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The “war on terror” has nothing to do with protecting the U.S. and world's people from “terrorists”, and everything to do with securing the American empire abroad and muzzling democracy and human rights at home. The 9-11 attacks were the pretext which sold the myth of evil Muslim terrorists imminently threatening Americans. That tale allowed the Cheney-led members of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) to implement their 1990 DPG plan for world control. The “war on terror” is modelled on Islamophobic stereotypes, policies, and political structures developed by the Israeli Likkud and Bush Sr. in 1979. It is designed to inspire popular support for U.S. wars of world conquest. To defeat this plan, we must overcome our Islamophobic fear of “terrorists” and stand in solidarity with Muslims.

In a global environment where terrorist organisations based in a poor country target a rich nation, this paper aims to study the properties of a dynamically incentive compatible contract designed by the target nation that involves joint counter-terror tasks with costly participation by each country. The counter-terror operations are however subject to ex post moral hazard, so that to incentivise counter-terror, the rich country supplies developmental aid. Development aid also helps avoid unrest arising from counter-terror activities in the target nation. However, aid itself can be diverted to non-developmental projects, generating a novel interlinked moral hazard problem spanning both tasks and rewards.

The authors use a dynamic model where the aid giving countries and aid receiving countries behave strategically. Then they solve for the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.

The authors characterise the optimal contract, showing that the dynamic structure of counter-terror resembles the shock-and-awe discussed by military strategists. The authors then prove that it is not necessarily the case that a more hawkish (resp. altruistic) donor is less pro-development (resp. softer on terror). In addition, the authors show that it may be easier to contract for higher counter-terror inputs when the recipient is more sympathetic to terrorists. The authors also discuss other problems faced by developing nations where this model can be readily adopted and the results can endorse appealing policy implications.

The authors characterise the optimal contract, showing that the dynamic structure of counter-terror resembles the shock-and-awe discussed by military strategists. It is proved that it is not necessarily the case that a more hawkish (resp. altruistic) donor is less pro-development (resp. softer on terror). In addition, the authors show that it may be easier to contract for higher counter-terror inputs when the recipient is more sympathetic to terrorists. Other problems faced by developing nations are also discussed where this model can be readily adopted, and the results can endorse appealing policy implications. These results have important policy implications, in particular in today’s world.

This Chapter applies the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to business’ role in the ‘War on Terror’. Specifically, it uses Levinasian ethics to explain how organisations, often with an abundance of ethical resources, become associated with military drones strikes against civilians, and offers ideas that challenge this practice. The chapter comprises several sections beginning with a brief introduction to the ‘War on Terror’ and the use of military drones. A concise discussion about business ethics and just war theory follows after which, the chapter explains Levinas’ ethics and his views on war. These ideas are applied to transform business ethical practice in this controversial area. The Chapter concludes with a summary of its main points.

This chapter delves into the controversy over detention and interrogation in the war on terror carried out by American operatives. While attending to political, legal, and ethical concerns, critical attention is directed at the manner by which certain interrogation techniques have been framed as being “scientific” and therefore effective in extracting truthful disclosures from terror suspects.

Drawing on extensive legal and medical literature, the critique offers a postmodern analysis by raising serious questions over the effectiveness and legitimacy of enhanced interrogation espoused by the Bush administration. By doing so, the conceits of the war on terror are exposed and confronted.

In 2014, the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program) was unclassified and released to the public. Among other revelations, the document clearly shows that interrogators and their psychological consultants committed torture. In doing so, they often relied on medical knowledge for harming, rather than healing. Ethical and legal remedies aimed at correcting those problems are recommended.

The chapter delivers a sophisticated critique that blends recently revealed evidence of torture with postmodern interpretation. While casting doubt on the effectiveness and legitimacy of enhanced interrogation, discussion throws critical light on incidents of human rights abuses committed by health professionals. Paradoxically, those physicians and psychologists opted to use their medical skills and expertise to inflict suffering rather than alleviating it. Those acts constitute egregious ethical and legal violations that warrant prosecution.

Pyrotechnic effects and spectacular death belong to the symbolism of terror and political assassination – bizarre techniques of miscommunication through fear practiced on the innocent and designed to effect social change. While focusing on the use of terror in 9-11, this article deals with both terror and political assassination as closely related communicative practices of death. It outlines a theory of terrorism that suggests September 11 may be an example of expedient terrorist destruction ordered from within the state, a macabre instance of a state protection racket. Commentators on the left tend to see terrorism as a blow extended by the oppressed against exploiters. However, terrorism is much less likely to be a manifestation of a revolt by – or on behalf of – the underprivileged than a demonstration of brute force by the state or its agents. Machiavellian state terrorism is terror/assassination performed for reasons different from the publicized ones; often initiated by persons or groups other than those suspected of the act; and – most important – secretly perpetrated by, or on behalf, of the violated state itself. Machiavellian state terror advances the ruling agenda, while disguising itself as the work of individuals or groups opposed to the state's fundamental principles. As an example, the article reviews a mysterious 1971 assassination in Paris that obliquely foreshadows some critical elements of the official story of 9-11. The article underlines the importance of oppositional theorizing: questioning government and looking for connections between events are critical features of what it means to be vitally active in the political universe.

