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Examines the compensation method used in state‐owned enterprises in the People′s Republic of China. A questionnaire survey of 504 workers′ attitudes towards compensation practices regarding wages, bonuses, pensions, unemployment compensation and other incentives was conducted. Research results revealed that there was strong agreement among respondents for the ranking of the different forms of compensation practices. The respondents preferred a performance‐based compensation system as opposed to an egalitarian system. These results give some insight into designing a compensation package and the direction for economic reforms in enterprises.

Total factor productivity (TFP), for a country and for a firm as well, is a crucial element for economic growth by inducing high output. Actually, workers' effort is among the important factors that positively influence the TFP.

In this paper, the authors assume that the wage bonus enhances the worker's effort. Wage bonus is an incentive mechanism and plays a role in the TFP as is shown in a recent paper by Le Van and Pham (2021). The firm will maximize its profits. The supplies of capital and workers are exogenous. At equilibrium, the authors obtain that wage bonus has positive effects on output, labor productivity and price of the output.

The wage bonus system can make the optimal sequence of outputs grow without bounds. And if the optimal sequence converges to a steady state, this one can be characterized by higher output per capita than that in the steady state without the bonus.

In particular, the result show if, thanks to the wage bonus externality effect, the production may become of increasing returns and if the incentive mechanism is very strong, any optimal path of physical capitals will converge to infinity.

A growing body of research finds that gig economy platforms use gamification to enhance managerial control. Focusing on technologically mediated forms of gamification, this literature reveals how platforms mobilize gig workers’ work effort by making the labour process resemble a game. This chapter contends that this tech-centric scholarship fails to fully capture the historical continuities between contemporary and much older occurrences of game-playing at work. Informed by interviews and participatory observations at two food delivery platforms in Amsterdam, I document how these platforms’ piece wage system gives rise to a workplace dynamic in which severely underpaid delivery couriers continuously employ game strategies to maximize their gig income. Reminiscent of observations from the early shop floor ethnographies of the manufacturing industry, I show that the game of gig income maximization operates as an indirect modality of control by (re)aligning the interests of couriers with the interests of capital and by individualizing and depoliticizing couriers’ overall low wage level. I argue that the new, algorithmic technologies expand and intensify the much older forms of gamified control by infusing the organizational activities of shift and task allocation with the logic of the piece wage game and by increasing the possibilities for interaction, direct feedback and immersion. My study contributes to the literature on gamification in the gig economy by interweaving it with the classic observations derived from the manufacturing industry and by developing a conceptualization of gamification in which both capital and labour exercise agency.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate changes in the economic importance of performance-related-pay (PRP) in Britain through the 2000s using firm-level data.

The authors utilise nationally representative, monthly data on the total wage bill and employment of around 8,500 firms. Using these data, the authors decompose the share of the total economy-wide wage bill accounted for by bonuses into the shares of employment in the PRP and non-PRP sectors, the ratio of base pay between the two sectors, and the gearing of bonus payments to base pay within the PRP sector.

The growth in the economic importance of bonuses in Britain in the mid-2000s – and subsequent fluctuations since the onset of recession in 2008 – can be almost entirely explained by changes in the gearing of bonus to base pay within the PRP sector. There has been no substantial change in the percentage of employment accounted for by PRP firms; if anything it has fallen over time. Furthermore, movements in the gearing of bonuses to base pay in the economy are heavily influenced by changes in Finance: a sector which accounts for a large proportion of all bonus payments in Britain.

The paper demonstrates the importance of understanding further how firms decide the size of bonus payments in a given period.

This is the first paper to present monthly firm-level data for Britain on the incidence and size of bonus payments in the 2000s.

Uses longitudinal data from the NLSY79 to examine the effect of a broad variety of performance‐based pay schemes and fringe benefits on male and female wages between 1988 and 1998. Specifically, analyzes whether the offer of various performance‐based pay schemes and fringe benefits functions as an alternative work incentive, eliciting greater effort and raising wages or, instead, it is accompanied by lower wages, as predicted by compensating wage theory. The results indicate that, while most performance‐based pay schemes are associated with higher wages to differing extents across gender, tips are commonly accompanied by lower wages among men. Similarly, while the offer of a retirement plan appears to as a work incentive raising male and female wages, workers are willing to trade wages for jobs offering life and medical insurance.

THE possibility of Work Study practitioners investigating lost industrial time through gambling is not to be ruled out in the future. This possibility arises from the question of the Secretary of the Churches' Committee on Gambling, who recently asked in effect: “Can lost production and efficiency through gambling be measured?” Presumably, no‐one has ever informed the Reverend Secretary that every form of industrial inefficiency can be measured. Let us hasten to inform the Committee, therefore, that, if the necessity should arise, the tools are ready to be applied.

