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The new economic-policy regime in Sweden in the 1990s included deregulation, central-bank independence, inflation targets and fiscal rules but also active labour market policy and voluntary incomes policy. This chapter describes the content, determinants and performance of the new economic policy in Sweden in a comparative, mainly Nordic, perspective. The new economic-policy regime is explained by the deep recession and budget crisis in the early 1990s, new economic ideas and the power of economic experts. In the 1998–2007 period, Sweden displayed relatively low inflation and high productivity growth, but unemployment was high, especially by national standards. The restrictive monetary policy was responsible for the low inflation, and the dynamic (ICT) sector was decisive for the productivity miracle. Furthermore, productivity increases in the ICT sector largely explains why the Central Bank undershot its inflation target in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The new economic-policy regime in Sweden performed well during the global financial crisis. However, as in other OECD countries, the moderate increase in unemployment was largely attributed to labour hoarding. And the rapid recovery of the Baltic countries made it possible for Sweden to avoid a bank crisis.

The assignment of targets to instruments in developing countries cannot satisfactorily follow any simple universal rule. Which approach is appropriate is influenced by whether the economy is dominated by primary exports, by the importance of the domestic bond market and bank credit, by the extent of existing restriction in foreign exchange and financial markets, by the presence or absence of persistent high inflation, and by the existence or non‐existence of an active international market in the country's currency. Eighteen observations and maxims on stabilisation policy are tentatively drawn (pp. 64–8) from the material reviewed, and the maxims are partly summarised (pp. 69–71) in a schematic assignment, with variations, of targets to instruments.

Labor markets for unskilled and low-wage workers in the United States stagnated in the last quarter of the 20th century. The collapse in the low-wage labor market has been well documented¹ and numerous research initiatives have investigated the causes. Despite some geographical mismatches between buyers and sellers low-paying jobs are generally available but forces are at work on both the demand and supply sides of unskilled labor markets that make it increasingly difficult for working families at or near the bottom of the income distribution to earn enough to meet basic needs. Welfare reform effectively increased the supply of unskilled workers, which placed added pressures on wages and earnings of low-income families.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the employer’s wage policy on the wage dynamics of vulnerable groups of employees at large firms, including younger employees, employees on fixed-term contracts, and employees who take parental leave.

The first step of the analysis identifies the wage policy models adopted by a sample of large Italian companies by means of a cluster analysis based on firm-level variables that describe the wage level, wage structure, and wage dynamics. The second step estimates the impact of the employer’s wage policy on the wage growth path of matched employees, paying particular attention to groups of vulnerable workers.

The cluster analysis identifies four clusters whose characteristics reflect ideal types suggested by the literature. The 2SLS wage regressions that examine the impact of the employer’s wage policy model on a matched employee’s wage five years later confirm that the initial employer’s wage policy is a significant determinant of wage dynamics. However, the observed patterns significantly differ between the whole sample and the examined groups of vulnerable employees.

Despite consistent evidence of negative labour market outcomes for vulnerable employees, the impact of firm characteristics on segregation into disadvantaged groups is still under-researched. This paper provides new evidence of how the employer’s wage policy impacts the wage growth path of disadvantaged employees and highlights critical dimensions to reduce the risk of segregation into less favourable segments of the labour market.

We study the impact of tax and minimum wage reforms on the incidence of informality. To gauge the incidence of informality, we use measures of the extent of tax evasion, the extent of minimum wage noncompliance, and the size of the informal workforce. Our approach allows us to examine (i) the distinction between determinants of firm-level reported wage distribution and actual wage distribution, (ii) the complementarity of tax and minimum wage enforcement, (iii) the impact that a minimum wage reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance, and (iv) the impact that a tax policy reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance. We conclude with the design of optimal minimum wage and tax policies (even in the complete absence of minimum wage enforcement). We do so based on two objectives derived from popular concerns associated with an unchecked expansion of informality: tax revenue maximization, and poverty alleviation among workers.

I. INTRODUCTION In this monograph we point out and analyse various dimensions of bargaining structure, which we define broadly as the institutional configuration within which bargaining takes place, and attempt to provide some guidelines for management action. We look at the development, theory, and present framework of bargaining structure in Britain and then examine it in terms of choices: multi‐employer versus single employer, company versus plant level bargaining, and the various public policy issues involved.

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.

1. INTRODUCTION The recent proliferation of literature on the problems inherent in inflation, unemployment and incomes policy does not lag far behind the rate of inflation that initially prompted it. Before we get into the discussion of incomes and prices policies, it will be advisable to (a) present some evidence on the wage‐price‐unemployment behaviour in selected industrialised countries and (b) discuss theoretical and empirical results which have led to the conclusion that monetary and fiscal policies will not be adequate to meet the current inflationary problems. The first should provide substance to the claim that inflation has increased over time and has now become a more critical problem; the second should throw some light on the nature of current controversy on inflation and why mixed economies should need to supplement monetary and fiscal policies by other policies to provide themselves with a better trade‐off between inflation and unemployment. Accordingly, we will (1) describe recent wage‐price‐unemployment experience in selected industrialised countries, (2) discuss theoretical and empirical issues involved in the study of wage‐price‐unemployment behaviour, and (3) present the rationale advanced for an incomes policy, and discuss the past experiences of countries which have experimented with incomes policies and conclude with the suggestion that incomes policy and manpower policy be considered as complementary.

We examine personnel policies and careers in public agencies, particularly how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public-sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public-sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and work hard. To do so requires internal personnel policies that sort “slackers” from “zealots.” Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Even with well-designed personnel policies, an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition remains.