Search results
1 – 10 of over 3000Yixin Liang, Xuejie Ren and Lindu Zhao
The study aims to address a critical gap in existing healthcare payment schemes and care service pricing by recognizing the influential role of patients' decisions on…
Abstract
Purpose
The study aims to address a critical gap in existing healthcare payment schemes and care service pricing by recognizing the influential role of patients' decisions on self-management efforts. These decisions not only impact health outcomes but also shape the demand for care, subsequently influencing care costs. Despite the significance of this interplay, current payment schemes often overlook these dynamics. The research focuses on investigating the implications of a novel behavior-based payment scheme, designed to align incentives and establish a direct connection between patients' decisions and care costs. The primary objective is to comprehensively understand whether and how this innovative payment scheme structure influences key stakeholders, including patients, care providers, insurers and overall social welfare.
Design/methodology/approach
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model to incorporate the performance of self-management with the demand for healthcare service, compare the patient's effort decision for self-management and provider's price decision for healthcare service under a behavior-based scheme with that under two implemented widely payment schemes, that is, co-payment scheme and co-insurance scheme.
Findings
Our findings confirm that the behavior-based scheme incentives patient self-management more than current schemes while reducing their possibility of seeking healthcare service, which indirectly induces the provider to lower the price of the service. The stakeholders' utility under various payment schemes is sensitive to the cost of treatment and the perceived health utility of patients. Especially, patient health awareness is not always benefited provider profit, as it motivates patient self-management while diminishing the demand for care.
Originality/value
We provide a novel framework for characterizing behavior-based payment schemes. Our results confirm the need for modification of the current payment scheme to incentivize patient self-management.
Details
Keywords
Wenqiang Li, Juan He and Yangyan Shi
Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply…
Abstract
Purpose
Marketing is a hot topic, and the purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholding strategies can be applied to achieve strategic synergy between firms in vertical supply chains to improve retailers’ marketing efforts from a long-term perspective.
Design/methodology/approach
This study constructs Stackelberg models to analyze the operating mechanisms of shareholding supply chains under forward, backward and cross-shareholding strategies. The authors analyze the effects of shareholding on prices, marketing efforts and profits, and explore the strategic preferences and outcomes of different supply chain members.
Findings
Forward/backward shareholding plays the same role as cross/nonshareholding in supply chains because the effect of the retailer’s shareholding is offset by the power status of the manufacturer, and the retailer can still profit when wholesale prices are higher than selling prices in certain cases. A manufacturer’s shareholding in a retailer can benefit consumers and improve marketing efforts by reducing retailers’ marketing costs, while a retailer’s shareholding in a manufacturer has no such effect. None of all shareholding strategies can coordinate the interests of all members; however, an effective rebate policy can resolve this problem.
Originality/value
The results reveal the operational mechanism of shareholding supply chains and provide reference values for managers who want to improve marketing efforts and economic performance using a shareholding strategy.
Details
Keywords
Abstract
Purpose
Promoting electric vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve carbon neutrality. If EVs are widely adopted, this will undoubtedly be good for the environment. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of network externalities and subsidy on the strategies of manufacturer under a carbon neutrality constraint.
Design/methodology/approach
In this paper, the authors propose a game-theoretic framework in an EVs supply chain consisting of a government, a manufacturer and a group of consumers. The authors examine two subsidy options and explain the choice of optimal strategies for government and manufacturer.
Findings
First, the authors find that the both network externalities of charging stations and government subsidy can promote the EV market. Second, under a relaxed carbon neutrality constraint, even if the government’s purchase subsidy investment is larger than the carbon emission reduction technology subsidy investment, the purchase subsidy policy is still optimal. Third, under a strict carbon neutrality constraint, when the cost coefficient of carbon emission reduction and the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology are larger, social welfare will instead decrease with the increase of the effectiveness of emission reduction technology and then, the manufacturer’s investment in carbon emission reduction technology is lower. In the extended model, the authors find the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction technology can also promote the EV market and social welfare (or consumer surplus) is the same whatever the subsidy strategy.
Practical implications
The network externalities of charging stations and the subsidy effect of the government have a superimposition effect on the promotion of EVs. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively strong, government can withdraw from the subsidized market. When the network effect of charging stations is relatively weak, government can intervene appropriately.
Originality/value
Comparing previous studies, this study reveals the impact of government intervention, network effects and carbon neutrality constraints on the EV supply chain. From a sustainability perspective, these insights are compelling for both EV manufacturers and policymakers.