This paper aims to hypothesize on the relationship between the Millennial workforce and US firms’ response to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. The authors postulate that societal pressure from the younger generational cohorts will motivate socially cognizant corporations to share their newly acquired tax benefits with their workforce to attract, retain and inspire employee productivity and retention, as well as customer loyalty.

The authors empirically examine work-related cultural attitudes of the Millennial generational cohort in the USA, and by exploring related literature on organizational management and supply side economics, the authors aim to connect them to firms’ response to tax cut windfall in a simple theoretical model. The authors complement their methods by using descriptive statistics on firm tax responses that followed the 2017 TCJA.

The authors offer support for the notion that companies are behaving rationally by providing short-term benefits to employees when employees are, on average, younger. The competitive nature of the global market acts as an incentive to avoid permanent obligations such as wage and benefits increases. The data reveal that a significant number of companies had a transitory reaction to the latest tax cut.

The authors encourage future research, once sufficient time elapses, to exploit the time periods before and after the tax cut to provide a better assessment of the empirical impact of the 2017 tax cut on firm responses, conditional on workforce makeup.

The authors examine whether and how the Millennial cohort might shape firm behavior following changes in tax policy.

We analyze the role of works councils for the use of performance appraisals (PA). We distinguish between the incidence of PA systems as intended by the firm and their actual implementation on the level of the individual employee.

We draw on two complementary data sets. These are the German Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), which combines firm-based information with information provided by several of those employees, and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is a representative longitudinal study of persons living in Germany.

We find that works councils tend to promote rather than restrict PA. Employees working in establishments with a works council are more likely to face a formal PA procedure. Works councils also act as a transmission institution for the actual use of an existing PA system – i.e. among the firms that claim to implement PA for all their employees, the likelihood of their employees actually having regular appraisals is substantially larger when works councils are in place. Moreover, the existence of works councils is positively related particularly to PA systems, which affects bonus payments.

We contribute to the understanding of the work of works councils in firms. In more general, we shed light to the relation of industrial relations and human resource management in firms.

This result hints at a higher acceptance of PA systems in firms with works councils. It seems likely that the stronger formalization of such systems necessitated by codetermination laws increases the likelihood of supervisors consistently carrying out such appraisals.

We are the first who complement the analysis of the existence of HR practices (PA system) with its actual use for employees.

The authors investigate the extent to which differences in provincial union legislation have impacts on the union earnings premium.

Content analysis of provincial union regulations of 25 provinces is conducted to create two indices: one reflecting the degree of stringency of the local requirement that unions be established in a timely fashion and the other reflecting requirements for employers to negotiate wages with the union. The authors use individual level data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) of 2010 to estimate the union earnings premium.

The authors find that unionised workers in China receive an earnings premium ranging from 6.4 to 9.6%, which is in range of other studies (but not all) for China that tend to find a (perhaps surprising) union wage premium in spite of the fact that unions tend to be “company unions” designed to foster stability and growth and to serve as a transmission belt for the wishes of the Party rather than bargaining for the benefit of their members. The authors also find that provincial requirements to establish unions in a timely fashion enhance the impact of unions on the earnings of their members, but provincial requirements to negotiate wages dampen the effect of unions on the earnings of their members. Reasons for these results are discussed.

Despite this lack of independence of the Chinese unions, research continuously finds that Chinese unions have effects that are surprisingly similar to those of unions in Western countries. This paper drills deeper into the underlying mechanisms to see if local union strategies, exemplified by provincial union legislation, can explain the unexpected union effects on compensation. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to do so. Moreover, the authors use individual-level data in contrast to most studies on China that use firm or provincial level aggregate data.

During the crisis, the Greek labor market went through major changes in terms of employment, unemployment and wages. The economic activity registered a cumulative decline of around 25%, weighting heavily on the labor market. The unemployment rate showed a substantial increase, with signs of persistence and the employment rate fell substantially. Utilizing a unique dataset, the European Union Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) the paper examines the evolution of wages over the period 2010–2014. During that period, the economic adjustment programs to deal with the chronic deficiencies of the Greek economy and restore sustainable public finances, to gain competitiveness and set the foundation for long-term growth, were implemented. Data refer to 2010, when the first elements of the program were beginning to be executed, and to 2014 when the crisis had already unfolded. Results point to a reduction of average wages across industries, even after controlling for personal and workplace characteristics. Amid a wage decrease at the mean, there is evidence of a divergent wage evolution between sectors of economic activity during the crisis. Furthermore, we find that wage premia that have persisted in the Greek economy during the same period are not disproportionately captured by employees at the upper end of the conditional wage distribution.