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A number of earlier studies have examined whether extensive labour market programmes (ALMPs) contribute to upward wage pressure in the Swedish economy. Most studies on aggregate data have concluded that they actually do. In this paper we look at this issue using more recent data to check whether the extreme conditions in the Swedish labour market in the 1990s and the concomitant high levels of ALMP participation have brought about a change in the previously observed patterns. We also look at the issue using three different estimation methods to check the robustness of the results. Our main finding is that, according to most estimates, ALMPs do not seem to contribute significantly to an increased wage pressure.

Purpose – I suggest that we conceptualize labor markets as observable social networks, in which workplaces are the nodes and people moving between workplaces are the edges. The movement of people delivers the actionable information as to what the supply, demand, and going wage for labor might be. Labor market networks are hypothesized to be quite thin thus leading to substantial wage setting autonomy within workplaces, consistent with contemporary observations in both economics and sociology as to the weakness of labor market signals.Method – This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work in economics, sociology, and network science and develops a network image of labor market structure and function. Hypotheses derived from economic, sociological, and network theories are proposed to explain workplace-level wage setting.Findings – Information flow, trust in information, information variance, collusion, and status beliefs are all proposed as important network properties of labor markets. The paper outlines an observational strategy to make labor markets scientifically observable.Originality – Economists and sociologists often refer to labor markets as mechanisms setting the price of labor but rarely observe them. This paper outlines a strategy for making the invisible hand of the market scientifically observable.

The paper aims to link product market features in the Greek metal processing sector to the wage-setting practices followed therein.

Aggregate business structural statistics are used to document the product market structure features while information from a rich sectoral collective agreement database, covering a number of sectors of the Greek economy, is used for the wage-setting practices. The approach is, in general, descriptive and discursive with the use of some regression analysis.

The main findings of the paper include: first, the metal sector as a whole is heterogeneous in terms of its structural/productive features; second, the type of collective agreements followed in the subsectors of the metal sector appear related to the structural features of the subsectors; third, negotiated wages appear binding for subsectors facing less product market competition; and finally, the ability to opt out of the sectoral agreement and sign firm-level agreements during the recent crisis in Greece was used mainly by firms suffering accounting losses.

The research results are limited by the absence of detailed firm-level information both on the actual wages paid and on the exact industrial relations practices in the workplace.

In view of the changes taking place in industrial relations in general and collective bargaining in particular, the issue of the homogeneity – in terms of structure and performance – of individual sectors, sets the question of whether one size (agreement) fits all and consequently whether extensions of agreements to whole sectors are advisable. This is the spirit in which the paper is written. The originality is linked both to the issue addressed but also to the use of the detailed collective labour agreements information and its association with product market features.

The chapter presents a historical and economic analysis of Nordic wage formation, with a special focus on how collective agreements really work. A stereotypical interpretation of the evolution of Nordic wage bargaining systems is that a centralised setting of wages has gradually been substituted with more decentralised pay bargaining. This overlooks the fact that central organisations could never really control wage levels, even in the golden age of centralised bargaining. Instead, central pay bargains defined minimum wage changes that ensured that local conflicts would be ruled out. Moreover, the central stipulations could often be overruled or adjusted at the local level. Following insights of Teulings and Hartog, we argue that the main function of Nordic collective agreements has always been to rule out local conflicts that would otherwise be initiated to seek local rents. Thus, collective agreements combine macroeconomic flexibility with adequate investment incentives at the local level. In this crucial sense, Nordic collective agreements are a completely stable institution. The most important transformation that has taken place is that formal peak bargaining on mean pay increases has been substituted with pattern bargaining where the manufacturing industry acts as a wage leader. Economic theory suggests that this almost amounts to centralised pay setting.

We use a laboratory experiment to examine a multitask environment common to practice, in which managers have multiple responsibilities, including both managerial reporting, as in participative budgeting settings, and effort provision toward daily tasks. Consistent with typical contracting arrangements, we examine incomplete contracts where honesty and effort are not enforceable. In such a multitask environment, when employers choose to offer comparatively generous wages to managers, we predict that managers will elect to provide higher effort. Meanwhile, we remain agnostic ex ante about the degree of misreporting due to findings in studies on gift exchange, moral licensing, and moral wiggle room. Overall, we find evidence that reciprocity, consistent with the gift-exchange model, does extend across both tasks. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to describe how the voluntary living wage (LW) in the UK is set. It examines how this calculation relates to contemporary approaches to setting wage floors, both in relation to their goal of supporting adequate living standards and in relation to the place of wage floors in the labour mark.

The paper examines how compulsory and voluntary wage floors are being determined, in the UK and in particular the role of public consensus in contributing to the calculation and adoption of a LW. It then reflects on the future sustainability of a system of wage floors in which the concept of the LW plays a significant role.

The central finding is that widespread support for wages delivering socially acceptable minimum living standards has transformed the context in which low pay is being addressed in the UK. The LW idea has stimulated more decisive efforts to do so; however, if a compulsory version of a LW were to reach a level shown to be harming jobs, this could seriously undermine such efforts. Moreover, the extent to which adequate wages are compatible with high employment levels can also be influenced by state support for households, especially tax credits and Universal Credit.

