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This chapter examines the effect of mutual monitoring and the personality trait of need for achievement on subordinates’ budgetary-slack creation in a team-based environment. Experimental results show that the creation of budgetary slack is lower when mutual monitoring is present than when it is absent. The results also show that a two-way interaction between mutual monitoring and the personality trait of need for achievement affects subordinates’ budgetary-slack creation.

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine the effect of accountability pressure as a monitoring control tool to mitigate subordinates' propensity to create budgetary slack. The results suggest that budgetary slack is (lowest) highest when accountability pressure is (present) absent under a private information situation. The results further reveal that accountability pressure is positively associated with subordinates' perceived levels of honesty, which in turn is negatively associated with budgetary slack creation. The findings of this paper have important theoretical and practical implications for budgetary control systems design.

This paper examines the effectiveness of the reliance on a leader’s reputation as an informal control tool to mitigate subordinates’ budgetary slack. In addition, it seeks to explain whether this relationship is mediated by subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing their private information.

A laboratory experiment was conducted involving 60 undergraduate business students who participated in the experiment. A 1 × 2 between-subjects design was employed for the experimental study. Each subject assumed the role of a production manager responsible for setting a budget target. The experimental task employed involved a simple decoding task adapted from Chow (1983).

The results of this study indicate that budgetary slack is lower when a leader’s reputation is favourable than when it is unfavourable. In addition, it is found that subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing private information fully mediates the relationship between a leader’s reputation and budgetary slack.

This paper extends the limited literature on the reliance of informal controls in mitigating budgetary slack by examining a leader’s reputation as an informal control. The findings of this study provide important implications for the design of effective management control systems.

This chapter examines the effects of the value attainment and cognitive roles of budgetary participation on job performance. A structural model consisting of variables such as budgetary participation, job-relevant information, job satisfaction, and job performance is proposed and tested using a survey questionnaire on 70 senior managers, drawn from a cross-section of the financial services sector. Their responses are analyzed using a structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. The results reveal that budgetary participation is positively associated with job-relevant information. These results lend support to the cognitive effect of budgetary participation, which suggests that subordinates participate in the budget setting process to share information. In addition, the results suggest that budgetary participation is positively associated with job satisfaction. These results support the value attainment role of budgetary participation, which increases subordinates’ levels of job satisfaction. Furthermore, the results reveal that there are positive relationships between job-relevant information and job satisfaction, job-relevant information and job performance, and job satisfaction and job performance.

This chapter addresses the criticisms that escalation of commitment research has focused only on individual (as opposed to team or group) decision-making. It has been suggested that research findings of individual-based decision on managers’ escalation behaviors may not be applicable in today’s business environment which is increasingly dominated by team or group-based decision. Specifically, this chapter examines the effects of information availability (public vs. private information) and type of responsibility (sole and joint responsibility) on managers’ project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test the hypotheses developed for this study. The results indicate that, consistent with prior research, project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project under private information than public information conditions. In addition, in the private information condition, project managers with joint responsibility for an investment project expressed a greater tendency to continue a failing project than those with sole responsibility. Implications of our results for the design of management control systems are discussed.

This study examines the effect of employees' perceptions of political connections on performance measurement systems (PMS) design choice and firm performance. In addition, this study explores the moderating effect of social networking, a very common and widely used factor by domestic and foreign multinational firms operating in China, and its joint effect with political connections or PMS design choice on firm performance. We collected survey responses from a sample of 110 managers from manufacturing firms in China. Our results reveal that highly politically connected managers use nonfinancial measures, leading to improved firm performance. Our results suggest that social networking interacts significantly with political connections, and nonfinancial and financial measures on firm performance. The theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.

This chapter examines the effect an informal control namely trust-in-superior and subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing their private information on budgetary slack. A laboratory experiment was conducted. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression were used to test the hypotheses proposed in this chapter. The independent variables were trust-in-superior and subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing their private information. The dependent variable was budgetary slack. The results indicate that trust-in-superior reduces the budgetary slack created by subordinates under private information condition. In addition, the results show that subordinates’ truthfulness in revealing their private information mediates the effect of trust-in-superior on budgetary slack.

This paper ranks university faculties, accounting doctoral programs, individual behavioral accounting researchers, and the most influential articles based on Google Scholar citations to publications in Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research (AABR). All articles published in AABR in its first 15 volumes are included and four citation metrics are used. The paper identifies the articles, authors, faculties, and doctoral programs that made the greatest contribution to the development of AABR. Such an analysis provides a useful basis for understanding the direction the journal has taken and how it has contributed to the literature (Meyer & Rigsby, 2001). The h-index and m-index for AABR indicates it compares favorably among its peers. Potential doctoral students with an interest in behavioral accounting research, “new” accounting faculty with an interest in behavioral accounting research, current behavioral accounting research faculty, department chairs, deans, and other administrators will find these results informative.

This study aims to partially replicate and extend prior escalation of commitment (e.g., Harrell & Harrison, 1994; Harrison & Harrell, 1993). It extends prior studies by examining the impact of risk propensity on managers’ project evaluation decisions. In addition, the study examines the joint effects of private information, potential for personal gain, and risk propensity on managers’ project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment involving 146 subjects was conducted to test the various hypotheses developed for this study. The results are consistent with prior studies, suggesting that managers exhibit a greater tendency to continue unprofitable projects under conditions of private information and potential for personal gain. Furthermore, the results reveal that managers with high risk propensity exhibit a greater tendency to commit additional resources to unprofitable projects than those with low risk propensity. The results support the proposition that high risk propensity managers who experience conditions of private information and potential for personal gain exhibit a greater tendency to commit additional resources to unprofitable projects than low risk propensity managers who experience only one or neither of these conditions.

This paper replicates and extends Chenhall and Brownell (1988) by exploring the potential moderating effects of role ambiguity and role conflict, as two dimensions of role stress, on the budgetary participation and job satisfaction-performance linkages. The responses of 79 middle-level managers, drawn from a cross-section of manufacturing companies in Australia, to a questionnaire survey are analyzed by using a path analysis and moderated regression techniques. The results, in general, failed to support the intervening variable view model of Chenhall and Brownell. The results, however, showed that both role ambiguity and role conflict have an interactive effect on managerial performance but not on job satisfaction. This study, in general, partially supported the contingency model view as suggested by Chenhall and Brownell.