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Within 18 months of exiting bankruptcy, Kmart's position was sufficiently strong to launch an acquisition of Sears, once the nation's largest retailer and also a core holding of ESL. Looks at a number of compelling issues related to Kmart's bankruptcy, restructuring, and rebirth under the control of ESL, a large hedge fund. Presents some of the key metrics that Eddie Lampert, head of ESL, had available to him as he made two decisions: first, in 2002, to amass a controlling stake in Kmart's defaulted debt during the restructuring; and second, in 2004, to launch a takeover of Sears. The first deal illustrates the decision-making process for a financial buyer, including the downside protection of Kmart's real estate holdings, whereas the second deal represents a traditional strategic acquisition. Illustrates the innovative use of real estate as a “hedge” for ESL in the event that the retail combination does not produce the required financial results. Also focuses on the role of investment bankers and the increasingly important position that hedge funds and LBO funds have carved out in the M&A market.

To outline the explosive growth in assets and influence of alternative investment managers, particularly LBO funds and hedge funds, and the transition of some larger hedge funds from shorter term trading strategies to longer term plays on distressed debt, restructurings, and turnarounds.

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

At three o'clock in the morning on September 10, 2001, Thierry Hautillac, a risk arbitrageur, learns of the final agreement between Pinault-Printemps-Redoute SA (“PPR”) and LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA (“LVMH”). After a contest for control of Gucci lasting over two years, PPR has emerged as the winner. PPR and LVMH have agreed for PPR to buy about half of LVMH's stock in Gucci for $94 per share, for Gucci to pay an extraordinary dividend of $7 per share, and for PPR to give a two and a half year put option with a strike price of $101.50 to the public shareholders in Gucci. The primary task for the student in this case is to recommend a course of action for Hautillac: should he sell his 2% holding of Gucci shares when the market opens, continue to hold his shares, or buy more shares? The student must estimate the risky arbitrage returns from each of these choices. As a basis for this decision, the student must value the terms of payment and consider what the Gucci stock price will do upon the market's open. The student must determine the intrinsic value of Gucci using a DCF model as well as information on peer firms and transactions. The student must consider potential synergies between Gucci and PPR and between Gucci and LVMH. The student must assess the likelihood of a higher bid, using analysis of price changes at earlier events in the contest for clues.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

In January 2012, Ellen Kullman, CEO and chairman of DuPont, must decide whether to retain or sell the company's Performance Coatings (DPC) division. This is an introductory case on valuing a leveraged buyout. The case focuses on a publicly listed corporation's decision to divest a large division and asks students to compare the division's value if it remains under DuPont's control or is sold to an outside party. The transaction size of approximately $4 billion is too large for potential strategic buyers in the industry, making private equity (PE) firms the most likely bidders. The case provides a base-case adjusted present value (APV) model of DPC as a stand-alone company and gives students specific assignments to adjust it to reflect the division's potential value under PE ownership (e.g., EBITDA growth, multiple arbitrage, and increased leverage).

The case is designed to illustrate and discuss the differences between a public company's valuation based on unlevered free cash flows and a PE sponsor's valuation based on residual (levered) cash flows.

This case has been successfully taught in a second-year elective course covering entrepreneurial finance and private equity and in an advanced undergraduate course on corporate finance. It is appropriate for use in classes on private equity, advanced corporate finance, or deal valuation.

The case presents a context of irrational pricing in a stock and demonstrates the possible role of investor heuristics operating in the financial markets. The case is ideal in a course on behavioral finance to teach topics like the limits to arbitrage or the influence of various heuristics in financial markets.

This case examines the exchange rate risk of a U.S.-based manufacturer of women's luxury shoes that has recently introduced its product in Japan. Students are asked to evaluate the extent of the firm's exposure to currency risk and whether hedging via forward contract or currency option is advisable.

In April 1992, this multinational consumer foods and beverages company is the focus of takeover rumors, which have prompted an assessment of the firm's returns. The student must choose among the principal methods of estimating the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) for GrandMet and its three main business segments, and must then produce WACC estimates in order to evaluate the firm's performance.

After the global financial crisis of 2008, Allied Irish Banks (AIB) was rescued by the Irish government. During 2013 and 2014, the tiny fraction of shares remaining with the public appeared to be vastly overvalued in the Irish stock market. The American Depository Receipts (ADRs) of AIB appeared to be overvalued even relative to the inflated Irish price. The case illustrates the possibility of pervasive mispricing in an illiquid market and the difficulty of valuing companies with large embedded option values.

Pricing of natural gas in India suffers from asymmetry because of the presence of limited suppliers having byzantine contracts. The oligopolistic market combined with price regulation results in welfare losses, and market failure. We argue that for the sake of long-term development of natural gas sector in fast developing economies like India, the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) seems to be the most suitable pricing policy. In the case analysis, we present a theoretical framework of calculating LRMC while acknowledging that the conditions necessary for a ‘first-best world’ rarely exist. We conclude that it is very much possible to gradually move from the existing ad-hoc pricing mechanism to a more robust LRMC regime that takes into account not just the production cost but also a scarcity premium as well as any externalities resulting from the natural-gas fuel cycle. The outcome based on our model compares very well with the one from the Rangarajan Committee's formula that got the government's nod recently for fixing of price of indigenously produced natural gas, to be effective from 01st April 2014.