The paper clarifies how the setting of the UK LW contributes to objectives related both to living standards and to labour markets, and critically addresses some key issues raised.

EU social policy is perhaps the most controversial aspect of European integration yet, despite all the political clashes on the matter, concepts like “social Europe” or “social dimension” remain ill‐defined and imprecise terms. Intends to outline and clarify in detail the debate about whether or not the European Union should have competence with regard to labour market affairs. A key message is that social policy has been controversial because it has become embroiled in the debate about the future political direction of the EU. In particular, three contrasting political models –symbiotic integration, integrative federalism and neo‐liberalism – have been put forward as organizing principles for the EU and each has a coherent view of what form social policy should take at the European level. It is the clash between these three models that has caused EU social policy to be so contestable and intractable.

The authors aim to investigate public‐private pay determination using French, British and Italian micro data from the 2001 ECHP (European Community Household Panel) and estimate public/private wage differentials by country. By focussing on different countries, they exploit institutional differences to gain insights on the process of pay formation.

The authors use regression techniques to compute the pay premium both at the average and at different education/skill levels. They then decompose the observed differences into a part due to characteristics and another part due to different returns between sectors, also at different quantiles of the wage distributions within skills.

Even after controlling for observable characteristics, the authors find an overall positive wage differential for public sector workers in each of the three countries. As expected, the differential varies by skill. In general, the present findings do not fully support the view that the public (private) sector pays more (less) among the low skilled than the private (public) sector, and that the opposite is true for the highly skilled. The authors also document that the public pay premium varies as one moves up or down in the skill distribution.

On the one hand, the authors’ results confirm that the public sector acts in general as a “fair employer”, compressing pay dispersion with respect to the private sector. On the other hand, the interactions of public and private labour market institutional arrangements play a crucial role in shaping the structure of relative wages across sectors. For example, when the monopsony power in wage bargaining is relevant in both sectors as, for example, in Britain, the private sector pays in absolute value proportionally less, and also the public wage premium is smaller.

This is the first attempt to use comparable data for three countries to analyse public/private wage differences by skill levels and to link the evidence with differences in public/private wage setting regimes.

This paper uses two complementary approaches to estimate the effect of right-to-work (RTW) laws on wages and unionization rates. The first approach uses an event study design to analyze the impact of the adoption of RTW laws in five US states since 2011. The second approach relies on a differential exposure design that exploits the differential impact of RTW laws on industries with high unionization rates relative to industries with low unionization rates. Both approaches indicate that RTW laws lower wages and unionization rates. Under the assumption that RTW laws only affect wages by lowering the unionization rate, RTW can be used as an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the causal effect of unions on wages. In our preferred specification based on the differential exposure design, the IV estimate of the effect of unions on log wages is 0.35, which substantially exceeds the corresponding OLS estimate of 0.16. This large wage effect suggests that RTW may also directly affect wages due to a reduced union threat effect.

The authors' work aims to identify the employer-specific drivers of the college (or university) wage gap, which has been identified as one of the major determinants of the dynamics of overall wage and income inequality in the past decades. The authors focus on three employer-level features that can be associated with asymmetries in the employment relation orientation adopted for college and non-college-educated employees: (1) size, (2) the share of standard employment and (3) the pervasiveness of incentive pay schemes.

The authors' establishment-level analysis (data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), 2005–2018) focusses on Japan, an economy characterised by many unique economic and institutional features relevant to the aims of the authors' analysis. The authors use an adjusted measure of firm-specific college wage premium, which is not biased by confounding individual and establishment-level factors and reflects unobservable characteristics of employees that determine the payment of a premium. The authors' empirical methods account for the complexity of the relationships they investigate, and the authors test their baseline outcomes with econometric approaches (propensity score methods) able to address crucial identification issues related to endogeneity and reverse causality.

The authors' findings indicate that larger establishment size, a larger share of regular workers and more pervasive implementation of IPSs for college workers tend to increase the college wage gap once all observable workers, job and establishment characteristics are controlled for. This evidence corroborates the authors' hypotheses that a larger establishment size, a higher share of regular workers and a more developed set-up of performance pay schemes for college workers are associated with a better capacity of employers to attract and keep highly educated employees with unobservable characteristics that justify a wage premium above average market levels. The authors provide empirical evidence on how three relevant establishment-level characteristics shape the heterogeneity of the (adjusted) college wage observed across organisations.

The authors' contribution to the existing knowledge is threefold. First, the authors combine the economics and management/organisation literature to develop new insights that underpin the authors' testable empirical hypotheses. This enables the authors to shed light on employer-level drivers of wage differentials (size, workforce composition, implementation of performance-pay schemes) related to many structural, institutional and strategic dimensions. The second contribution lies in the authors' measure of the “adjusted” college wage gap, which is calculated on the component of individual wages that differs between observationally identical workers in the same establishment. As such, the metric captures unobservable workers' characteristics that can generate a wage premium/penalty. Third, the authors provide empirical evidence on how three relevant establishment-level characteristics shape the heterogeneity of the (adjusted) college wage observed across organisations.