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Based on the tournament theory and the principal agent theory, this study aims to empirically investigate how top management team (TMT) vertical pay disparity (the pay disparity between the CEO and non-CEO executives) influences firm innovation performance.

This study empirically tested the hypotheses based on a sample of listed high-tech companies in China during the period between 2007 and 2018.

TMT vertical pay disparity promotes innovation performance; CEO power undermines the positive effect of TMT vertical pay disparity on innovation performance; the negative moderating effect of CEO power is mitigated by board age and gender and educational levels, whereas the proportion of female directors has no such effect at any significant level.

This study uniquely contributes to the theoretical and empirical development of tournament theory and the principal agent theory.

This study aims to re-examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on firm innovation. Studies on how EPU affects firm innovation have been inconclusive. The authors clarified the curvilinear relationship between EPU and firm innovation and examined the moderating effects of managerial pay gaps, specifically vertical pay disparity and horizontal pay dispersion.

This study’s analyses used data collected from Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2019.

The authors found an inverted U-shaped relationship between EPU and firm innovation. Furthermore, vertical pay disparity strengthens the curvilinear relationship, while horizontal pay dispersion weakens it.

First, politicians should avoid adjusting economic policies too frequently because the high EPU levels created by frequent adjustments can inhibit business innovation. Second, firms should be aware that EPU creates opportunities for leapfrogging. In particular, firms can incentivize executives to take advantage of the valuable growth opportunities presented by EPU by widening vertical pay disparities and avoiding excessive horizontal pay dispersion.

First, the authors analyze not only the positive effects of lower EPU on firm innovation but also the negative impacts of higher EPU to examine EPU’s “double-edged sword” effect on firm innovation. Second, the investigation of vertical pay disparity and horizontal pay dispersion as moderating variables sheds new light on the equivocal research findings regarding the EPU–firm innovation relationship and clarifies the boundary conditions of the double-edged sword effect of EPU on firm innovation.

This study examines the performance consequences of pay dispersion in publicly listed firms in Turkey for the period 2009–2013. Our study focuses on vertical pay dispersion, which reflects intra-firm and vertical differences between pay at two important hierarchical levels: top executive level and lower hierarchical level. The author intends to present arguments based on equity theory and tournament theory and will propose two contradictory hypotheses to test them within the context of an emerging market. Results provided in the present study confirm that pay dispersion between executives and employees has a positive impact on a firm’s profitability in Turkey. Our study contributes current empirical evidence by examining vertical pay dispersion in an emerging country context, which may have a different cultural orientation and societal-wide assumptions concerning fairness, power, and disparities, relative to its developed country counterparts.

Explained pay dispersion theory (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002) contends that the consequences of pay dispersion depend on two critical contingencies: (1) the presence of legitimate or normatively acceptable dispersion-creating practices, and the (2) identifiability of individual contributions. In this chapter, the first 20 years of empirical evidence and theoretical offshoots of this theory are reviewed. Other recent studies on the outcomes of horizontal and vertical pay dispersion are also evaluated. The review concludes with an evaluative summary of the literature and the identification of several potential fruitful areas for future research.

This study examines how the presence of labor unions affects a firm’s pay disparity between executives and employees and its financial statement comparability.

It uses firm-level labor union data in Korea and applies regression analyses to a sample of 1,776 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2008.

The authors find that unionized firms have a smaller pay disparity between executives and employees than non-unionized firms, suggesting that labor unions place pressure on the pay structure. Unionization also lowers financial statement comparability, which helps managers of unionized firms maintain information asymmetry. Further, this negative relationship between unionization and financial statement comparability is stronger in non-chaebol firms, implying that they are more motivated than chaebol firms to reduce their financial statement comparability in response to the presence of labor unions. In addition, the negative relationship between unionization and financial statement comparability is pronounced in profit-making firms, firms with less analyst following, firms with fewer foreign investors and firms in more competitive product markets.

The finding that firms adjust comparability in response to labor unions interests regulators and policymakers, who emphasize the role of comparability in providing usefulness to information users.

The findings add to the existing literature on the effect of labor unions on firms' pay structures and accounting choices.

While the effect of vertical pay dispersion on the voluntary turnover rate of vice presidents (VPs) has received attention, the existing research conclusions are still divided. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relationship between vertical pay dispersion and voluntary turnover rate of VPs in a Chinese context using data from listed firms.

Integrating tournament theory and social comparison theory, this study examines the non-linear effect of vertical pay dispersion on VPs’ voluntary turnover rates using empirical data from Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2016.

The results reveal a U-shaped relationship between vertical pay dispersion and the voluntary turnover rate of VPs. After further incorporating the moderating effect of the board governance structure, the effect is found to be enhanced in firms with more efficient board governance (i.e. smaller board size, higher board turnover and higher proportion of outside directors). Further analysis indicates that the aforementioned conclusions mainly exist in non-state-owned enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises.

