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A method of systematically assessing the “first-round” impact of tax and transfer policy changes on the income distribution and the incidence of relative income poverty is proposed. It involves the construction of a “distributionally neutral” policy, which can be approximated by a policy that indexes tax allowances, credits and bands and welfare payment rates in line with a broad measure of income growth. The impact of actual policy changes in five EU countries over the 1998–2001 period is then measured against this benchmark, using the EUROMOD tax-benefit model.

The purpose of this paper is to combine multidimensional welfare analysis and entropy metrics to derive not only the best relative weights but also substitution degree among different attributes to construct multidimensional indices of well-being with Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002 data.

The authors follow Maasoumi’s two-step measures of multivariate inequality to calculate the inequality for three social groups in China, urban residents, migrants, and rural residents. The two-step approach provides an aggregation formula which is numerically identified in this paper based on a metric entropy distance measure between the distribution of the aggregate well-being functions, on the one hand, and the distribution of the self-reported “happiness” indicator. The authors compare the differences in relative weights and substitution degree for the three groups, and link them to some institutional factors.

The authors find that incorporating substitution among attributes, and taking into consideration group heterogeneity are very important in multidimensional analysis of well-being.

The two-step approach provides an aggregation formula which is numerically identified in this paper based on a metric entropy distance measure between the distribution of the aggregate well-being functions, on the one hand, and the distribution of the self-reported “happiness” indicator.

This paper aims to shed light on two mechanisms that show how foreign productivity improvement affects domestic welfare.

First, this study applies a general equilibrium model that takes into account how wages respond to productivity improvements. Second, this study uses a monopolistic competition model that shows how benefits or losses from foreign productivity changes are distributed within domestic economy.

First of all, this study shows that a region’s productivity improvement is beneficial for the region itself as well as for its trading partner. Moreover, the study finds that productivity improvement in a developing region is beneficial for the entire economy, benefits all unskilled workers in the economy and skilled workers in the developing region and hurts those in the developing region’s trading partner.

This study contributes to the existing literature in two key aspects. First, the study applies a two-region, two-factor, one-sector general equilibrium model with flexible wages, and second, the study uses a two-region, two-factor, two-sector monopolistic competition model, relaxing the single-factor (labor) assumption, which is used in other works. Under the single-factor assumption, foreign productivity changes do not have any impact on domestic income distribution. In reality, however, any productivity change between countries creates losers and winners within each country. Hence, the author believes that it is imperative to study how benefits or losses that come from foreign productivity changes are distributed between domestic production factors.

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and “rival” methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers into a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a non-parametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate survey-based values of the elasticity of marginal social valuation of income, an important welfare parameter in cost-benefit analysis.

A model relating equity welfare weights to income is developed, and iso-elasticity of marginal valuation of income is tested using survey data obtained from a sample of Turkish politicians who are instrumental in policy making.

Based on the survey feedback, formal statistical testing indicates that Turkish politicians, regardless of party allegiance, reveal preferences consistent with an iso-elastic marginal social valuation of income. The estimated value of the elasticity measure is close to unity for each of the political parties.

The originality of the paper is in terms of the survey method used to obtain from Turkish politicians estimates of the marginal social valuation of income. This welfare parameter is needed in the calculation of both social discount rates and welfare weights. The paper will be of interest to academics in the field of welfare economics as well as to practitioners involved in the appraisal of social projects and policies.

The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer under subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction. The consumers are assumed to prefer to low-carbon products and formulate a supply chain optimal control problem.

The authors adopt differential game to analyze investment strategies of cost subsidy coefficient with respect to vertical incentive of a manufacturer and a retailer. A comparison analysis under four different decision-making situations, including decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, maximizing social welfare, is obtained.

The results show that the economic benefit and environmental pressure have a win–win performance in centralized decision-making. In four different game models, equilibrium strategies, profits and social welfare show changing diversity and have a consistent development trend as time goes on.

The authors estimate the demand function is a linear function in this paper. According to the consumers’ preference to low-carbon products, consumer’s awareness meets the law of diminishing marginal utility like advertising goodwill accumulation. The carbon-sensitive coefficient might be a quadratic expression, which will complicate the problem and be consistent with reality.