Details
Keywords
Yanping Liu, Bo Yan and Xiaoxu Chen
This paper studies the optimal decision-making and coordination problem of a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain. The purpose is to analyze the impact of…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper studies the optimal decision-making and coordination problem of a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain. The purpose is to analyze the impact of information sharing on optimal decisions and propose a coordination mechanism to encourage supply chain members to share information.
Design/methodology/approach
The two-echelon dual-channel FAP supply chain includes a manufacturer and a retailer. By using the Stackelberg game theory and the backward induction method, the optimal decisions are obtained under information symmetry and asymmetry and the coordination contract is designed.
Findings
The results show that supply chain members should comprehensively evaluate the specific situation of product attributes, coefficient of freshness-keeping cost and network operating costs to make decisions. Asymmetric information can exacerbate the deviation of optimal decisions among supply chain members and information sharing is always beneficial to manufacturers but not to retailers. The improved revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism.
Practical implications
The conclusions can provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers to deal with information asymmetry and improve the competitiveness of the supply chain.
Originality/value
This paper combines the three characteristics that are most closely related to the reality of supply chains, including horizontal and vertical competition of different channels, the perishable characteristics of FAPs and the uncertainty generated by asymmetric demand information.
Details
Keywords
This paper aims to study the preferences of the supply chain (SC) members on various power structures under demand information asymmetry considering competing retailers.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to study the preferences of the supply chain (SC) members on various power structures under demand information asymmetry considering competing retailers.
Design/methodology/approach
A two-level SC with one manufacturer and two retailers is designed. The retailers are in Bertrand competition. The manufacturer who holds the confidential demand information chooses the appropriate information sharing (IS) format. Three IS formats are provided, i.e. no IS (the manufacturer never shares with the retailers), partial IS (the manufacturer shares with one retailer), full IS (the manufacturer shares with all retailers). In addition, the authors model two power structures based on the decision sequences in the SC, i.e. retailers or manufacturer-dominant SC. The authors characterize the equilibrium solutions and payoffs and then investigate the members’ preferences for IS formats.
Findings
It is shown that in retailers (manufacturer)-dominant SC, the retailers prefer full (no) IS, but the manufacturer prefers no (full) IS. Moreover, the authors analyze the members’ preferences on power structures under demand information asymmetry, which has a relationship with the degrees of demand uncertainty and competition intensity.
Originality/value
The analysis regarding the preferences of the SC members on power structure under demand information asymmetry provides valuable managerial insights to enhance cooperation and achieve a win-win result.
Details
Keywords
Abstract
Purpose
With the development of digitalization and interconnection, there is a growing need for enterprise customers to ensure the compatibility of the third-party components they are using in the manufacturing process, thus raising the integration requirements for the Industrial Internet platform and its third-party developers. Therefore, our study investigates the optimal integration decision of the Industrial Internet platform while considering its access price, the integration cost, and the net utility derived by enterprise customers from the third-party components.
Design/methodology/approach
We model a two-sided Industrial Internet platform that connects customers on the demand side to the developers on the supply side. We then explore the integration decision of the Industrial Internet platform and its important factors by solving the optimal profit function.
Findings
First, despite the high integration cost of third-party developers, the platform still chooses to integrate when enterprise customers derive high utility from the third-party components. Second, due to the compatibility effect, charging the enterprise customers a higher price may reduce the platform profits when these customers derive low utility from the third-party components. Third, the platform profits will increase along with the integration cost of third-party developers when it is low in the case where enterprise customers derive low utility from third-party components.
Originality/value
Our findings offer insightful takeaways for the Industrial Internet platform when making integration decisions.
Details
Keywords
In this chapter, we consider the possibility that a firm may use costly resources to improve its technical efficiency. Results from static analyses imply that technical efficiency…
Abstract
In this chapter, we consider the possibility that a firm may use costly resources to improve its technical efficiency. Results from static analyses imply that technical efficiency is determined by the configuration of factor prices. A dynamic model of the firm is developed under the assumption that managerial skill contributes to technical efficiency. Dynamic analysis shows that the firm can never be technically efficient if it maximizes profits, the steady state is always inefficient, and it is locally stable. In terms of empirical analysis, we show how likelihood-based methods can be used to uncover, in a semi-non-parametric manner, important features of the inefficiency-management relationship using a flexible functional form accounting for the endogeneity of inputs in a production function. Managerial compensation can also be identified and estimated using the new techniques. The new empirical methodology is applied in a data set previously analyzed by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) on managerial practices of manufacturing firms in the UK, US, France and Germany.
