regulatory purposes.
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same…
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing “overreactions” to public signals as shown by Morris and Shin (2002). Recent experiments on games with strategic complementarities show that subjects attach a lower weight to public signals than theoretically predicted. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the welfare effects of public signals accounting for the weights observed in experiments.
Aggregate behavior observed in experiments on games with strategic complementarities can be explained by a cognitive hierarchy model where subjects employ limited levels of reasoning. They respond in a rational way to the non-strategic part of a game and they account for other players responding rationally, but they neglect that other players also account for others’ rationality. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under such limited levels of reasoning.
In the model by Morris and Shin (2002) public information is always welfare improving if strategies are derived from such low reasoning levels. The optimal degree of publicity is decreasing in the levels of reasoning. For the observed average level of reasoning, full transparency is optimal, if public information is more precise than private information. If the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private actions, the government should secretly respond to its information without disclosing or signaling it to the private sector independent of the degree of private agents’ rationality.
This paper takes experimental evidence back to theory and shows that the main result obtained by the theory under rational behavior breaks down if theory accounts for the bounded rationality observed in experiments.
Purpose – This chapter suggests that the value of the extension to free trade areas (FTAs) of the Kemp–Wan (KW) theorem on necessarily welfare-improving customs unions is…
Purpose – This chapter suggests that the value of the extension to free trade areas (FTAs) of the Kemp–Wan (KW) theorem on necessarily welfare-improving customs unions is undermined by its very rationale – the greater popularity of FTAs over customs unions for ‘political’ reasons.
Methodology/approach – We discuss some intuition supported by partial equilibrium diagrammatic analysis and then present simulations of a global CGE model.
Findings – We argue that this sort of FTA will likely be unattractive to potential member countries. We then observe that the external tariffs here and in KW will be identical for many goods but illustrate, in a partial equilibrium setting, a context in which there might be some difference between them. Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that there are reasons to expect some harmonisation of tariffs between member countries in this sort of FTA.
Originality/value – We are the first to question the practical value of the extension of KW to FTAs. We also provide one of the few computable general equilibrium analyses of KW customs unions.
Purpose – To evaluate the efficiency consequences of the Medicare Part D program.Methods – We develop and empirically calibrate a simple theoretical model to examine the…
Purpose – To evaluate the efficiency consequences of the Medicare Part D program.
Methods – We develop and empirically calibrate a simple theoretical model to examine the static and the dynamic welfare effects of Medicare Part D.
Findings – We show that Medicare Part D can simultaneously reduce static deadweight loss from monopoly pricing of drugs and improve incentives for innovation. We estimate that even after excluding the insurance value of the program, the welfare gain of Medicare Part D roughly equals its social costs. The program generates $5.11 billion of annual static deadweight loss reduction and at least $3.0 billion of annual value from extra innovation.
Implications – Medicare Part D and other public prescription drug programs can be welfare-improving, even for risk-neutral and purely self-interested consumers. Furthermore, negotiation for lower branded drug prices may further increase the social return to the program.
Originality – This study demonstrates that pure efficiency motives, which do not even surface in the policy debate over Medicare Part D, can nearly justify the program on their own merits.
Empirical studies show that years of schooling are positively correlated with good health. The implication may go from education to health, from health to education, or…
Empirical studies show that years of schooling are positively correlated with good health. The implication may go from education to health, from health to education, or from factors that influence both variables. We formalize a model that determines an individual’s demand for knowledge and health based on the causal effects, and study the impacts on the individual’s decisions of policy instruments such as subsidies on medical care, subsidizing schooling, income tax reduction, lump-sum transfers, and improving health at young age. Our results indicate that income redistribution policies may be the best instrument to improve welfare, while a medical care subsidy is the best instrument for longevity. Subsidies to medical care or education would require large imperfections in these markets to be more welfare improving than distributional policies.
In this chapter I put forward a framework to help us understand the underlying sources of national policy failures regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) protection…
In this chapter I put forward a framework to help us understand the underlying sources of national policy failures regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, the need for international coordination, and how the coordination should be done. I also analyze whether global harmonization of IPR standards is necessary or sufficient for achieving globally welfare-maximizing policies. Then I move on to analyze the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is a mighty effort to coordinate IPR policies across member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO). I discuss what TRIPS was supposed to do and what it has actually achieved, with reference to my theoretical framework. I explain that it is desirable for IPR to be included in world trade talks and be negotiated along with other trade issues. I offer analyses on the extensions of the basic model by introducing political economy and trade barriers, as well as allowing countries to discriminate against foreign firms. Finally, I comment on further potential extensions such as introduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) or licensing, parallel imports, cumulative innovations, subject matter of protection and costs of implementation. The main thrust of the basic model is that, provided that there is free trade and non-discrimination of foreign firms, there exist positive cross-border externalities as a country strengthens its IPR protection, since it raises the profits of foreign firms and the welfare of foreign consumers without causing any deadweight loss on foreign soil. This implies that national governments tend to provide too little IPR protection compared with the global optimum. The model also implies that a country with higher innovative capability and larger domestic market would provide stronger IPR. Thus, it is natural for the South to protect IPR less than the North in the absence of international coordination. These basic results largely continue to hold under various extensions.
Details a behavioral theory of economic welfare that overlaps and extends the global theoretical framework contained in Pareto Optimality, with significant public policy…
Details a behavioral theory of economic welfare that overlaps and extends the global theoretical framework contained in Pareto Optimality, with significant public policy implications. The essence of this framework is contained in Adam Smith’s the Wealth of Nations where it is argued that the economic welfare of society cannot be augmented if the material level of well‐being of the working population is reduced, even if the economy experiences growth. Moreover, it is argued that there need not be an equity‐efficiency trade‐off in a competitive market economy to the extent that wages positively affect productivity and do not increase production costs. Therefore, shifting from a low to a high wage economy is welfare improving. Smith, in effect, argues that one can have economic ‘justice’ and economic efficiency where the former is necessary to the latter. The behavioral model of economic welfare paints a dynamic picture of economic welfare in contradistinction to the static framework provided by Pareto Optimality wherein the conditions of Pareto Optimality need not be violated.