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We examine whether the percentage of independent members sitting on the audit committee, in different institutional settings, impacts the market reaction (measured by the abnormal stock returns variance and the abnormal trading volume) to earnings announcements. For our sample composed of more than 7'600 earnings announcements made by European firms from 15 countries between 2006 and 2014, we find that the market reactions to earnings announcements are significantly larger when the audit committee is more independent in countries with weak institutional setting. Our results generally hold after controlling for numerous methodological issues. We conclude that more independent audit committees are substitutes for weak institutions to increase the credibility of earnings announcements. Our results should be of great interest for European regulators who recently introduced new requirements for public firms regarding audit committees’ independence.

This chapter is motivated by a surprising empirical finding: During the 2008 economic crisis, leading global buyers of labor-intensive manufacturing goods were more likely to terminate contracts with suppliers based in countries with strong formal contract enforcement institutions than with those in countries where such institutions were weak. We develop a formal model that explains this counterintuitive finding as the result of heightened reliance on informal contracting when the formal contracting system is unreliable. This explanation contrasts with recent characterizations of outsourcing as an exercise of real options and adds to understanding of the effect of using relational contracting across multiple borders.

The primacy of institutions for economic progress has been established in the literature. Yet, less research attention is paid to the existence and persistence of weak economic institutions in Africa. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to empirically explore the determinants of the quality of economic institutions in Africa.

Hausman–Taylor instrumental variable estimator of panel regression was employed for a sample of 43 Sub-Sahara African countries over the period 1995–2017.

The study finds that the existence and persistence of weak economic institutions in Africa is more of design than destiny. That is, weak economic institutions are created and sustained more by bad political institutions rather than cultural diversity and geographical factors. Therefore, strong political institutions need to be entrenched to reverse the equilibrium of weak economic institutions and dismal economic performance in the continent.

The study provides deep understanding of the determinants of economic institutions. This is imperative for policy makers, development agencies and stakeholders in designing viable economic policies and programs for the continent.

The novelty of the study is rooted in the examination of the factors responsible for the development and persistence of weak economic institutions in Africa. The idea is original because previous studies focus on political institutions and neglected economic institutions.

This paper examines whether firms choose to source from multinational (MNC) suppliers instead of local suppliers as a means of overcoming weak contract enforcement institutions and as a means of accessing supply chain management capabilities. It uses a unique dataset of international contract manufacturing orders constituting the global supply chains of many of the world’s largest brands in footwear, sportswear, and apparel. It finds strong evidence that buyers are more likely to source from MNC suppliers in countries where contract enforcement is weak and when they have less experience sourcing from a given country. Further, it finds evidence that buyers are more likely to source from MNC suppliers when they source a wider variety of products, have smaller supplier networks, or have smaller order volumes.

In weaker institutions, lack of corporate social responsibility (CSR) constituencies causes organizations to naturally incline toward corporate socially irresponsible actions. Grounded in the institutional theory, this paper aims to explore the nature of corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) in the weaker institution and its effect on legitimacy and reputation. The presence of corporate ability moderates the impact of CSIR on legitimacy and reputation.

A list of manager’s contact information was generated from an online database. In total, 1,500 employees in 560 Pakistani organizations received the self-reported survey. In total, 203 managers working in 110 Pakistani organizations responded with the completed questionnaire that provided empirical support to the hypotheses.

Institutional drivers were positively significant to CSIR and negatively associated with the manager’s CSR attitudes. CSIR was negatively significant to legitimacy and reputation. Group differences between high and low corporate ability indicated that corporate ability played a vital role between CSIR and reputation.

These results have important implications for leaders, business-to-business and human resource (HR) managers in weaker institutions highlighting that organization’s supply chain partners consider adopting CSR practices. This can help the organization avoid undesirable and detrimental impact on its legitimacy and reputation, which are linked to irresponsible behaviors. HR managers should build CSR cognition in employees to bring effective change in the organization.

Lack of investigation into corporate ability and CSIR has raised questions about the organization’s efforts in the weaker institution that are sensitive to institutionalized corruption. This research adds to the literature by exploring how the organizations develop legitimacy and reputation while still acting irresponsibly in a weaker institution, presenting a paradox.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether subnational market-supporting institutions in Indian states affect the likelihood of Indian multinational enterprises (MNEs) to undertake acquisitions in advanced economies (AEs) rather than emerging economies (EEs) and, if so, which mechanism – institutional fostering or escapism – underlies the phenomenon.

The paper uses a logistic regression model on a dataset of 647 firm-level cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) undertaken by Indian MNEs during the period 2010–2016.

The paper finds support for the institutional escapism mechanism, as opposed to the institutional fostering mechanism, underlying Indian MNEs’ acquisitions in AEs (rather than EEs). That is, firms headquartered in Indian states where market-supporting institutions (such as economic liberalization and efficiency of legal systems) are weak are more likely to undertake CBAs in AEs than in EEs as an escapist response to weak subnational institutions at home.

The paper highlights the relevance of the mainstream international business (IB) concept of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) internationalization to critical IB scholarship by examining subnational institutional influences on EMNEs’ foreign market choice between AEs and EEs. In particular, by providing evidence for the institutional escapism mechanism which has potential negative socioeconomic consequences in the region of the investing firm, the paper adds to critical IB research which places great emphasis on the examination of inequalities and draws attention to the EMNE context as a suitable setting for further research on internationalization from a critical perspective.

