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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between social capital and fiscal performance using provincial sub-national state-level data in India during 1991-2012. Fiscal performance in India is based on social trust on fiscal institutions that emphasizes mainly social need for economic development.

People participation in public affairs or simply vote turnover in general election in India is taken to measure social trust on fiscal institution. Applying principal component analysis, the author constructs social capital index and examines the said relation also. Models are estimated using panel data techniques.

Strong social capital reduces fiscal deficits. As one percent vote turnover rate rises, fiscal deficit reduces by 2.6-2.8 percent during 1991-2012. The empirical findings suggest that social capital indirectly controls the fiscal performance of the elected government. The results are robust to a number of control variables.

The strong political trust is established through high turnover rate and vote share in the election for formation of government that creates the platform for sound fiscal policy decisions.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation committee structure or characteristic impacts say on pay (SOP) voting dissent and the impact of SOP dissent on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover.

The authors use corporate governance and SOP data to test the relationships amongst variables. Additional analysis is performed using one-to-one propensity-score matched samples.

The authors find that firm-years with at least a female member present on the compensation committee are associated with lower SOP dissent. The authors find mixed results of the impact of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.

This paper suggests that diversity on the compensation committee, particularly the presence of at least a female member on the committee, serves as an important determinant of SOP voting outcome in the USA. The paper provides policymakers and practitioners with insights into factors influencing SOP voting outcomes and implications of SOP dissent for firms.

The findings of this paper contribute to the corporate governance literature by enhancing the understanding of the role of the compensation committee as it relates to SOP dissent and effect of SOP dissent on CEO turnover.

This chapter analyzes the market response to ticker symbol change of stocks with non-conventional voting structures (or multiple class shares, MCS). I find a significant drop (increase) in prices and liquidity (short-sale activity) of MCS stocks, with the most severe decrease being reported for the lower-voting class. This evidence suggests that investors revised downward the assessment of MCS stocks. Regression analysis shows that a significant part of the cross-sectional variation of the event-results is explained by firm's agency costs. Overall, the chapter stresses the importance of enhanced market transparency in curbing private benefits.

Defines corporate governance, describes the special characteristics of Belgian companies and presents a study of the disciplining of bad management in 165 companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange 1989‐1996. Finds that poor share price performance is generally linked to a higher turnover of directors except in holding companies and that several measures of poor accounting performance are linked to higher director and CEO turnover, although there is more resistance to this in large companies and less in those with a higher proportion of non‐executive directors or total/foreign ownership. Shows that negative after‐tax earnings lead owners with strong monitoring abilities (e.g. holding companies) to increase their stake while others (e.g. families and institutional shareholders) reduce it; and that CEO replacement is followed by increased dividends. Summarizes the findings, noting the differences between the finance sector and others.

This paper aims to examine why a legislature would repeal an interest group deal. Design/methodology/approach–This paper provides a case study of the House of Representatives’ roll call reversal on the Brady Bill. The House voted against the Brady Bill in 1988 giving a victory to pro‐gun interest groups. It then reversed itself and voted for the Brady Bill in 1993.

This paper finds that changes in the democratic party leadership may be responsible for the House's policy reversal on gun control.

These findings suggest that in a principal–agent relationship, the agent has some discretion. In this case, the principal (elected members of a party in the US House) hires an agent (its leadership) to organize their teamwork to produce legislative output. The leadership has some discretion in making interest group deals.

The paper shows how changes in leadership reduce the durability of interest group deals.

This paper reviews academic literature related to the consequences that outside directors and boards may face in the wake of earnings restatements and suggests directions for future research. We examine loss of board seats; recruitment of new directors; proxy recommendations and shareholder support; pre-emptive director departures; director wealth effects; director reputation, litigation, and sanction risks; international evidence; and legal proposals for reform. The overall picture that emerges from the literature is that directors’ primary risk in the wake of earnings restatements is loss of board seats, in part through adverse proxy advisor recommendations and reduced shareholder support. Directors typically face little risk of legal liability or SEC sanctions, and some directors pre-emptively leave a problem company’s board and reduce their loss of interlocked board seats. Some legal scholars have called for director liability to be increased so as to promote more vigilant board oversight. Companies often focus on increasing the independence of the board in the wake of a restatement in an effort to repair organizational reputation. While researchers have revealed a host of important findings to date, much more can be learned about the effects of restatements on outside directors and boards.

The proportion of British voters who delay making their voting choice until the general election campaign is under way now make up nearly one quarter of the electorate. This large and electorally volatile group have the potential to determine the election result. However, because late deciders are less politically aware and less committed than other voters, they are notoriously difficult to influence. Using the 1992 British Election Study survey, shows that the Liberal‐Democrats made a slight net gain in votes from late deciders, but that for all three of the major parties the proportions of conversions were cancelled out by defections. Overall, the results suggest that political marketing strategies would be more cost effective if they targeted voters who made up their minds in the one or two years prior to the election, using precampaign marketing techniques.

This paper aims to put the focus on political disaffection that the voters may have and its impact on their resistance to the changes, thereby influencing intention to adopt Internet voting. This study also examines the impact of perceived risk and technological skills on the trust of the Internet technology and informal networks, such as social influence and media influence on the trust of the government.

To empirically test the model, an online survey is administered to 851 people who are eligible to vote.

The findings show that positive media influence and social influence also significantly impact trust in government but trust in government does not necessarily decrease resistance to change and positively impact intention to adopt eVoting. Also, the resistance to change was shown to significantly influence the intention to use Internet voting.

A primary potential limitation of this study is the use of convenience sampling, which may lead to self-selection bias that limits the generalization of our research to all citizens.

Government institutions, as well as political parties, can use the findings of this research to understand how political dissatisfaction such as apathy and cynicism can increase trust in technology and lead to higher participation in online voting.

While the focus on previous literature has been heavily on security and system requirements, this study expands existing research by exploring voting habits, political disaffection, the resistance of change and informal influence on intention to use online voting.

This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective.

Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic.

The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation.

A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation.

With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity).

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.

To demonstrate how the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in the United States through the “National Jesuit Committee on Investment Responsibility” played a significant role as a socially conscious institutional and religious investor in influencing Chevron’s Human Rights Policy 520 and to analyze the factors that contributed to a successful shareholder engagement with the company.

Case study based on firsthand information.

1. Our conclusion offers support for Allen et al.’s (2012) conclusion of legitimacy (credibility) being the dominant force in a successful engagement.

2. We found that coalition-building is a significant moderating variable in increasing shareholder salience. This finding contradicts the study by Gifford (2010).

Our conclusion offers support for Allen et al.’s (2012) conclusion of legitimacy (credibility) being the dominant force in a successful engagement.

We found that coalition-building is a significant moderating variable in increasing shareholder salience. This finding contradicts the study by Gifford (2010).

The chapter is based on the actual process of shareholder engagement with Chevron Corporation that led to the human rights policy and is written mainly based on firsthand information.