This paper explores the domain of the symbolic imaginary to comprehend the mechanisms and effects of neoliberal deregulation (anomie) and reckless capital accumulation within and external to the US imperial core with special emphasis on the war on terror, the figure of the suicide bomber, and the internal manifestations of social liquidation in the appearance of the rampage shooter. The concept of the piacular developed by Durkheim is expanded to demonstrate the contrast between the “variable” or human forms of terror with “constant” or mechanized form of the piacular as it appears in the form of the unmanned aerial vehicle or drone. The apparently disconnected image of the drone flying around up there somewhere in the clouds is intimately connected with seemingly unrelated phenomenon of mass murdering martyrs and fanatics down here on the ground. Lastly, the prospects for an anti-drone movement are touched upon and suggested as a fulcrum point from which to “touch” the synthetic point where terror, rampage, and revenge unify.

Unique to this paper is the development of a dialectical, formal, conceptual “geometry” rooted in Durkheim’s classic analysis of suicide for disclosing the hidden analogs obtaining in the relationship between suicide bombings and rampage shootings and their conceptual fusion in the form of the unmanned aerial vehicle or drone.

Capitalism linked to global defense and security operations produces its own terrifying nemeses as both causes and effects. Rather than something that has to be defeated, terror is an enemy that cannot be defeated but neither can it prevail against an empire. Likewise, the rampage shooter is not merely an individual in need of psychiatric care but a product of domestic policies that sacrifice everything for security and war. These two figures are “mirror opposites” or speculative doubles of one another, which when we attempt to comprehend the image of the seemingly unrelated drone machine what were find is the unexpected synthesis of the twin logics of terror and rampage at work in the sky.

If people hope to live in a society ruled democratically rather than imperial subjects they must know where to apply moral and political leverage. Suicidal bombers and lone shooters are definite problems, but focusing on the defects of individuals diverts the critical gaze from the larger problem of foreign policy, domestic austerity, and, perhaps, the war on the drone represents a unique opening within the aggregate system to push back against the abstract, imperial system of global and domestic hegemony.

This paper represents a new and unique synthesis of Durkheimian and interpretive sociologies with various strands of critical social theory providing new optics for the analysis of international terrorism, domestic mass murders, and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the wars on terror.

Congress has expressed concern that the Homeland Security agency might lack the power necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. This paper argues that it less likely to be a lack of police power and more likely the misapplication of those powers that undermines the war on terror. Until one learns to police in ways that build trust within those communities least likely to willingly assist the police, no amount of additional funding or legal authority will increase the capacity of the police forces to gather the information needed. For neighborhood policing this means partnering with those most victimized by crime. For the war on terror, this means partnering with Arab‐American communities. This examination of partnerships provides a basis for understanding how likely it is that current neighborhood policing practices will support a successful war on terror.

This chapter argues that aspiring hegemons face a wide array of complex and distinct military challenges. Managing scarce military resources requires a subtle and complex global strategy that is likely to generate cognitive overload for the political system. As a result of cognitive overload, aspiring hegemons are likely to flail around, rapidly shifting from one global strategy to another. Such strategic flailing will occur independently of whether or not the economy is in crisis, though clearly economic crisis will exacerbate the tendency towards strategic incoherence. The chapter examines U.S. global strategy since the end of the Cold War, looking at the focus on “rogue regimes,” a growing concern with “global chaos,” worry about the rise of a peer competitor (China), and the debates about the root causes of, and best strategies to mitigate, terrorism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of culture and notions of national identity and their role in the formulation of grand strategy.

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate on the relationship between terrorism, criminal organisations, and the so-called ‘new wars’.

Review of the existing literature on the ‘new wars’ and on the terrorism–crime nexus; estimate of the financial revenues gained by terrorist groups engaged in illicit activities.

Terrorist and criminal groups can develop several forms of collaboration. Whether terrorists convert to criminal activities or not depends on a variety of factors, both internal and external. In some cases these links are occasional and opportunistic, associated with the possibility of exploiting the availability of specialised competences in a stateless environment, in other cases the warring parties are directly involved and create stable relationships as a way to finance their war activities.

Lack of reliable data limits a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, the study has important consequences for designing and adopting more effective policies regarding terrorism, organised crime, as well as conflict resolution.

The study presents an overview of different strands of the literature on terrorism; a discussion is articulated on the interplay between ‘new wars’ and the terror–crime connection. Potentially fruitful avenues of investigation are suggested for future research.