The purpose of this article is to develop new insights into the interplay between trust, indigenous institutions and weak/dysfunctional formal institutions using the Nigerian context – a developing country in Western Africa. It advances new understanding on how Nigerian entrepreneurs trust in their indigenous institutions such as family ties, kinship, chieftaincy, religion, cooperatives and trade associations to resolve disputes arising from their exporting activities as opposed to dormant formal institutions in their country.

This exploratory study adopts an interpretive research paradigm, and it utilises a case study strategy. Data collected through observations, archival records and qualitative conversations with 36 exporting Nigerian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is analysed by utilising a combination of within and cross-case analysis techniques. Doing so enabled an in-depth study of the methods their owner-managers use in order to take advantage of the relationships they established through their long-standing cultural institutions in the place of weak formal institutions in their country.

Indigenous institutions have evolved to replace formalised institutions within the business environment in Nigeria. They have developed to become an alternative and trusted arbiter for solving SMEs' export issues because of weak/dysfunctional formal institutions in the Western African country. The owner-managers of exporting SMEs perceive formal institutions as representing a fragmented system that does not benefit their export businesses.

The findings demonstrate that there is need for policymakers to consider the role of informal institutions in the Nigerian context. Such an approach is essential given the economic importance and increasing number of SMEs that trade and export their goods through informal structures in Nigeria.

The study indicates that it is not just the void or absence of institutions that exist in a developing country such as Nigeria, but weak/dysfunctional formal institutions have been replaced by culturally embedded informal institutions. Thus, the study provides a new theoretical avenue depicting the concept of trusting in indigenous institutions.

The authors explore how home and host market institutions impact emerging market (EM) international entrepreneurship (IE) into developed markets.

Based on four case studies of Nigerian entrepreneurs expanding into the USA, this qualitative research adopts an institutional perspective to the study of EM IE.

The findings show home and host formal and informal institutions simultaneously enable and constrain the IE process. Weak home institutions shape the international opportunity recognition decision but seriously impede international opportunity development and exploitation activities in the developed market. EM entrepreneurs benefit from highly functioning regulation in the developed market whilst also experiencing discriminatory treatment from institutions. The findings of the study further show the positive and constraining effects of host institutions throughout the process.

Based on the findings, the paper details future research ideas, managerial implications and recommendation for policymakers.

While many studies on institutional environment have primarily focused on the influence of the host country environment, limited insights have been offered on how the different dimensions of home institutions affect firm internationalization. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the effects of regulatory institutions at home.

Using country governance quality to proxy quality of regulatory institutions, this study attempts to reveal how regulatory institutions at home facilitate a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) international expansion and why the influence differs in different country clusters. Using hierarchical linear modeling and cluster analysis, proposed hypotheses were tested with a three‐year panel of 511 firms from 38 countries.

The results provide substantial support for the authors' hypotheses that MNEs with high governance quality at home are more engaged in internationalization than those with low governance quality at home. Moreover, differences in institutional effect do exist between country clusters.

This study provides evidence that while country differences exist, governance quality at home can facilitate MNEs' expansion into foreign markets. This finding will help managers of any MNEs to consider country‐level factors and evaluate the governance quality at home before committing resources into foreign operations.

Building on the institutional environment literature, this theory and results make original contributions by underscoring how the consideration of regulatory institutions at home can significantly improve understanding of institutional influence on MNEs. The findings have important implications for both international business researchers and managers of MNEs.

This study aims to examine the effect of private (PRST) and public (PUST) sector-led financial sector transparencies on bank interest margins (BIM) termed as social cost of financial intermediation in different institutional quality setups.

This study uses a two-step dynamic generalized method of moments panel data and bootstrapped quantile models with 91 economies between 2004 and 2016. Data is sourced from World Development Indicator and Global Development Finance databases.

The results show that under strong and weak political and financial regulatory institutional setups, the reducing effect of PRST on BIM are observed and reported while the full sample reports no significant nexus between PRST and PUST on BIM. Furthermore, under political institutional quality sample, economies with strong corruption control and regulatory quality are able to reinforce the dampening effect of PRST on BIM while under the same political institutional quality sample, economies with weak rule of law are able to heighten the reducing effect of PRST on BIM. Moreover, under financial regulator institutional quality sample, economies with strong overall weighted and unweighted, chief executive officer and policy dependent central banks are able to intensify the diminishing effect of PRST on BIM while under the same financial regulator institutional quality sample, economies with weak limits on lending are able to amplify the reducing effect of PRST on BIM. However, PUST is reported to propel lower levels BIM in the bootstrap models, especially in strong institutional economies.

These findings imply that policymakers may rely on PRST to reduce BIM, especially under financial regulatory institutional quality. Additionally, economies must be careful on their reliance on PRST because the effectiveness of PRST to tame high BIM is dependent on the strength of political and financial regulatory institutions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study presents first time international evidence on the effect of private and public sector-led financial transparency on BIM in strong and weak political and financial regulatory institution economies.