It captures that there is a necessity to strengthen cooperation and exchange of carbon emission technology among the enterprises by simulation of different decision-makings when government granted cost subsidy.

The results provide significant guidelines for the supply chain to make decision-makings of emission-reduction technology investment and relevant government departments to determine emission subsidies costs.

An endogenous subsidies coefficient is produced by the social welfare function. Distinguished from previous study, it also considered the influences of carbon emission trade policy and consumer preference.

Unlike the common belief in the so-called “trickle-down effect,” trade-induced output growth in a small open economy does not necessarily improve the domestic welfare of the economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conditions under which the trickle-down effect does not work properly such that the connection between trade-induced output growth and welfare improvement is broken.

This paper introduces an inter-sectoral migration barrier in the general equilibrium model and conducts various simulation experiments under reasonable parameter values.

This paper demonstrates that subsidizing export industries may raise the total value-added of an economy but deteriorate aggregate welfare. This worsens especially when the supply of non-tradable domestic goods is inelastic, and the demand for them is more substitutable by tradable goods.

To reinforce the trickle-down effect, it is necessary to facilitate efficient labor reallocation and to induce capitalization in the non-tradable sector.

That output growth and welfare improvement do not always move in the same direction requires a reappraisal of the former common belief on the trickle-down effect which emphasizes output growth as an indicator of welfare improvement.

Members in a supply chain account for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in different ways. This paper considers a socially responsible supply chain in which the manufacturer innovates in a sustainable product while the retailer exhibits CSR concerns. This paper aims to investigate how socially responsible behavior, namely, sustainable innovations or CSR concerns, affects the pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare, in such a socially responsible supply chain.

This paper first constructs an integrated case as a benchmark and then develops a Manufacturer-Stackelberg game in a decentralized scenario. The pure profit, environmental impact and social welfare are confirmed and analyzed in centralized and decentralized cases. Moreover, two unique coordinating contracts, i.e. wholesale price discount contract and revenue-sharing contract, are used in this socially responsible supply chain.

Analytical analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the optimal CSR strategies hold for maximizing pure channel profit, minimizing environmental impact and maximizing social welfare. Whether the performance in a centralized case outnumbers that in a decentralized case depends on the CSR concerns level and environment-friendly degree of the product. In addition, it is found that a wholesale price discount contract is better for the retailer whereas a revenue-sharing contract is better for the manufacturer in pure profit to improve coordinating efficiency.

These results can offer managerial implications to the socially responsible supply chain in terms of pricing decisions, CSR strategies and sustainability innovations. Specifically, under certain conditions, placing more CSR concerns level increases pure channel profit and the social welfare. A balance between the pure profit and the social welfare is hereby achieved for the two socially responsible individuals by designing a proper contract.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first studies so far to combine the CSR concerns strategy and sustainability innovation into a socially responsible supply chain.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal competition or cooperation decision between technology service platforms and governments in the context of fierce competition within urban agglomerations.

Based on the cooperation and competition game model, this study builds a two-level model for government and technology service platforms considering three cases: perfect competition, platform cooperation and government-led cooperation.

By analyzing the optimal strategies of the government and a platform in three cases, the research shows that choosing appropriate cooperation in a competitive situation is beneficial to both the government and the platform. Government-led cooperation is conducive to increasing social welfare. From the perspective of the platforms, if they actively seek cooperation, they can obtain higher subsidies and profits. The more intense the competition is, the higher the profits and social welfare generated from the platforms' active cooperation.

The contribution of this study relates to the development of technology service platforms in urban agglomerations. As local governments and platforms continuously undertake decision-making processes, this study constructs quantitative models to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of competition and cooperation. It is worth noting that relying on government subsidies to maintain the sustainable development of technology service platforms is not a long-term solution. Government subsidies play a vital role in the initial development of technology service platforms. The analysis results are in line with Guo et al. (2016), Jung and Feng (2020) and Li (2021) conclusions. Furthermore, long-term government subsidies will make platforms dependent on these subsidies. These are the contributions to the scientific literature.

Instead of focusing on vertical relationships, this study emphasizes the horizontal cooperation and competition relationship between platforms and local governments in an urban agglomeration. Thus, the vertical effects of government subsidies on platforms can be investigated. Another innovation is the social welfare policy goal, which is an important index for the development of urban agglomerations.