The findings deepen the understanding of the costs and benefits associated with vertical pay dispersion, enrich the research findings on pay dispersion and contribute to the integration of previously inconsistent findings.

Participative budgeting can benefita firm by incorporating subordinates’ private information into financing and operating decisions. In the managerial accounting literature, studies of participative budgeting posit superiors that range from passively committed to highly active participants, some of whom are permitted to communicate, choose compensation schemes, negotiate with subordinates, and reject budgets. This paper synthesizes and analyzes experimental research in participative budgeting with a focus on the role of the superior defined in the research design, and on how that role affects budget outcomes, subordinate behavior, and in some cases superior behavior. We demonstrate how superior type influences economic and behavioral predictions, and likewise affects budgeting outcomes and the interpretation of the results. This paper is intended to further our understanding of how superior type affects behavior in participative budgeting studies, and to facilitate the choice of superior type in future research designs.

Organizational justice research has become the main paradigm of research in the field of HRM. The purpose of this paper is to outline a number of underlying challenges to which this paradigm is ill-suited. It broadens the traditional understanding of what is meant by fairness within the HRM literature to help explain how justice judgements are formed and may be used to influence societal-level fairness processes. It develops a framework to aid the understanding of the fairness of decisions that individuals or organizations make.

The paper presents a conceptual review of the main paradigms used in fairness research. It draws upon the organizational justice literature as the dominant paradigm in HRM research, and conducts a cross-disciplinary review that introduces a range of theories less frequently used by HRM researchers – specifically capability theory, game theory, tournament theory, equity sensitivity theory, theories of intergenerational equity, and burden sharing. It demonstrates the relevance of these theories to a number of areas of organizational effectiveness.

The paper shows that researchers are now augmenting the organizational justice research paradigm under two important pressures – awareness of hidden structures that preclude the option for real fairness; and new variables that are being added to the consideration of organizational justice.

HR functions have invested significant resources in employee engagement or insight units, but if their policies trigger significant inequality of outcomes, perceived problems of justice, a lack of burden sharing, no sense proportionality, organizations may not be able to achieve other important HR strategies such as sustaining and deepening employee engagement, developing organizational advocacy, building an employer brand, or being seen to have authenticity in its values. The framework suggests a broadened educational base for HR practitioners around fairness. It also suggests that there may be complex employees segments concerning perceptions of fairness.

The cross-disciplinary perspective taken on fairness helps deconstruct the judgements that employees likely make, enabling organizations and individuals alike to ask more critical questions about their respective behaviour.

This paper empirically investigates the impact of board diversity in terms of demographic and cognitive dimensions on financial distress likelihood in an emerging Chinese market to explore whether the Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs) power moderates the relationship between board diversity and the probability of financial distress.

To test the hypothesized relationships, demographic diversity through gender, age and nationality, and cognitive diversity through education, expertise and tenure, are taken as independent variables to investigate their impact on the probability of financial distress measured by the Altman China Z score. Data is collected for 13,740 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2018. This study employs panel data regression under fixed effect assumptions. Further, to control the possible endogeneity issue, this study uses a two-step System Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) model as a robust check.

The results reveal that board diversity is positively associated with financial distress Z score, suggesting that diverse boards are helpful in reducing the likelihood of financial distress. Moreover, CEO power positively moderates this relationship. It means that board diversity, in the presence of powerful CEOs, is more effective in reducing financial distress likelihood by controlling the wrong financial decisions taken by top executives to reap personal benefits. Further, the robustness model confirms the relationship between board diversity and the probability of financial distress.

To the best of researchers' knowledge, this is one of the earliest studies to investigate board diversity by constructing demographic and cognitive board diversity indexes as a determinant of financial distress likelihood in China. Further, researchers found no study in the literature using CEO power as a contextual variable on the relationship between board diversity and financial distress.

This paper seeks to explore the effect of performance duration (rather than intensity) on the subsequent initiation of strategic change by firms. Specifically, the effect of outperformance and underperformance duration on strategic change, as well as the moderating effect of environmental dynamism, is studied.

Using a fixed-effects model, analyzing a sample of 34,907 firm-year observations from 1980 to 2018 across 112 industries mostly supported proposed hypotheses.

Results revealed a U-shaped relationship between outperformance duration and strategic change and an inverted U-shaped relationship between underperformance duration and strategic change. The moderation role of environmental dynamism was only partially supported.

This study examines a new dimension of performance feedback, namely duration, rather than the widely used intensity of performance feedback, to enhance our understanding of the behavioral theory of the firm.