Details
Keywords
Due to the cross-network effect, two-sided users communicate with each other, producing a coupling network. To study the spread of platform self-operation in two-sided users'…
Abstract
Purpose
Due to the cross-network effect, two-sided users communicate with each other, producing a coupling network. To study the spread of platform self-operation in two-sided users' marketing and purchasing tactics, this paper considers the differences in reputation acquired by platform-owned and third-party operating channels.
Design/methodology/approach
This study proposes a two-layer network with cross-network links: one layer represents the social network of consumers, while the other layer represents the competitive network of buyers. A closed system of differential equations, based on the binary dynamics of the stochastic network, is developed to study the trend and stability points of the platform self-operation dissemination. Then the overall benefits of platform are analyzed to unify the platform diffusion and pricing strategies.
Findings
The degree of difference in social influence and cross-network effects affect diffusion synergistically. Cross-network effects hinder diffusion when there is a significant difference of social influence between consumers and sellers but promote diffusion when there is little difference of social influence between consumers and sellers. Additionally, the network weights and reputation gap exhibit a nonlinear correlation with diffusion. For pricing strategy of the platform, it can achieve maximum profit when the pricing of self-operated goods and third-party-operated goods is equal.
Originality/value
This study considers the complex network architecture created by bilateral markets and the dynamic influence of group interactions on product. Additionally, this study takes reputation into account when considering the price and dissemination tactics of various operating channels, offering guidelines for platforms to control merchants and mediate disputes between various operating channels.
Details
Keywords
Hua Ke and Yaqin Zhou
In this paper, the authors study the entry and outsourcing strategies of manufacturer while considering the brand spillover effect resulting from outsourcing. The supply chain…
Abstract
Purpose
In this paper, the authors study the entry and outsourcing strategies of manufacturer while considering the brand spillover effect resulting from outsourcing. The supply chain comprises two manufacturers: one being the entrant with a strong brand, and the other as the incumbent with a weak brand. The entrant decides whether and how to enter the market.
Design/methodology/approach
Stackelberg game is applied to study the optimal strategies for the manufacturers. This paper conducts a comparative analysis on four situations, yielding conclusions and managerial insights.
Findings
The results show that, for the entrant, there is no need to worry about the brand spillover effect in the outsourcing process, which is very interesting and counterintuitive. To get further, the authors find the reason: The spillover effect causes the entrant’s equilibrium retail price to grow faster than the wholesale price. They also prove that a stronger brand effect empowers the entrant to challenge industry barriers, while the impact of the brand spillover effect is the opposite. For the incumbent who acts as the weak party in this issue, it is demonstrated that the optimal choice is to continue selling when facing the encroachment and outsourcing call from the entrant.
Originality/value
Differing from previous studies, the authors notice the brand spillover effect caused by outsourcing when studying company’s entry strategy. They further divide the brand effect into two parts, one of which does not exhibit a spillover.
Details
Keywords
Dheeraj Chandra, Vipul Jain and Felix T.S. Chan
The increasing prevalence of a wide range of infectious diseases, as well as the underwhelming results of vaccination rates that may be traced back to problems with vaccine…
Abstract
Purpose
The increasing prevalence of a wide range of infectious diseases, as well as the underwhelming results of vaccination rates that may be traced back to problems with vaccine procurement and distribution, have brought to the fore the importance of vaccine supply chain (VSC) management in recent years. VSC is the cornerstone of effective vaccination; hence, it is crucial to enhance its performance, particularly in low- and middle-income countries where immunization rates are not satisfactory.
Design/methodology/approach
In this paper, the authors focus on VSC performance improvement of India by proposing supply contracts under demand uncertainty. The authors propose three contracts – wholesale price (WSP), cost sharing (CS) and incentive mechanism (IM) for the government-operated immunization program of India.
Findings
The authors' findings indicate that IM is capable of coordinating the supply chain, whereas the other two contracts are inefficient for the government. To validate the model, it is applied to a real-world scenario of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in India, and the findings show that an IM contract improves the overall efficiency of the system by 23.72%.
Originality/value
Previous studies focused mainly on the influenza VSC industry within developed nations. Nonetheless, there exists a dearth of literature pertaining to the examination of supply contracts and their feasibility for immunization programs that are administered by the government and aimed at optimizing societal benefits. The authors' findings can be beneficial to the immunization program of India to optimize their VSC cost.
Details