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This paper seeks to examine whether or not divident policy is influenced by the firm's corporate control structure, investigating the relationship between the dynamics of earnings payout and the voting power enjoyed by different types of shareholders. This allows one to test a set of hypotheses derived from agency and pecking order theories.

A large panel of UK firms for the 1990s and is analyzed that the payout policy is significantly related to control concentration. The problem of control measurement is addressed and the use of Banzhaf indices advocated as a relevant measure of voting power in the analysis of corporate policy choices. The traditional framework proposed by Linter is extended and an econometrically sound approach to modeling the dynamics of the total payout suggested. Where most – even recent – studies on payout policy show some methodological flaws, state‐of‐the‐art dynamic panel data estimation procedures are applied.

Expectedly, profitability is a crucial determinant of payout decisions, but the presence of strong block holders or block holder coalitions weakens the relationship between the corporate earnings and the payout dynamics. Block holders appear to realize that an overly generous payout may render the company liquidity constrained, and, consequently, result in suboptimal investment policy.

The results challenge some of the implications of the agency theories of payout, and favor a pecking‐order explanation for the observed patterns. The analysis of payout dynamics reveals also that companies adjust payout policies to changes in earnings only gradually, which is consistent with “dividend smoothing”. In fact, the results suggest a presence of a more general phenomenon of the “total payout smoothing”.

According to one's bet knowledge, this is the first study employing those game theory‐based concepts in the context of corporate payout policies.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically study the relationship between informed trading and overall corporate governance mechanisms.

A broad range of governance characteristics are used to measure the governance structure of firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange. The risk of informed trading is estimated using a PIN measure that avoids biases induced by trade classification errors. Our proxies for informed trading are regressed on measures of corporate governance.

Our most important result is that the observed trade‐off between CEO compensation and informed trading holds only for large firms. There is no correlation between CEO cash compensation and the risk of informed trading in small and medium sized firms. We find evidence that cross‐sectional differences in the risk of informed trading are explained by a firm's governance structure.

Research finding a trade‐off between CEO compensation and informed trading merits closer examination.

Limitations on insider trading, and more broadly on informed trading, may involve different costs and benefits for large firms than for medium and small firms.

This paper expands the set of governance characteristics shown to interact with informed trading activity. The Toronto market is well suited to focusing on relations between informed trading and firm‐level governance characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy.

The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical.

The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule.

The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers.

The purpose of this study is to use role expectation theory to identify potential determinants of user voting avoidance on mobile social media.

Data were collected through a survey of 602 WeChat users, and the proposed model was analysed using structural equation modelling.

Results indicate that user voting avoidance was positively influenced by unfair competition, perceived inauthenticity, perceived information insecurity, over-consumption of renqing (a unique Chinese human relation) and organisation placement in the context of mobile social media.

This study illustrates mobile user voting avoidance from the perspective of role expectation theory and clarifies the importance of avoidance in current voting research.

This paper aims to apply blockchains (BCs) for trade clearing and settlement in a realistic clearinghouse. The purpose is to demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of this approach.

The study uses account BCs and trading BCs as building blocks for trade clearing and settlement. Careful design is made to ensure that this approach is feasible and scalable.

A design has been proposed that can process hundreds of thousands of trades for a clearinghouse and it addresses performance, privacy and scalability of realistic trade clearing and settlement. The design has been implemented and experimented in a clearinghouse for over two months and processes over 3B real transactions from an exchange. The first month was to experiment with the system with historical data, the second month was to experiment with real-time data during market trading hours. The system performed as designed and intended.

This is the first large research paper that applied BCs for clearing in the world. The authors applied the system to a clearinghouse and processed over 3 billion transactions, equivalent to 13 years of London Stock Exchange transaction volume, demonstrating that BCs can handle a large number of transactions.

The design can be duplicated to many clearinghouses in the world, and this also paves the way BCs can be used in large financial institutions.

An implication is that other trading firms, clearinghouses and banks can apply the same technology for trade clearing, ushering the way BCs can be used in institutions. As clearing is a core function in business transactions, this has significant implications. The design can be discussed and improved in various communities.

As this is the first application of BCs to large clearinghouses that uses unique BC designs. This has significant value. Many studies have been performed but few have been reported in the scientific community. The system has been implemented, experimented and demonstrated in public for months.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the political parties will approach older people in the run-up to the General Election.

A review of what was announced in the autumn party conferences, and what older people and their organisations have been pressing for.

A personal and subjective article, the conclusion is that there will be a lot in the forthcoming General Election of importance to older people.

The perspective is entirely personal.

In this chapter, we assess the ownership characteristics for the companies in our sample. For this, we do not only use ownership concentration measures such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index but also voting power measures since ownership and voting power are not necessarily equivalent. We find that, in line with previous studies, ownership concentration and voting power of large shareholders is generally higher in continental European countries, which has important implications for corporate governance.

The insurance industry often experiences criticism for unethical and frequently illegal activities. This document suggests that insurers operate in an uncompetitive environment and that the nature of insurer operations leads otherwise ethical individuals in the direction of questionable ethical decisions throughout the operations of an insurance company.

This chapter investigates which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance using a hand-collected panel data set with information about turnout rates, voting behaviour and ownership structures of companies that are listed in seven Member States. We document how ownership concentration positively affects total shareholder turnout, but has a negative effect on small shareholder turnout. Voting power also affects small shareholder turnout rates; the greater small shareholder voting power, the greater their eagerness to vote. In addition, total and small shareholder turnout is higher the more important the meeting agenda. And, small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but the magnitude of the free-rider effect is larger for the latter category of blockholders. Our results provide some important insights for the debate on shareholder rights and the role of the AGM in corporate governance. The results show that, despite the criticism, the AGM still plays an important role in small shareholder monitoring. Some topics seem to clearly motivate small shareholders to attend, while others are less relevant. Policy makers can stimulate shareholder monitoring by focusing on the factors that are determined in this study, but it is important to consider possible endogeneity issues as well.